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Inspired by the regime approach, East Asia is identified as a distinctive welfare 
state regime featuring ‘the subordination of social policy to economic or industrial 
objects’ and consequently, the significance of private welfare. The public-private 
pension mix, as a critical criterion in the welfare regime approach, however, was not 
scrutinised. This study aims to explain the cross-national variations in the patterns of 
the public-private pension mix, and pension reforms, in Japan, Korea and Taiwan. 
After reviewing five perspectives, I elaborate an integrated political-economic 
explanation through synthesis of the developmental state thesis and the varieties of 
capitalism to analyse similarities and variations in public-private pension mix in East 
Asian welfare states. This integrated political-economic explanation assumes that, in 
order for economic catch-up, the East Asian governments had to be production-
oriented, acting as the institutional coordinator, but how they coordinate institutional 
coherence between social protection and capitalist production depends on their 
national capitalist structures. Through ‘comparative institutional analysis’ and 
‘comparative historical analysis’, this study demonstrates that shaped by national 
capitalist structure, political actors’ pension preferences are divergent and, 
consequently, the patterns of the public-private pension mix in East Asia. In Japan 
and Korea’s business-conglomerate-dominated capitalist structure, the state and 
employers tend to used pensions to resolve economic coordination of capital and skill 
formation in the post-war period. Since 1980s, Japan and Korea reformed the pension 
systems in line with the dualist strategy- the universalisation of public pensions and 
the introduction of DC corporate absorb the cost, and address problems, of the non-
regularisation of the labour markets; but core workers are maintained having generous 
corporate welfare and employment security. Both Japan and Korea, therefore, have 
‘basic’ and ‘earning-related’ public pensions, supplemented by a well-developed corporate pension system. By contrast, pension rarely considered as a resource in 
economic coordination and capital mobilisation, but initially as a policy instrument of 
social control, that enhances ethnic division between indigenous Taiwanese and 
mainland Chinese, in Taiwan’s SMEs-dominated capitalist structure. Through 
exploitation of ethnic division by the opposition party, the pension issue arose 
following democratisation. The institutional fragmentation, and its SMEs-dominated 
capitalist structure, however, forced the state to select a fragmented national pension 
scheme. Due to its SMEs-dominated capitalist structure, of which flexibility is 
treasured as the main comparative institutional advantage, corporate pensions are 
negligible in Taiwan. Thus, the statist pension system was created, and remains. This 
study concluded that the integrated political-economic explanation is a more 
appropriate for illuminating pension and social policy variations in East Asia, and 
remind us that social policy variation within East Asia should not be ignored. Content  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
“Typologizing, as anyone who can still remember the tedium of 
memorizing the Linnaean hierarchy in high school biology will agree, is the 
lowest form of intellectual endeavour: necessary perhaps, a precondition no 
doubt for loftier and more sophisticated pursuits, but the preserve 
nonetheless of the bean counter and bookkeeper.” 
(Baldwin, 1996, p. 29) 
 
1.1 East Asian Welfare State Regime?: A Critical Review 
Thanks to the East Asian economic miracle, a large number of East Asian studies 
have accumulated since the 1980s. At the beginning, endeavours focused on the story 
of economic development, and the issue of social policy was understandably less 
emphasised. Since the 1990s, however, more and more efforts have been devoted to 
East Asian welfare states, mainly because of Esping-Andersen’s (1990) seminal book 
on three worlds of welfare capitalism. From then on, the East Asian welfare state 
became an important topic of East Asian studies, and the regime theory inspired the 
following studies to debate whether or not there is a distinctive East Asian welfare 
state regime that differs from three worlds of welfare capitalism (Ku & Finer, 2007, 
pp. 121-122).  
‘Confucianism’ was initially proposed as the common factor in illuminating the 
significance of ‘family’ in East Asian social policy development (Jones, 1990). Then, 
‘conservative politics’ was argued to be the reason why East Asian welfare states 
shared similar conservative features in social policy (Aspalter, 2001). Recently, the 
focus has shifted to a political-economic explanation. Holliday (2000) put forward 
that the idea of ‘productivism’ should be integrated into Esping-Andersen’s three 
dimensions of welfare state typology (decommodification, stratification, and the 
relationship of the state-market-family) as the fourth criteria. Accordingly, East Asia 
should be categorised a ‘productivist welfare state regime’ featuring “the 
subordination of social policy to economic or industrial objects” (Holliday, 2000; 
Holliday & Wilding, 2003b). In this sense, resources are channelled into economic 
sectors, avoiding or limiting social policy, or others, that are expected to obstruct 
economic development. Holliday’s work is particularly important, the idea 
establishing linkage between social and economic policies.  
It is widely accepted that ‘productivism’ is rooted in the developmental state (Y. 
J. Lee & Ku, 2003, 2007). K.-L. Tang (2000) argues that in the ‘tiger economies’, the 
state played a critical role in industrialisation by purposely channelling financial 
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resources to economic sectors, penetrating the ideology, to civil society, of growth-
first. Thus, welfare was left to market and private actors (market and family). Y. J. 
Lee and Ku (2007) demonstrated this argument, showing that Korea and Taiwan 
could be grouped into the developmental welfare state regime, whereas Japan cannot 
fit perfectly into this model. 
Put simply, these studies, inspired by Esping-Andersen’s regime perspective, 
draw the ‘big picture’ of the worlds of welfare capitalism, rather than individual social 
policy areas. The focus is on the totality of welfare efforts, outcomes and endeavours, 
linking to the relationship of the state-market-family. The object of these studies is not 
to reject Esping-Andersen’s regime approach, but rather to add a fourth welfare state 
regime to his original three. To construct an East Asian welfare state regime, 
similarities in institutional arrangements of welfare provision are highlighted in these 
studies. To categorise East Asian welfare states, including Japan and the other four 
Asian ‘Tigers’ (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong-Kong and Singapore) into one distinctive 
welfare state regime, common elements shared by them all are explored. That is, 
variations across East Asian welfare states are not the focus of attention. 
It is prudent to be cautious about conclusions made by the East Asian welfare 
regime studies when we know the variations in pension policy, between East Asian 
welfare states, are conspicuous. Their theoretical underpinnings have three problems. 
First, these studies “operate at an abstract level, setting up an ideal type and then 
drawing selectively on data which support it or imposing it” (White & Goodman, 
1998, p. 16). Holliday (2000) and Jones (1990), for example, both assumed an ideal 
East Asian welfare model exists, and sought a common factor shared by the states, but 
lacked empirical materials. 
Next, East Asia is seen as a homogenous region. Seeing it as a unit of analysis 
helps minimise variations within the region, and then the construction of an East 
Asian welfare state regime. For example, Haggard and Kaufman (2008) compared the 
social policy development of East Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe, 
attributing the variations to the interaction of the developmental strategies, critical 
realignments, and financial capacities. When one East Asian country is compared to 
another, however, the differences will be salient. For example, although Korea and 
Taiwan have similar patterns of industrialisation, their developmental strategies are 
very different (T. J. Cheng, 1990; Cumings, 1984). Likewise, Izuhara (2013, p. 2) 
suggested East Asia to be a diverse region, in terms of factors such as country size, 
level of economic development, and colonial history, thus, social policies in East Asia 
tend to vary widely across societies. Pension policy is a good example of this.  
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Also, the term ‘regime’ denotes that the country is mature, and stable, such as 
countries in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
However, the East Asian developing countries (four tigers) are not mature or stable 
enough to be mapped out within an ideal framework, nor classified as an ideal model 
for comparison with other models of the Western welfare states (even Japan) (Esping-
Andersen, 1997). Gough (2004), and Holliday and Wilding (2003a) both contend that 
though East Asia could be described as a productivist welfare regime, sharing some 
particular features, East Asian welfare states are at the mercy of future shocks and 
challenges (such as financial crises, globalisation, democratisation, and the integration 
of women into the formal labour market) that will undermine “the essential basis of 
the tiger reliance on growth as the universal solvent” (Holliday & Wilding, 2003a, p. 
175).  
Ku and Finer (2007, p. 124) questioned: “why should we be trying to classify 
East Asian welfare in ‘model’ terms at all?” These regime studies help the difference 
between East Asia and other regimes (or regions) to be understood, but will lead to 
the social policy variances between East Asian welfare states being ignored. They 
concluded: “we should not confine our effort to looking for an East Asian welfare 
model, but should also be searching more thoroughly for a theoretical framework by 
which to understand its development” (p. 128). The focus of this study is, therefore, to 
understand the continuity and change of ‘pension policy’, and the cross-national 
variations in pension policy within East Asia (Japan, South Korea (hereafter Korea), 
and Taiwan). 
 
1.2 Pension Systems in East Asia: An Unsolved Puzzle 
Pension policy is a good starting point, not least because the pension system is 
the most important part of the welfare state, in terms of social expenditure. It also 
allows the nexus of the state and market to be examined. The public-private pension 
mix is the essential basis to understanding a particular welfare state regime, as 
Esping-Andersen (1990, p. 103) argued: “in any case, the logic of any welfare system 
can only become clear when we examine the interplay of public and private 
provision”. However, the public-private pension mix has not been scrutinised in East 
Asian welfare state studies, even non-state welfare provisions were emphasised as a 
crucial element of East Asian welfare states (Deyo, 1989; Holliday & Wilding, 2003a). 
Generally, Japan, Korea and Taiwan are categorised into the ‘Bismarckian 
pension model’, since their public pension systems were designed according to the 
principles of social insurance and fragmented along the lines of occupational 
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categories, or employment status (Bonoli & Shinkawa, 2005). In Taiwan, different 
public pension schemes exist for different types of public workers; the Labour 
Insurance is mainly for private workers; a non-contributory payments is received by 
peasants above 65 years of age; the rest of the population are covered by the National 
Pension Insurance. Similarly, in Korea there are different public pensions for different 
types of public workers, with the National Pension Insurance introduced in 1988 
(mainly for private employees, and the rest). In Japan, the Mutual Pension Schemes 
were launched for public workers, the Employees’ Pension Insurance is for private 
employees, and the National Pension Insurance is for peasants and the rest. This 
perspective neglects two crucial facts, however. In contrast to European conservative 
welfare states, whose pension systems are also often the social insurance pension 
model, the benefit level of public pensions is low in East Asia and the states are 
reluctant to be direct pension providers, only regulators (Holliday & Wilding, 2003a; 
White & Goodman, 1998). The relatively lower level of pension benefit left ample 
scope for complementary private pension and family in East Asia (Deyo, 1989; 
Holliday & Wilding, 2003a; Pempel, 2002). The public-private pension mix is crucial 
to understanding the nature of East Asian welfare states, but has not drawn much 
attention.  
In East Asia, formal, private pensions (i.e. corporate pensions) or informal 
security schemes (family) are important in the early stage of welfare state formation 
(Gough, 2004; Jones, 1990; Pempel, 2002). A great variation in corporate pensions in 
East Asia is seen, however. In Taiwan, the state introduced the ‘Workplace Act’ to 
encourage employers to offer lump-sum retirement payments, based on volunteerism, 
which was formalised in 1984 by the Labour Standard Act. In 2004, the Labour 
Pension Act was introduced to replace the old defined-benefit (DB) corporate pension, 
with lump-sum payments. Corporate pensions never became a critical element of 
Taiwan’s pension system, and instead, public pensions dominate. This is because the 
state, as an employer, plays the part of pension provider for the employees in public 
enterprises through the Labour Insurance, and other social insurance programmes, for 
state officials and military serviceman. By contrast, Japan and Korea have relatively 
well-developed corporate pension schemes (Kimura, 1997; Phang, 2010; Shinkawa & 
Pempel, 1996; Yi, 2007). In Korea, the corporate pension (the Retirement Allowance) 
(1954) came before the National Pension Insurance (1988). Before the National 
Pension Insurance’s introduction, the Retirement Allowance was the primary 
retirement income protection for private employees. In 2005, the new corporate 
pension system was introduced to allow employers to provide their employees with 
either DB or DC (defined-contribution), or individual account pensions. Likewise, 
enterprise welfare has been acknowledged as a distinctive feature of the Japanese 
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welfare system, not only providing private pensions, but also other fringe benefits 
(Esping-Andersen, 1997; Estévez-Abe, 2008; P. H. Kim, 2010). In Japan, the 
corporate pension was introduced in the late 19th century in order to reduce labour 
market mobility. It expanded in the 1920s, as part of human resource management 
(Nishiguchi, 1994; Nishinarita, 2009). In the post-war period, Japan’s corporate 
pensions were significantly developed again- two main corporate pension schemes 
were introduced (the Tax-Qualified Pension Schemes and the Employees’ Pension 
Funds) (Estévez-Abe, 2008; Gordon, 1998). In 2001, two corporate pension acts were 
legislated, allowing employers to offer DB or DC pension to their employees. Japan 
and Korea, thus, have well-developed corporate pensions, whereas Taiwanese 
corporate pensions are underdeveloped.1 It is interesting to explore why these East 
Asian welfare states have different patterns of public-private pension mix, even they 
have shared features (these being Confucianism, productivism and conservative-
dominated politics). Existing studies have drawn insufficient attention to this issue.   
Further, conditioned by institutional legacies, the patterns of pension reforms in 
East Asia are divergent. In Japan, following World War II, its public pension system 
underwent a process of expansion and consolidation; yet, since the 1980s, a series of 
public pension reforms has been introduced to unify the flat-rate pension component 
of fragmented pension insurances- to reduce benefits, but conversely to increase the 
statutory retirement age. In 2001, two new corporate pension acts were legislated. In 
Korea, public pension for private employees was not established until 1988, when the 
National Pension Insurance was also introduced. With the introduction of the National 
Pension Insurance, the Korean government expanded the coverage to rural areas and 
the self-employed. However, various measures were introduced to cut benefit levels 
before the first retirement benefit was paid in 2008. Furthermore, the Korean 
government also launched an allowance scheme in 2007. Since the 1990s, expansion 
and retrenchment in Korea has occurred simultaneously, and overall, recent pension 
reforms in Japan and Korea could be summarised as: the universalisation of public 
pensions, and the retrenchment in benefits. 
1 However, because of a lack of data regarding private pensions (even in OECD’s social expenditure 
data, the relevant data is lacking) it is difficult to show the cross-national variations in the public-
private pension mix in terms of expenditure. For example, OECD’s data shows that Japan’s 
government expenditure on pensions is wholly categorised as ‘public’, and nothing goes to private. It 
can probably be ascribed to the definition of a private pension. According to Katsumata’s estimate 
(2004), however, private pensions shared more than 12% of total pension expenditure, almost equal to 
1% of GDP. This is in contrast to private pensions in Korea which shared almost half of pension 
expenditure. In Taiwan (not an OECD country), social expenditure data does not count the part 
attributable, to private pensions. Comparable data on private pensions in East Asia is lacking- the data 
mentioned here can be found on the OECD website.  
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In Taiwan, although the major public pension– the Labour Insurance– was 
introduced in the early 1950s, there was no significant expansion in the public pension 
system until the 1990s. Since then, a conspicuous expansion of public pension  has 
occurred, with varieties of allowance schemes initiated. Two important public pension 
reforms were the introduction of the National Pension Insurance, and the annuitisation 
of the old-age benefit in the Labour Insurance. Simply, pension retrenchment does not 
occur in Taiwan. 
The public-private pension mix, and the patterns of pension reforms are both 
critical issues in contemporary comparative pension studies. In East Asia, both of 
them received scant attention- East Asian welfare state studies, generally, aim to 
account for why public welfare was underdeveloped, rather than to study the diversity 
of public-private welfare mix (Deyo, 1992; Holliday, 2000; Y. J. Lee & Ku, 2007; 
Pempel, 2002). More specifically, though a large number of East Asian pension 
studies were produced over the past two decades, two problems exist. First, the 
majority of them are single case studies, attempting to explain the development of 
pension system in each country through emphasise of either politics, or socio-
economic changes, such as, for Korea, J-.J. Yang and Klassen (2010), Klassen and 
Yang (2014), Joo (2010) and others; for Japan, Shinkawa (2005b), Yoshida, Guo, and 
Cheng (2006); and for Taiwan, Shi and Yeh (2011), Shi (2010) and W.-H. Tang and 
Yeh (2006). Then, corporate pensions were under-scrutinised, except for some studies 
(C.-L. Chen, 2010; Nishinarita, 2009; Phang, 2010; Shinkawa, 2005a, 2005b). 
Evidencing that a comparative theoretical framework, to understand and explain the 
variations in public-private pension mix, and pension politics in East Asian welfare 
states, is lacking.  
Explaining the cross-national variations in the pattern of public-private pension 
mix, and patterns of pension reforms, in East Asia is something to focus on; these 
cross-national variations within East Asia are the point of departure of this study and 
in order to explain the cross-national variations in pension policy within East Asia, I 
will elaborate an integrated political economy approach to explain these research 
questions.  
 
1.3 Brief Argument and the Organisation of the Thesis 
In this study, to analyse similarities and variations in public-private pension mix 
in East Asian welfare states, I elaborate an integrated political-economic explanation 
through synthesis of the developmental state thesis, and the varieties of capitalism. 
This integrated political-economic explanation assumes that, in order for economic 
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catch-up, the East Asian governments had to be production-oriented, acting as the 
institutional coordinator, and how they coordinate institutional coherence between 
social protection and capitalist production depends on their national capitalist 
structure. Shaped by national capitalist structures, Japan and Korea tended to mobilise 
capital to assist business-conglomerates through policy loans, while Taiwan facilitated 
export-oriented small and medium Enterprises (SMEs) through fiscal incentive 
schemes, such as tax exemptions. Also, national capitalist structure shaped political 
actors’ social policy preferences, and how they interacted and collaborated. In Japan 
and Korea, employers tended to see corporate pensions as a resource for resolving 
economic coordination problems; employers in Taiwan, however, were inclined to 
reduce labour costs as much as possible. The state could either dominantly coordinate, 
such as in Taiwan where employers and labour were politically incorporated into the 
KMT’s party-state ruling regime; or collaborate with the capitalists- as in Japan and 
Korea, where business-conglomerates are enhanced through the state’s assistance, 
becoming symbiotic partners of the state. A statist, but fragmented, pension system 
was forged in Taiwan, with negligible corporate pensions; conversely, Japan and 
Korea both developed a hybrid pension system, containing well-developed corporate 
pensions. While public pensions provide a relatively low benefit level, the corporate 
pensions are relied upon to resolve economic coordination problems.  
To systematically illuminate this theoretical argument, the structure of this thesis 
is organised as follows. In chapter 2, five perspectives of welfare state development 
are reviewed: (1) the logic of industrialism; (2) the power resource theory; (3) the 
democratisation thesis; (4) the developmental state thesis; and (5) the varieties of 
capitalism approach. The first two theories are critical in explaining cross-national 
variations in western welfare state development. The democratisation thesis is vital to 
developing countries, shedding light on how democratisation not only influences the 
expansion of social spending, but also the design of social policy. Two political 
economic explanations – the developmental state thesis and the varieties of 
capitalism – endeavour to explain how social policy is inter-connected with capitalist 
development. The developmental state thesis argues that the East Asian social policy 
development should be analysed in the context of the developmental state; the 
varieties of capitalism emphasise institutional complementarity to explain cross-
national variations in social policy. To conclude, the synthesising of these two 
political economic explanations can refine our understanding of how East Asian 
welfare states are linked to their national structure of capitalist production. This is will 
be further expanded in chapter 3.  
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In chapter 3, three issues will be addressed, elaborating the theoretical 
framework. To begin with, neither seeing the state as an omnipotent actor (the 
developmental state thesis) nor the firm as the coordinator (the varieties of capitalism), 
the state will be analysed as the core coordinator in economic coordination. Firms in 
East Asian developing countries were too weak coordinate, as were their counterparts 
in advanced countries. The next issue is the state still needing to collaborate with 
firms to enhance their capacities to compete in the world market. The state 
intervention models consequently vary according to national capitalist structure. This 
diversity thus needs addressing. Following Walter and Zhang’s (2012a) theoretical 
criteria, three institutional spheres will be analysed and compared: (1) business system; 
(2) financial system; and (3) labour market regime. Finally, state-business relations 
will be discussed. The nature of cross-class coalition is the key to understanding 
welfare state development (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Mares, 2003; Mares & Carnes, 
2009; Swenson, 1991, 2002). In East Asia, the state-business developmental alliance 
was dominant in coordinating a productive-oriented environment (Hundt, 2009; 
Johnson, 1987). This does not imply labour is completely excluded and irrelevant, but 
either incorporated into the state-business developmental alliance (in Taiwan) or 
decentralised to enterprise unionism (in Japan and Korea). 
Case selection and research methods will be discussed in Chapter 4. Based on the 
most similar system method, three cases from Northeast Asia will be selected- Japan, 
Korea and Taiwan- to control systematic variables and focus on the diversity of 
capitalist production. Two methods will be adopted: ‘comparative institutional 
analysis’ and ‘comparative historical analysis’. The former helps to analyse 
institutional complementarities between the business system, the financial system, and 
the labour market regime (in chapter 5). The latter will use the process-tracing method 
to analyse how the national capitalist structure has shaped political actors’ preferences 
over pensions, and how they were designed to embed into the structure (chapters 6-8).  
Chapter 5 will use comparative institutional analysis to dissect the diversity of 
East Asian capitalism, and understand how the sub-institutions are inter-embedded. In 
Japan, the keiretsu-centred business system, complemented with the main bank 
financial system, aids large Japanese firms to develop long-term commitments in 
inter-firm relations and employment relations, in turn developing a firm-specific, skill 
formation system. In Korea, the state intentionally developed the chaebol-dominated 
business system, controlling banks to channel financial resources, such as policy loans, 
to assist the chaebols. The Korean state also repressed labour, encouraged enterprise 
unionism, and developed the company-based skill formation system. In Taiwan, 
export-oriented (SMEs) were encouraged through fiscal incentive schemes, such as 
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tax exemption, to develop export-oriented industrialisation, becoming the core of the 
national capitalist structure. This, despite domestic-oriented public enterprises and 
large private firms being developed to support the KMT’s import-substitution 
industrialisation in the 1950s. The SMEs-dominated capitalist structure relied on 
informal financial channels, and general skills, creating a flexible cooperative 
production network that enhanced its comparative institutional advantage- flexibility. 
The comparison of national capitalist structure lays the foundation for three case 
studies to analyse how it shapes political actors’ preferences, and the nature of cross-
class coalition.  
Chapter 6 will show that public and private pensions tend to be used to resolve 
economic coordination of capital and skill formation in Japan, shaped by the keiretsu-
centred capitalist structure. Although financial liberalisation and the non-
regularisation of the labour market forced Japanese firms to put more emphasis on 
short-term profits, it did not change the institutional logic of the public-private 
pension mix in Japan. Japan adopted a dualist strategy to retain its core workers, who 
can enjoy generous corporate pensions; by contrast, it can externalise the cost of 
economic liberalisation to the state, through non-regularisation of the labour market.  
Chapter 7 will discuss Korea, where the privatisation of public enterprises led the 
state to encourage corporate pensions, in turn, externalising pension costs to the 
chaebols. Initially employers were resistant to launching corporate pensions for their 
employees. From the 1970s, as the developmental strategy shifted to heavy and 
chemical industrialisation, employers started to favour enterprise welfare. Public 
pensions for private employees were lacking in the post-war period, although the state 
attempted to launch the National Welfare Pension Insurance for capital mobilisation 
in the early 1970s. The National Pension Insurance for private workers was 
implemented in 1988, thanks to democratisation. It then underwent a dual 
transformation: an expansion in coverage, and a retrenchment of benefit level, to 
address the deregulation of the labour market. In the face of economic liberalisation, 
and the Asian Financial Crisis, the chaebols adopted a strategy of maintaining a 
portion of core workers. This created a source of comparative institutional advantage, 
but the cost of economic liberalisation was externalised, through subcontracting 
networks, to non-regular workers and SMEs. Despite corporate pensions reforming in 
2005 due to economic difficulties, the dominance of DB pensions for core workers 
was maintained; further, DC pensions are introduced for non-regular workers of 




Chapter 8 examines Taiwan’s pension system, rarely considered as a resource in 
economic coordination, but initially as a policy instrument of social control, that 
enhances ethnic division between indigenous Taiwanese and mainland Chinese. This 
forged a political opportunity for the opposition party, and through exploitation of 
ethnic division, the pension issue arose following democratisation. The institutional 
fragmentation, and its SMEs-dominated capitalist structure, however, forced the state 
to select a fragmented national pension scheme. Due to its SMEs-dominated capitalist 
structure, of which flexibility is treasured as the main comparative institutional 
advantage, corporate pensions are negligible in Taiwan. Thus, employers prefer to 
reduce labour costs where possible, and the statist pension system was created, and 
remains.  
In chapter 9, a brief argument will be summarised. Shaped by national capitalist 
structure, political actors’ pension preferences are divergent in East Asia. In Japan and 
Korea’s business-conglomerate-dominated capitalist structure, employers tend to used 
pensions to resolve economic coordination of capital and skill formation. With 
unfixed preferences, they varied in developmental strategy. By contrast, employers 
tend to consider pension as financial burdens in Taiwan. Both Japan and Korea, 
therefore, have ‘basic’ and ‘earning-related’ pensions, supplemented by a well-
developed corporate pension system. In Taiwan, however, the statist pension system, 
constituted by public pensions and supplemented by negligible corporate pensions 
persists. It can thus be argued that the integrated political-economic explanation, 
synthesising the developmental state thesis and the varieties of capitalism perspective, 
is a more appropriate explanation can be established to illuminate pension and social 
policy variations in East Asia and other developing countries. Emphasising pension 
variations is not to reject the notion that East Asia be construed a distinctive welfare 
state regime, but rather to remind us that social policy variation within East Asia 




Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
The focus of this study is not to emphasise similarities in pension policy and 
politics of Japan, Korea and Taiwan, but to explain their variations. For this reason, 
East Asian regime studies, that place more emphasis on similarities, would not be the 
focus. Instead, five main explanations of welfare state development: (1) the logic of 
industrialism, (2) the power resource theory, (3) the democratisation thesis, (4) the 
developmental welfare state thesis, and (5) the varieties of capitalism approach will be 
studied. 
 
2.1 The Logic of Industrialism  
In the 1960s and 1970s, the logic of industrialism was developed to demonstrate 
how welfare state development was affected by the emergence of social needs, 
produced by universal developmental processes such as industrialisation, urbanisation 
and population ageing. In the process of industrialisation, labour is commodified to 
rely on wages but then made to face employment-related modern social risks, such as 
retirement, unemployment, work-injury, and health. In this transition, the change in 
demographic structure (the ageing population and declining fertility rate) intensified 
the demand for public social provisions, but simultaneously eroded the traditional 
welfare provider– family (Wilensky, 1975, 2002). In the process of industrialisation, 
the state is therefore considered to play a critical role in welfare provision, to deal 
with social risks and the social demand facing citizens. Wilensky (1975, p. xiii) wrote: 
“economic growth and its demographic and bureaucratic outcomes are the root cause 
of the general emergence of the welfare state.” 
Wilensky (1975) found that the increase in social security effort (social spending/ 
GNP) is the result of economic development (GNP per capital) and which is mediated 
by the number of the elderly and the age of social security; but political influence is 
negligible (p. 24). As time goes on, more of the beneficiaries either reach retirement 
age, or experience disabilities or other risks, and the resources to devote to these 
social security programmes must be increased. Then, due to the increase in the 
fraction of elderly social security efforts would significantly increase– an ageing 
population increases the demand on social care and economic security of them. 
Furthermore, older people constitute a population in need, and a political force for 
further social security development. The elderly form a ‘grey power’ in democratic 
politics, prompting the government to initiate social security programmes (Wilensky, 
1975, 2002).  
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With this argument, the logic of industrialism points to a general convergence in 
the institutional structure of social security programmes in rich countries, irrespective 
their political and economic systems, or dominant ideologies (Overbye, 1994; 
Wilensky, 2002, p. 212). It expects that the pension system in rich countries would 
converge towards the dual systems of income maintenance in the long run. The 
countries that institutionalised earning-related pension schemes, such as Germany and 
Austria, tend to adopt a universal flat-rate, tax-financed minimum pension, in order to 
secure a minimum standard for the aged; the inverse is true for Britain and Sweden. 
Overbye (1994) argues that industrialisation weakened ‘traditional insurance 
institutions’ (family, the guild, the church) to meet the need of the inhabitants; it also 
led to increasing longevity, however, exposing an increasing percentage of the 
population to the risk of reaching an age at which the ability to work begins to fall, 
fuelling the demand for an old-age pension. As a catalyst, democratic politics forces 
politicians to respond to social demands in order to ensure electoral supports. The 
working population needs contributory, earning-related pension schemes to preserve 
their living standards, while the marginal groups need minimum pension schemes for 
provision of a basic pension. The result is that the pension system of rich countries 
will converge into the dual pension system (Overbye, 1994, pp. 156-157).  
In short, the logic of industrialism predicts that the government will 
‘functionally’ initiate social policy to deal with social risks. Therefore, it asserts that a 
general convergence in aggregate welfare effort, and the institutional structure of 
social security programmes due to the convergence of social structure, exists. Two 
problems in explaining East Asian pension developments are evident however. It 
cannot explain why the first pension scheme for private employees was different in 
Taiwan and Korea. Korea introduced a corporate pension scheme in 1954, while 
Taiwan introduced the Labour Insurance (public pension) in 1958. Also, the logic of 
industrialism emphasises public welfare, thus it would be insufficient for explaining 
the public-private pension mix in East Asia. Unlike Japan and Korea, Taiwan does not 
have well-developed corporate pensions. 
 
2.2 The Power Resource Theory 
The power resource theory sees the class division between the capitalist and the 
working class as the determinant of welfare state development (Korpi, 1983; Stephens, 
1979). In contemporary capitalism the working classes tend to increase their political 
influence through democratic means, in turn improving working conditions and their 
social and economic status. The stronger the labour’s political influence, the higher 
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social spending.  
In the transition from pre-industrial society to industrially capitalist society, two 
conflicting classes were produced: the working class and the capitalist. In the market 
sphere, capital and economic resources are the foundation of power. Thus, the 
capitalist, owning ownership and the means of production, could exploit the 
proletariat (the working class who is considered as the subordinate class in the 
capitalist system) (Korpi, 1983). Simultaneously, capitalist development furthered the 
centralisation of ownership and means of production, and in turn, created material 
conditions for the working class to form class consciousness, and promote labour 
organisation (Stephens, 1979, pp. 8-9). The working class has political rights to vote 
and to organise for collective action. Though relatively weak, in terms of their market 
resources, a numerical advantage in political resources allows them to affect the 
conditions for, and outcomes of, distributive market conflicts (Korpi, 1983). The 
working class and the capitalist have different power resources that can be mobilised, 
used in politics, and on markets (ibid, p.312).  
The power resource theory assumes that wage earners have interests to modify 
market processes, and to extend social citizenship in the democratic political process, 
striving for the introduction of social policies, or the commitment of full employment, 
to improve their living standards. Their interests, however, must be articulated by 
political parties, in particular, the socialist parties, for example, the social democratic 
party in Scandinavian countries (Esping-Andersen, 1985, p. 3). Social democratic 
parties need electoral support from the working class to win the elections and control 
the government. Democratic socialists, once in control of the government, can launch 
a series of welfare and economic policies to improve the living standards of the 
working class, to establish the conditions of social democratic class formation (ibid, 
pp. 30-36). The working class and social democratic party, as such, form a symbiotic 
relationship. 
Generally, social democratic class formation involves three basic conditions. 
Decommodification via ‘universalistic welfare policy’ is crucial. Under the constraints 
of market power, class solidarity would be weakened if workers are atomised and 
commodified (Esping-Andersen, 1985, pp. 32-35). Thus, a universalistic welfare 
policy can stimulate class solidarity to diminish the effect of stigma of poor relief 
schemes. Social democratic class formation needs the centralised coordination of 
trade unionism, as it helps resolve the logic of collective action. The bargaining 
advantages thus could be socialised to the entire working class (p. 33). Forging cross-
class coalitions is a chief consideration of the social democratic party. The solidaristic 
universe must address the ‘people’, instead of the ‘class’, in order to manufacture its 
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own political bases (p. 32). Thus, universalistic social policies would be a “natural 
consequence of social democratic mobilisation” (p. 34). Social citizenship can be seen 
as an outcomes of the political coalition between the working class mobilisation, and 
socialist parties. It is therefore assumed that the higher the power of the working class 
and the left parties, the better the public pension scheme, in terms of coverage, 
generosity and other factors.  
It is worth mentioning two important studies on pension development in western 
welfare states. Myles (1989) adopted a cross-sectional method to demonstrate that 
three independent variables of working-class power (being measures of mobilisation, 
union centralisation and the measure of labour control over government), have 
influence over the quality of old-age benefits in the capitalist democracies. The 
mobilisation of electoral support is important for working-class parties to win 
elections, and sustain political control for extended periods of time (pp. 86-88). Since 
cohesive labour movements are the precondition for this mobilisation. Simply, the 
degree of labour solidarity determines the quality of pension benefits. 
To analyse whether pension rights and expenditure in 18 OEC countries from 
1930-1985 were conditioned by labour power, Palme (1990) adopted time-series, and 
cross-sectional methods. In the cross-sectional comparison of 1930 and 1980, he 
found labour power to positively impact on pension rights, but age-vote and 
industrialism have weak associations. In the time-series analysis, however, 
industrialism and working-class power mobilisation both have a positive association 
with pension rights. It suggests that the logic of industrialism has had more to do with 
the timing of the expansion of old-age pension entitlement, than the cross-national 
differences in its levels. If the dependent variable is replaced by pension expenditure, 
it is determined automatically by the number of recipients and its generosity rather 
than the working-class mobilisation and economic development.  
In their studies, labour power was evidenced as a critical variable in explaining 
the variations of pension quality. It may, however, be insufficient for explaining East 
Asian cases. In the power resource theory, ‘class struggle’ is central in the analysis of 
social policy development, but not all social policy initiatives are the result of class 
struggle between the capitalist and the working class. In countries where the working 
class are too weak to be an important political actor in social reforms, this is 
particularly evident. Taiwanese pension reform since the 1990s, for example, was 
centred, not on class struggle, but ethnic division, resulting from Taiwan’s specific 
historical legacies. Labour power hadn’t influenced the pension policy making.  
Next, the power resource theory assumes that the distribution of power resources 
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is crucial in explaining the difference in social institutions. Thus, the state is neutral in 
relation to these different groups, and is conceived of as a set of institutional 
structures that have emerged in the struggles between classes, and interest groups in a 
society (Korpi, 1983). Recent East Asian studies have demonstrated, however, that the 
state is neither a neutral actor, nor are institutional structures (Johnson, 1982; Wade, 
2004). In order for economic catch-up, the state ‘actively’ channelled resources to 
strategic industries. That is, the state in East Asia was an active actor in the economic, 
and social policy, development. This argument will be more clearly stated later.  
The power resource theory assumes that employers’ social policy preferences are 
antagonistic. Esping-Andersen (1990) argues that social policy aims to “emancipate 
workers from market-dependence” and to “minimise the importance of market-
generated income” (p. 26), and, thus, “decommodification strengthens the workers 
and weakens the absolute authority of the employer. It is for exactly this reason that 
employers have always opposed decommodification” (p. 22). However, employers’ 
opposition to the welfare state is often assumed, rather than documented. The varieties 
of capitalism school, recently, have systematically studied employers’ social policy 
preferences, and political strategies, which are conditioned by institutional contexts 
rather than assumed (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Mares, 2003; Swenson, 2002). This will 
be discussed later in the paper.  
Finally, in the power resource theory, labour is assumed as a homogenous actor, 
with unified preferences, in favour of social policy expansion. However, the 
composition of labour is heterogeneous. Different occupation groups have different 
risk and income profiles, thus different social policy preferences. This is particularly 
true in East Asia, where, in Japan and Korea, enterprise unions consisted of core 
workers and were often in favour of protecting their generous corporate welfare rather 
than expanding public welfare provisions (Kume, 1998; J.-J. Yang, 2013).  
By and large, the core problem with the power resource theory illustrating the 
East Asian public-private pension mix is that labour power in East Asia is simply 
assumed to be weak, and linked to the underdevelopment of social policy. Why labour 
power is weak, and secondly, why different structure of labour power in East Asia 
cannot be explained. 
 
2.3 The Democratisation Thesis 
Democracy in advanced welfare states is not a critical variable, as, since the 
Second World War, most societies have remained continuously democratic. It is, 
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however, often used to explain the development of the developing welfare state 
(Haggard, 2005; Haggard & Kaufman, 2008; Wong, 2004). The democratisation 
thesis emphasises the importance of political competition on social policy 
development.  
The median voter perspective is a critical theory about the political economy of 
public expenditure used to illuminate how democratisation affect social policy 
development. It argues: “Any voting rule that concentrates votes below the mean 
provides an incentive for redistribution of income financed by (net) taxes on income 
that are (relatively) high. Extensions of the franchise to include more voters below 
mean income increase votes for redistribution and, thus, increase this measure of the 
size of government” (Meltzer & Richard, 1981, p. 916). This perspective is premised 
on two theoretical prerequisites- one is that economic growth will lead to a less equal 
income distribution, that is, a right-skewed income distribution will be formed. This 
unequal income distribution will increase political support for redistributive policies. 
The other is that democratisation is a process whereby the franchise that leads to a 
broader inclusion of voters below the mean income is extended. Generally, voters 
with a higher than median income will vote for candidates that favour lower taxes, 
and less redistribution; voters with a below median income generally prefer higher 
taxes and more redistribution meanwhile. Consequently, it is expected that democratic 
politics tend to have a bigger government, and more redistribution. 
This perspective, however, cannot explain the difference across East Asian 
pension mix, particularly between Korea and Taiwan who exhibit a similar process, 
and timing of democratic transition. It also ignores the significance of other political 
actors in pension policy-making in East Asia. Wong’s (2004) research on health 
politics in Taiwan and Korea fulfil these insufficiencies. His perspective is distinct 
from the median voter perspective, at least, in three points. First, he sees 
democratisation as a dynamic process, rather than a concept of dichotomy. Second, he 
puts emphasis on political and societal actors, and political coalitions, in the policy 
making process, rather than the aggregate preference of the median voters. Third, as 
well as electoral competition, the idea of welfare is involved.  
Democratisation is a dynamic process. The transition from authoritarian regime 
to democratic polity is “a sequence of political (and policy) events” (Wong, 2004, p. 
14), and that four periods should be identified: (1) authoritarian breakdown; (2) 
democratic breakthrough; (3) democratic crafting; and (4) democratic consolidation. 
In the era of authoritarian regime, the ruling elites conceived welfare as being 
unproductive in Taiwan and Korea. As such, social policy was subordinated to 
economic policy, and directed from the top-down. The pattern of social policy reform 
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in the authoritarian period was ‘crisis and selective compensation’ (ibid). In this 
regard, social policy was typically not universal in scope, but focused on the 
privileged. The political coalition of this era was then formed between the 
conservative ruling elite, and the privileged. The democratic breakthrough of the 
1980s changed political institutions in Taiwan and Korea, where, in order to maintain 
political legitimacy, their ruling conservative governments had to universalise health 
policy as a strategic response to political competition. In the period of ‘democratic 
crafting’, the effects of democratisation on social policy reforms were advanced due 
to economic insecurity generated in the late 1990s, and earlier 2000s. In the initial 
stages, the changing in the rule of the game led to radicalised electoral competition 
and political mobilisation, and although this opened a ‘window of opportunity’ for 
social policy development, it was not fully realised (pp. 15-16). In this period, the 
previously marginalised actors realised it, learning how to use these opportunities for 
promotion of social policy expansion. Civil society groups soon learnt from past 
experiences that intergroup cooperation was instrumental in effective societal 
mobilisation (p. 145). In other words, policymaking became more pluralistic and 
contested, the previously conservative coalition gradually losing its influences.  
Democratisation also altered the idea of welfare. In democratic transition, the 
idea of welfare gradually changed from productive-first to idea, focusing on economic 
equality in Taiwan and Korea. In the period of democratic consolidation, economic 
growth was not prioritised: “new normative understandings of redistributive social 
welfare and democratic government created new expectations for economic growth 
with equity among political actors in both Taiwan and South Korea” (Wong, 2004, pp. 
16-17). That is, social policy is independent from economic policy, and redistribution 
becomes the main goal of social policy.  
Wong (2004) additionally noted, in the context of democratisation, the 
differences of strategic adaptations in Korea and Taiwan. Democratic transition in 
Taiwan was predominantly managed by the ruling KMT government, despite greater 
pressure coming from below; democratisation, meanwhile, came from an intense 
confrontation between the state and society in Korea. Furthermore, electoral 
competition was phased in gradually in Taiwan; while in Korea, elections were almost 
held immediately. Consequently, while the Roh regime in Korea had to introduce a 
quick-fix reform, the Taiwanese KMT was allowed to plan a more transformative 
health policy reform (Wong, 2004, p. 38).  
Wong’s argument offers a sophisticated theoretical framework that dissects social 
policy development in new democracies. However, it would be called into question, 
while his theoretical framework is applied to pension policy in East Asia. After 
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democratisation, different patterns of pension reform in Korea and Taiwan can be 
observed. In Korea, the National Pension Insurance was implemented shortly after 
democratisation, but since the 1990s its expansion and retrenchment occurred 
simultaneously. In Taiwan, however, the expansion of pension system has been clear 
across the last two decades. It should be investigated how the dual transformation in 
pension politics in Korea, and the different patterns of pension politics in Korea and 
Taiwan, can be explained. 
With the public-private welfare mix assuming that the worse-off prefer public 
welfare, with its highly redistributive effects on democratic politics, the 
democratisation thesis tends to shed light on public welfare (Aspalter, 2002; Wong, 
2004). Consequently, it cannot dissect the differences in public-private pension mix in 
East Asia, or explain the non-state pension reforms of these countries.  
Though democratisation changes political institutions, the policy preferences of 
political actors are not assumed. Instead, actor preferences are conditioned by the 
given national capitalist structure- for example, highly unionised core workers in 
Japan and Korea wanted to maintain the existing pension systems; in Taiwan, though, 
labour preferred a universalistic national pension insurance (Yeh & Chen, 2013). 
The democratisation thesis provides a prominent perspective from which to 
analyse East Asian welfare states, when, since the mid-1980s, a significant increase in 
social spending in Taiwan and Korea has been seen. East Asian pension development, 
however, is more complicated than it assumed. Differences in pension politics, 
pension mix, and pension governance cannot, through a historical, comparative study 
focusing on historical and national idiosyncrasies, be perfectly explained by the 
democratisation thesis. 
 
2.4 The Developmental State Thesis 
The developmental state thesis is the dominant perspective in explaining the 
‘underdevelopment’ of East Asian welfare states, and its idiosyncratic characteristics 
by linking it to its particular, state-led developmental pattern, known as ‘the 
developmental state’ (Y. J. Lee & Ku, 2003; K.-L. Tang, 2000). Johnson (1982) 
proposed the concept of the developmental state to describe Japan’s state-led 
developmental pattern. Owing to late development, Japan had to rely, according to 
Johnson, on state interventions to combat Western imperialism and ensure national 
survival. Elite state bureaucracy is required to determine the national goal, to 
coordinate the developmental strategy, and to channel the financial resource to 
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strategic industries, such as the Ministry of International Trade and Industry in Japan, 
the Economic Planning Boarding in Korea, and the Council for Economic Planning 
and Development in Taiwan (Amsden, 1989; Johnson, 1982; Wade, 2004; Woo-
Cumings, 1999). Motivated by these nation-building objectives, the state therefore 
had to manipulate national support for its economic goals, deflecting public pressure 
for social welfare development (Goodman & Peng, 1996, p. 211). That is, the state 
must be productivist-oriented, and in this sense, routinely concentrates resources on 
economic development and productive social policies- such as education and health- 
essentially for economic growth and political legitimation (Holliday, 2005, p. 148). 
Protective social policies, such as pensions, would be limited to a particular category 
of workers who were politically significant, such as state officials, military, and public 
school teachers. Social policy is subordinated to economic objectives, a feature 
distinctive to East Asia. Consequently, East Asia is labelled as ‘the developmental 
welfare state’ (Kwon, 2005b; Y. J. Lee & Ku, 2007).  
By linking the concept of the developmental state to social policy, Holliday 
(2000) posed a question: “is there a distinctive East Asian welfare state regime?” He 
contended that aside from three indicators– decommodification, stratification, and the 
relationship between the state, market and family– a fourth indicator should be added. 
This would be ‘the subordination of social policy to other policy objectives’. That is, 
social policy is designed to serve the overriding policy objects of economic growth in 
East Asia. Thus, Holliday labels East Asia as ‘Productivist Welfare Capitalism’, and 
characterised “with minimum social rights with extensions linked to productive 
activity, reinforcement of the position of productive elements in society, and state-
market-family relationship directed towards growth” (p. 708). The ideology of 
‘growth-first’ is central to East Asian welfare states. 
In order to explain the underdevelopment of East Asian welfare states, Tang 
(2000) links the developmental state to social policy, arguing that “under this survival 
orientation, social policies played a subsidiary role to the overarching economic 
objectives” (p. 81). Thus, in order to pursue political survival and economic 
development, the state needs to channel financial resources to strategic industries, 
repressing labour power in turn. That is, the presence of the developmental state in 
‘the tigers’ created social impediments of state welfare. 
The developmental state thesis helps to dissect the distinctive feature of East 
Asian welfare states, when compared with European welfare states, but encounters 
three challenges for analysis of pension variations in East Asia. As stated, the main 
aim of the developmental state thesis is model construction of the East Asian welfare 
states regime, rather than social policy variations within East Asia. This is because the 
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state-led developmental pattern, in the developmental state thesis, is considered as a 
uniform pattern in East Asia. However, the state’s interventions differed depending on 
the national business structure. For example, Taiwan tended to use tax-credit to 
benefit export-oriented SMEs, while Japan and Korea used policy loans to enable 
business conglomerates to compete in the world market (T. J. Cheng, 1990). These 
differences in economic strategies would, in turn, lead to different welfare state 
arrangements.  
Furthermore, by linking the state-led developmental pattern and social policy 
development, the developmental state thesis, as a regime approach, aims to look for 
similarities in social policy arrangements. However, despite the developmental state 
thesis arguing for the significance of private welfare in East Asia, due to the feature of 
productivism, it does not scrutinise private welfare. East Asia’s national variations in 
private pension, however, are significant. Japan and Korea have relatively well-
developed corporate pensions, but Taiwan does not. 
Finally, the developmental state thesis is too static to study recent welfare state 
transformations in East Asia, particularly, their variations. East Asian welfare states 
are unstable and immature- in Japan, the public pension system has been retrenched 
since the mid-1980s; in Taiwan, public pensions were significantly expanded; in 
Korea, however, a dual transformation in the public pension system, expansion in 
coverage, and the retrenchment of benefit level can be witnessed. Hudson and Kühner 
(2011) also demonstrated, by analysing protective-productive welfare arrangements, 
that East Asian welfare states are unstable. 
In short, the developmental state thesis demonstrates how critical the role played 
by the state in structuring capitalist production and social protection in the process of 
economic catch-up, for economic and political survival. The fundamental challenge 
facing the developmental state thesis is that East Asia is considered as a ‘unit of 
analysis’ in the identification of a distinctive East Asian welfare state regime. By 
linking the concept of the developmental state to social policy development, efforts 
were devoted to look for similarities in social policy arrangements in East Asia, and 
cross-national variations are therefore neglected of social policy variations. This is 
because that we simply assume that three East Asian national capitalist structures are 
identical. The varieties of capitalism allowing the difference in national capitalist 





2.5 The Varieties of Capitalism Perspective 
Institutional complementarity between social protection and capitalist production 
can explain the cross-national variations in welfare state arrangements, this being the 
theoretical assumption of the varieties of capitalism perspective (Ebbinghaus & 
Manow, 2001; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Schröder, 2013). The varieties of capitalism 
argues that in order to maintain comparative institutional advantages, the firm, as the 
core political-economic actor, will strategically choose particular institutions that are 
beneficially complemented to the existing institutions coherence. Thereby, different 
logics of economic coordination would be developed, in turn determining its national 
capitalist structure (Hall & Soskice, 2001). By analysing four institutional spheres: (1) 
skill formation system; (2) industrial-relations system; (3) system of inter-firms 
relations; and (4) financial systems, two logics of economic coordination can be 
recognised: market-coordination, or non-market coordination. These institutional 
areas are institutionally complementary. According to different logics of economic 
coordination, two models of production regime can be distinguished: the Liberal 
Market Economies (LMEs) and the Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs). 
In LMEs, governments prefer a more hands-off approach in economic 
coordination, to ensure the processes, associated with business operations, are more 
likely to be subject to individual negotiations between the immediate parties. In such 
environments, therefore, corporate culture, rather than cooperation, is more cut-throat, 
and businesses tend to negotiate the best deal within relatively unregulated 
environments. Companies in LMEs tend to prefer a short-term credit system, which 
encourages short-term return, low-skill equilibrium, high labour market volatility, 
lower employer coordination and lower labour costs (Hall & Soskice, 2001, p. 7). 
CMEs tend to find a more cooperative way to bring labour and business interests 
together in order to negotiate beneficial production strategies. Such non-market 
coordination entails more extensive relational, or incomplete contracting, network 
monitoring based on the exchange of information. Consequently, the development of 
long-term economic coordination is more likely. For example, the financial system is 
structured on a long-term basis to support longer-term investment projects, and both 
the employer and employee have interests to invest in high-specific skills to increase 
productivity, underpinned by high quality product strategies. Thus, comparative 
institutional advantage is gained through the long-termist institutional arrangements, 
based on high-quality product strategies, and high-skill equilibrium within high-tech 
industries (ibid, p. 8). These two different models of capitalist production once set and 
firm. Other actors then have significant preferences, either to defend or preserve it in 
order to protect complementary institutions of value to them (ibid, p. 64).  
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The varieties of capitalism argues that the welfare state would be designed to be 
complemented to the production regime, according to different logics of economic 
coordination. It can be argued that LMEs would be complemented, therefore, with a 
liberal welfare state. CMEs, meanwhile, would be inter-embedded with either a 
conservative, or a social democratic welfare state (Huber & Stephens, 2001; Iversen 
& Stephens, 2008; Schröder, 2013). In LMEs, comparative institutional advantage 
rests on the basis of effective market mechanism, and the advantages of lower labour 
costs and liberal regulations, to compete in the international market. It exerts 
downward pressure on social welfare, so the welfare models in LMEs tend to be 
targeting, means testing, and low replacement rates, which underpin flexible, relative 
low-cost labour markets. By contrast, social protection in CMEs underpins the basis 
of long-term relationship between actors, for example, wage restraints can be a policy 
instrument for the exchange of more job opportunities, created by employers. In this 
sense, welfare models in CMEs are constructed more cooperatively. This is due to 
employers and employees tending to have common interests in social protection being 
designed to deal with the problem of economic coordination. The formation of social 
protection rests on the basis of cross-class coalition.  
The varieties of capitalism perspective has two critical contributions. First, 
employers’ social policy preferences are redefined, and second, the institutional 
design of the welfare state can be explained by national capitalist structure. The 
varieties of capitalism perspective sees the firm as the core actor in economic 
coordination, thus employers were not always antagonistic to social policy (as argued 
by the power resource theory), but determined by institutional settings (Hall & 
Soskice, 2001; Swenson, 2002). Swenson (1991, 2002) provides a sophisticated 
historical comparative analysis that demonstrates the role of the employer in the 
formation of the wage bargaining system, and the welfare state is more supportive 
than the power resource theory assumed. Swenson (2002) demonstrates that 
employers’ preferences about the formation of labour market and welfare state in the 
U.S., and Sweden, differ. In the late 19th century, the strategy of decentralisation was 
desired in order to regain managerial control for freer, and more profitable 
introduction of new technology, and as such, ‘segmentalism’ is central to the 
formation of the U.S. labour market and welfare state. This decentralisation forced 
employers, in order to achieve employee loyalty, reduce turnover costs, reward firm-
specific skill acquisition and secure flexibility and efficiencies in the labour process, 
to use high wages (including company welfare). Swedish employers, by contrast, 
preferred the more cooperative method of ‘solidarism’ to achieve economic 
coordination. In this institutional context, the capitalist class tended to collectively 
manage to keep wages below the market clearing levels, for the reason of maintaining 
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low prices, and creating more jobs. This approach only works, however, if others 
voluntarily abstain, or can be prevented, from following suit. Social policies, therefore, 
were designed to enable employers to manage the labour market on a solidaristic basis, 
that is, by individual employers, too eager to offer concessions, having pressure from 
below reduced. 
Also, Mares (2003) argues: “social policies can be regarded as institutional 
solutions to a ‘prior game’ between firms and employees over investment in skills” (p. 
24). Employers’ social policy preferences, however, such as the coverage and finance 
of social insurance, are varied, and determined by size, skill intensity and the risk 
profile of firm. A firm size determines its financial capacity to finance social 
protection- large firms have higher market power and greater capacity to bear 
additional labour costs, therefore prefer private social policies by which employers 
can own higher authority over administration. Meanwhile, smaller employers have 
greater interest in socialising the financial burden of social policies. Tax-financed 
social policies, are thereby preferred. The skill intensity of a firm determines its 
preference for the various social insurance types. Target benefits, such as occupational 
social insurance or private social policies, will be favoured by firms that rely on 
skilled workers, in order to play an institutional guarantee to encourage workers to 
invest in industry- and firm-skills. In the case of lower skill intensity, employers tend 
to prefer universalistic social policies, due to occupational social insurances, 
exhibiting narrow levels of coverage, being too costly and unattractive. The risk 
profile of a firm determines its preference of the coverage of social insurance. With 
their lesser effects of redistribution among occupations, Mares expects employers in 
low-risk industries to prefer occupational social policies, or contributory policies 
based on actuarial consideration. In contrast, high-risk producers will favour social 
policies featuring a high redistribution of risk, such as universalistic social policies. 
Mares demonstrated that large firms supported either private or contributory 
social insurances so that more authority over the administration of social insurances 
was retained. This is because those firms had more skilled workers, and so social 
policies, with earning-related benefits, could play a role in the management of human 
resources, such as through recruitment of new workers, in turn maintaining a long-
term relation with their workers (Mares, 2003, pp. 252-259). Social policies, in this 
respect, can be seen as a crucial policy instrument that complements the employment 
practices of firms. Small firms, however, showed more concern about the cost of 
social policies, preferring universalistic social policies, through which costs can be 
socialised. Further, it was demonstrated that the introduction of social policies was 
based on political support from cross-class alliances, comprising both trade unions 
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and representatives of business, and the political composition of strategic alliances 
shaped the institutional design of social policies (Mares, 2003, pp. 259-263).     
These two works demonstrate that social policy is not only for 
decommodification, but also a part of the national capitalist structure, helping to 
resolve the problems of economic coordination. Thus, “the historical development of 
the welfare state was not a class struggle between the working class movement and 
employers” (Iversen & Stephens, 2008, p. 606), but of cross-class coalition of 
employers and labour. The concept of ‘politics against markets’ of the power resource 
theory should be revised to the concept of ‘politics of markets’, to denote the fact that 
the welfare state functions to cope, not only with market vagaries, but also to facilitate 
the operation of the capitalist production (Ebbinghaus, 2006; Iversen, 2005).  
The varieties of capitalism also contribute, thanks to the concept of institutional 
complementarity, the ability to explain cross-national variations in welfare state 
arrangements, by dissection of the national capitalist structure. Institutions 
complementarity is defined as: “two institutions can be said to be complementary if 
the presence (or efficiency) of one increases the returns form (or efficiency of) the 
other” (Hall & Soskice, 2001, p. 17). That is, national market economies feature a 
particular ‘systemic logic’ of economic action, derived from distinctive institutional 
configurations (Jackson & Deeg, 2006). Therefore, once institutional 
complementarity was formed under a particular systemic logic, institutions will 
become an essential part of institutional totality, forming an increasing return 
mechanism that enhances, over time, the inter-linkages among institutional 
arrangement. Accordingly, the relationship between social protection and capitalist 
production is functionally interdependent (Ebbinghaus & Manow, 2001).  
Estévez-Abe et al. (2001) provided a good example of this through dissection of 
the relationship between skill formation, and social and employment protection. 
Initially, they argued that “employment and income protection can be seen as efforts 
to increase worker’s dependence on particular employers, as well as their exposure to 
labour market risks. Moreover, social protection often stems from the strength rather 
than the weakness of employers” (Estévez-Abe et al., 2001, p. 181). In LMEs, based 
on mass production, low-skills would be prevalent when this production work is 
broken into a narrow range of standardised tasks. The resultant relationship between 
the actors is short-termist, and the labour market is likely to be flexible. With general 
skills, the workers can be transferred between industries easier than those with high-
specific skills in the labour market. Social protection is, therefore, limited to firms, 
when a flexible labour market can be seen as a way of absorbing the risks of 
economic volatility. Consequently, social protection in LEMs is limited, while, in 
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CMEs, employers have a strong will to support the formation of social insurance 
schemes that help to develop firm- or industry-specific skills. This allows the 
adoption of a quality-based product market strategy (Estévez-Abe et al., 2001). 
It can be argued, then, that due to DB pensions with final-pay formulas being 
useful for economies relying on industrial- or company-specific skills, strong 
incentives for workers to invest in low-portability skill types exist. Further, their 
efforts to achieve high career-end salaries are sustainable. By contrast, in countries 
where general skill formation prevails, employers have insufficient incentives to 
extract the loyalty of employees with replaceable skills. A DC pension scheme, 
therefore, is often used, being effectively able to reduce the costs of corporate pension 
schemes by shifting the risk to employees (Dulebohn et al., 2009, p. 89).  
Institutional complementarity between the financial and pension systems can 
also be observed (Estévez-Abe, 2001; Jackson & Vitols, 2001). Jackson and Vitols 
(2001) contend that policy choice and institutional design affect the supply side of 
national savings, while the regulations of private pensions shape the manner in which 
financial capital can be channelled into capital markets. Pension funds are often used 
as one of the essential sources of working capital, for both the government and private 
companies (Estévez-Abe, 2001; Manow, 2001a; Vitols, 2001). In Japan, for example, 
public and private pension funds were redirected to strategic industries (Estévez-Abe, 
2001, 2008). A strong linkage exists between pension policy (financial system) and 
industrial development. Likewise, pension funds were re-channelled to heavy and 
chemical industries in the 1970s in Korea (D.-M. Shin, 2003; Woo, 2004).  
The varieties of capitalism perspective offers a sophisticated theoretical 
framework to explain cross-national variations in the public-private pension mix in 
East Asia, through dissection of the institutional linkage between the pension and 
capitalist structure. It, however, ignores the diversity of East Asian capitalism, 
preferring to view East Asia simply as the state-led capitalism (Amable, 2003). It can 
therefore be concluded that institutional arrangements of the East Asian welfare state 
are similar, like the developmental state thesis. However, recent studies have shown 
that the diversity of East Asian capitalisms is much more significant than first 
believed (Fields, 1995; Walter & Zhang, 2012b; Whitley, 1992; Witt & Redding, 
2013)– though this number is very few (Y. J. Choi, 2008, 2009, 2013; S.-Y. Lee, 
2011). This represents the focus of this study.  
More importantly, the varieties of capitalism perspective ignores the role of the 
state on institutional coordination. The state, in the varieties of capitalism perspective, 
is regarded as “a reflection of the existing mode of coordination” (Hancké et al., 
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2007). This feature of ‘statelessness’ is problematic when dissecting East Asian 
welfare states. In the newly industrialising countries, the firm cannot be at the main 
coordinator of economic coordination, due to their limited capacities in the initial 
stage of industrialisation. Consequently, the state must be the coordinator- for 
example, in the Asian tigers, the state, rather than the firm, coordinated the supply and 
demand of skill in order to facilitate economic growth in the early industrialisation 
period (Ashton et al., 1999). The significance of the state, in coordinating national 
capitalist structure, should not be neglected, even when the varieties of capitalism 
perspective is adopted to analyse institutional linkage of social protection and 
capitalist production. 
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
In this chapter, five explanations of welfare state development were reviewed. To 
start with, the logic of industrialism argues that the emergence of the welfare state is 
to address the social risks that originated from industrialisation. However, in East Asia, 
social policy was evident before industrialisation, and designed to facilitate 
industrialisation (Holliday, 2000). Then, the power resource theory argues that a 
labour-leftist political coalition could effectively play a proactive role in the 
construction of the welfare state. Thus, the less-developed East Asian welfare states 
could be ascribed to a weaker labour power. However, the power resource theory fails 
to offer a satisfactory explanation to elucidate why labour, in East Asia, is weak. Next, 
democratisation is a critical variable in explaining the expansion of social policy in 
East Asia, in particular across the last 20-30 years in Korea and Taiwan (Aspalter, 
2002; Wong, 2004). The theoretical challenges facing the democratisation thesis, 
however, are that it only focuses on public welfare, overestimating the influence of 
democratisation in welfare state development. For example, it is seen that enterprise-
level pensions are critical in the authoritarian Japan and Korea, but not in Taiwan. It is 
also interesting so look at why the expansion and retrenchment of social policy in 
Korea is seen over during the last 30 years, but not in Taiwan, despite democratisation 
being established simultaneously in Korea and Taiwan.  
The developmental state thesis is widely accepted to be the convincing 
perspective in explaining the development (or lack thereof) of the East Asian welfare 
state. It does this through emphasis of the active role of the state on creation of a 
friendly environment for industrialisation. In order for economic catch-up to occur, 
East Asian countries had to subordinate social policy to economic development, 
thereby repressing labour power and avoiding labour disputes, concentrating 
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resources on productive social policies such as education and health. The logic of 
social policy in East Asia is ‘commodification of labour’ rather than 
decommodification (C. Pierson, 2005). Social policies such as pension, and 
unemployment insurance, aiming for decommodification, were ignored or repressed 
in East Asia and thus, ‘productivism’ or ‘developmentalism’ is central to the East 
Asian welfare state regime.  
The developmental state thesis aims for model construction of the East Asian 
welfare regime through identification of its distinctive feature, rather than by 
illustrating cross-variations in social policy arrangements. Furthermore, although it 
endeavours to explain East Asian welfare state development by linking it to its 
particular state-led developmental pattern, it simply assumes that the state-led 
developmental pattern is identical in East Asia (Holliday, 2000; Y. J. Lee & Ku, 2003; 
Woo, 2004). Recent studies demonstrated that the diversity of capitalist production 
within East Asia is significant (Fields, 1995, 2012; Orrù et al., 1997; Walter & Zhang, 
2012b; Whitley, 1992, 1999; Witt & Redding, 2013). It would, therefore, be 
paradoxical for national capitalist structure to determine the nature and shape of 
national social policy regime, as argued by the developmental state thesis, if we 
expect there to be a homogenous East Asian welfare model, given the significance of 
diversity in East Asian capitalisms. Accordingly, attention should be paid to the 
diversity of East Asian capitalisms, on the assumption that social policy and economic 
structure are inter-embedded.  
The varieties of capitalism enables analysis of the ways in which capitalist 
production and social protection are inter-connected. By dissecting the diversity of 
national capitalist structures, cross-national variations in East Asian social policy 
arrangements can be explained. However, the varieties of capitalism overrates the 
capacity of the firm in economic coordination, when their focus is in advanced 
countries (Amable, 2003; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Hancké et al., 2007). In developing 
countries, the firms do not have sufficient capacity to resolve coordination and market 
failures, and compete in the world market without state intervention (Aoki et al., 
1996). Instead, the varieties of capitalism perspective tend to see the state as an 
institutional structure, providing a legal infrastructure for economic coordination that 
reflect the interests of business (Aoki et al., 1996; Hancké et al., 2007). The varieties 
of capitalism ignores the significance of the state in economic coordination (Hancké 
et al., 2007; Schmidt, 2009). 
Consequently, the synthesis of the developmental state thesis and the varieties of 
capitalism will help to elucidate the variations in pension policy and politics in East 
Asia. The synthesis develops the role of the state to modify the theoretical weaknesses 
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of the varieties of capitalism: the neglect of the role of the state; and the varieties of 
capitalism helps dissect the diversity of East Asian capitalisms. In this way, 
similarities and variations in pension policy and politics in East Asia can be 
simultaneously analysed. Cross-national variations in the public-private pension mix, 
and pension politics between Japan, Korea and Taiwan, may be explained by 
differences in the national capitalist structure. Several issues can then be investigated: 
the differences in the structure of capitalist production in East Asia; how the 
structures of capitalist production were structured; the importance of the state; how 
the institutional linkage between capitalist production and social protection may be 
dissected; and the co-evolution of social protection, and capitalist structure. By 





Chapter 3 – Towards an Integrated Political-
Economic Explanation 
In the previous chapter, five perspectives were reviewed, and were shown to be 
insufficient to explain pension variations in East Asia. Thus, an integrated political 
economic explanation, combining the developmental state thesis and the varieties of 
capitalism, is required for predictions to be drawn. It would be helpful to emphasise 
on similarities (the role of the state) and variations (the diversity of capitalist 
production) simultaneously. Synthesising these two perspectives, three issues must be 
discussed: the role of the state, the diversity of capitalist production, and state-
business relations.  
The role of the state is critical in the developing countries when the private 
economic agents have insufficient capacities for economic coordination (Amsden, 
1989; Wade, 2004). The role the state should play needs establishment. The market-
enhancing view will be adopted to view the role of the state as the institutional 
coordinator (Aoki et al., 1996). In this view, the role of the state is not to replace 
market mechanism, but to complement to the private sector, so that coordination and 
market failures are resolved (Aoki et al., 1996, pp. 8-9). In the first section, I will 
reinterpret the role of the state in East Asia, and show how the government, as 
institutional coordinator, coordinates institutions and redistribution of resources to 
achieve political stability, and create a social structure of capital accumulation.  
Then, the diversity of capitalist production will be discussed. Walter and Zhang’s 
(2012a) approach, to focus on the ‘business system’, the ‘financial system’, and the 
‘labour market regime’, will be adopted, and I will illustrate how these components 
are inter-connected. National capitalist structure are shown to shape political actors’ 
social preferences (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Swenson, 2002). As such, this comparison 
of East Asian capitalisms can lay the foundation for analysis of the differences, 
between East Asian welfare states, of political actors’ social policy. 
Attention will then be concentrated on state-business relations, the formation of 
national-specific political economies being mediated by a political process of cross-
coalition and political struggle (Thelen, 2004). Through study of state-business 
relations, how the pension system and the national capitalist production are political 
mediated may be understood. That is, institutional complementarities were the 
outcome of a strategic choice of actors, rather than the functional needs of systems 
(Hancké et al., 2007, pp. 16-23). Finally, the analytic framework will be elaborated 
and explained, in order to show how the developmental state thesis and varieties of 
capitalism are synthesised. Through this, prediction may be drawn.  
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3.1 State as Institutional Coordinator 
The essential need of less developed countries is to minimise the ‘external 
division between developed and developing countries’ rather than to eliminate 
internal ‘class, inequality and privilege’ (Rudra, 2008, pp. 82-83). Thus, it is widely 
accepted that a special institution is needed to coordinate this transition, to help the 
private economic agents to compete in the global market (Aoki et al., 1996; 
Gerschenkron, 1962). This is due to private economic agents in developing countries 
not having sufficient capacity to resolve coordination failure in the early stages of 
industrialisation. The developmental state thesis thereby argues that market 
mechanism has to be substituted for government interventions, to be the resolution of 
prevalent market failure (Amsden, 1989; Johnson, 1982; Wade, 2004). It should not 
be overrated, though, since in contemporary capitalism, economic activities are 
usually carried out by private economic agents- even if their capacities are limited. 
The state should not be an omnipotent, neutral substitute for the market (Aoki et al., 
1996, p. 34), but instead act to enhance market efficiency. In this sense, the state 
should be considered as an institutional coordinator, where its role is to collude with 
the capitalists in the creation, and coordination, of institutions to overcome market 
and coordination failure. It is not to substitute for the private economic agents or 
market mechanism, nor to be a legal infrastructure for market transaction (Aoki et al., 
1996, p. 9). 
The state has two roles in the process of industrialisation (or modernisation): to 
resolve coordination and market failures; and to maintain political legitimacy 
(Castells, 1992; Gough, 1979; Woo-Cumings, 1999). The primary task for all 
contemporary capitalist economies is to create an efficient capital structure, but unlike 
advanced societies, centralised coordination is needed for systematic economic 
development in developing countries (H.-J. Chang, 1999). In East Asia, the state acts, 
therefore, as the institutional coordinator in shaping a social structure of capital 
accumulation, conducive to a specific mode of institutional coordination (Aoki et al., 
1996). For example, the East Asian governments used industrial policy to mobilise 
resources to strategic industries that were selected by rational bureaucracies, 
according to the international political-economic environment, and division of labour 
(Castells, 1992; Cumings, 1984; Johnson, 1982). In Korea and Japan, the 
governments channelled financial resources to strategic industries through policy 
loans, setting up protectionist measures that prevented international competition from 
the world market (Amsden, 1989; Johnson, 1982). Ashton et al. (1999) demonstrated 
that to assist the strategic industries, the states centralised control over the education 
systems, coordinating with firms to develop their skill formation systems.  
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Particularly important to the East Asian developmental welfare states is political 
legitimacy, since it is the prerequisite to successful economic development (Johnson, 
1987; Woo-Cumings, 1999). Capitalist accumulation, and political legitimacy, are 
two facets of the same subject in the East Asian developmental state. Castells (1992, p. 
56) argues that “a state is developmental when it establishes its principle of legitimacy 
its ability to promote and sustain development, understanding by development the 
combination of steady high rates of economic growth and structural change in the 
productive system, both domestically and in its relationship to the international 
economy.” That is, the East Asian governments saw economic development as a 
source of political legitimacy, since they were reluctant to introduce universalistic 
social policy (P. H. Kim, 2009; K.-L. Tang, 2000). Instead, East Asian countries 
would utilise industrial policy to achieve full employment, then minimise income 
inequality (Estévez-Abe, 2008; K.-L. Tang, 2000). This characteristic signifies that 
East Asian governments are production-oriented (Castells, 1992; Holliday, 2000; K.-L. 
Tang, 2000). 
As a result, non-state social policy was preferred in East Asia, since the state was 
reluctant to bear financial burdens (P. H. Kim, 2010). East Asian governments 
introduced land reforms, for example, that addressed the rural-urban dualism to gain 
political support from small-holding farmers (Francks et al., 1999; P. H. Kim, 2009). 
Enterprise welfare was equally important– the Japanese and Korean governments 
encouraged, or prompted, private firms to introduce corporate, rather than public, 
pensions. In East Asian welfare states, it is important for two reasons. It helps to 
externalise the cost to enterprises and resolve problems of economic coordination 
(Estévez-Abe, 2008; Iversen, 2005; Mares, 2003). For instance, the state will 
encourage firms that rely on firm-specific skills to initiate corporate pension schemes 
that both facilitate long-term employment relations, and act as incentives for workers 
to invest in firm-specific skills, such as in Japan (Estévez-Abe, 2008; Manow, 2001b; 
Shinkawa & Pempel, 1996). Furthermore, corporate pensions are also one source of 
internal capital for Japanese keiretsu (Estévez-Abe, 2001, 2008; Manow, 2001b; 
Shinkawa, 2005a; Shinkawa & Pempel, 1996).  
In East Asia, as newly industrialising countries, the state must play a critical role 
in resolving the problems of capital accumulation and political legitimacy in order for 
economic catch-up. This is done by coordination of institutional complementarities 
between capitalist production and social protection. Aside from the developmental 
state thesis, the state takes on the role as strategic coordinator in order to design a 
pension system that is beneficial to capital accumulation, through being a provider or 
regulator. Considering this is only achieved through a series of attempts, rather than a 
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‘big bang reform’, the way that the state strategically coordinates the pension and 
capitalist production vary according to the structure of capitalist production, and this 
issue needs focus.  
 
3.2 The Diversity of Capitalist Production  
The aim of the developmental state thesis, as discussed, is regime construction 
through emphasis of the significance of the state. Cross-national variations within 
East Asia, thereby, are neglected. Strategic choices of institutional coordination, 
however, vary according to the structure of capitalist production and institutional 
legacies of social policy (Hancké et al., 2007). Thus, pension variations in East Asia 
can only be elucidated once the structure of capitalist production is synthesising into 
analysis.  
A critical task, when studying the diversity of capitalist production, is to identify 
which institutional spheres need analysis. Though the diversity of East Asian 
capitalist economies have been widely analysed (Boyer et al., 2012; Fields, 1995; 
Orrù, et al., 1997; Walter & Zhang, 2012b; Whitley, 1992, 1999), widely accepted 
theoretical criteria to identify key institutional spheres, that characterise political 
economies, are still lacking (Walter & Zhang, 2012a, p. 9).2 For two reasons, Walter 
and Zhang’s (2012a) theoretical criteria will be adopted for focusing on the ‘business 
system’, the ‘financial system’ and the ‘labour market’. First, their focus is East Asia, 
and their theoretical criteria have been adopted to analyse East Asian capitalisms 
(Witt & Redding, 2013). Secondly, these institutional spheres are relevant to pension 
policy.  
Although these institutional spheres will be separately discussed, they are 
interconnected (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Walter & Zhang, 2012a; Witt & Redding, 
2013). The business system is critical for structuring the logic of operation of 
capitalist production (Mares, 2003; Whitley, 1992, 1999). Its structure determines or 
(at least) shapes the interests and preferences of political-economic actors, moulding 
other key institutions, such as corporate governance and the financial system, in order 
to create and maintain comparative institutional advantages (Hall & Soskice, 2001). 
For example, the size of a firm determines the preferences of employers in skill 
formation (Mares, 2003). Here, I will focus on the business system, before focusing 
on the financial system and the labour market.  
 
2 A more detail discussion can be found in Witt and Redding (2013).  
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3.2.1  The Business System 
For the business system, firm size and inter-firm relations are two critical aspects 
for analysis of pension policy. This is because those factors directly determine 
employers’ social policy preferences and financial capacities (Mares, 2003; Swenson, 
2002), thus the modes of economic coordination (Whitley, 1992, 1999). The business 
system is defined as: “Differences in the scope and intensity of connections between 
firms are related to differences in the sorts of activities they coordinate and their 
competitive strategies…. The nature of firms as authoritative coordinators of 
economic activities, then, is interdependent with the ways in which they are organised 
as ‘industries’ and are embedded in reciprocal obligation networks which vary across 
institutional environments” (Whitley, 1992, p. 9). The business system not only 
represents a way of economic coordination, but also shapes other institutional spheres, 
such as the financial system and the labour market regime. By discerning the business 
system, we can understand how economic coordination is organised.  
To understand employers’ social policy preferences and their financing 
capacities, the size of the firm is important (Mares, 2003). Mares (2003) demonstrated 
that SMEs employers tend to prefer a tax-financed pension scheme in order to 
socialise the cost to the state, due to their limited financial capacity. Conversely, 
larger employers are incentivised to use corporate pensions as a policy tool of human 
resource management, for example, to encourage people to invest in firm, or industry-
specific skills (Busemeyer, 2009; Estévez-Abe et al., 2001; Mares, 2003) or 
encourage early retirement (Ebbinghaus, 2006). For them, the authority over human 
resource management is more important than financial consideration.  
The inter-firm relation is not directly relevant to pension policy, but signifies the 
mode of economic coordination. It shapes how the financial system and labour market 
are structured. “Inter-firm relations include alliance or network between firms from 
different industries and may foster long-term and reciprocal business partnerships and 
develop functional competencies” (Walter & Zhang, 2012a, p. 10). By dissecting 
these two aspects, it can be shown that business systems in East Asia are very 
different to each other.  
In post-war Japan, the dominant power in resource control and economic 
coordination is the large, industrially specialised corporations, or keiretsu. Unlike 
American firms, Japanese keiretsu do not include all the production and allied 
processes necessary to manufacture products into the managerial hierarchy. 
Instead they focus on a single industrial sector, and diversify within it (Whitley, 1992, 
p. 25). Thanks to its bank-based financial system, inter-firm relations in Japan are 
based on long-termism. In Korea, the large family-owned and controlled business 
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conglomerates, known as chaebol, dominated its capitalist structure. They were seen 
as a key institution that defined the Korean catching-up system “under the strongly 
directive and coordinating influence of the authoritarian state” (J. S. Shin & Chang, 
2003; Whitley, 1999, p. 141). However, inter-firm relations in Korea are not 
organised around long-term, mutual obligations, but short-term, single-transaction 
relations. The large size and self-sufficiency of the Korean chaebols refer to low 
interdependence with suppliers and customers, and are able to dominate SMEs. 
Furthermore, inter-chaebol relations are adversarial, and exhibit a reluctance to 
cooperate over joint projects (Wade, 2004, pp. 315-316). Cooperation does, 
nevertheless, occur between firms underpinned on direct personal ties between chief 
executives (Whitley, 1999, pp. 144-145).  
The business system in Taiwan is that of a dualism. Large companies, such as 
state and party-owned enterprises, dominated the domestic-oriented industries, while 
SMEs are the core of export-oriented industries. This dual structure resulted in an 
extremely flexible, but relatively independent private sector (Fields, 1997, p. 141). 
Taiwanese inter-firm relations are short-lived, relying on flexibly ‘cooperative 
production network’ to minimise market risks, and thus, systematic and stable alliance 
and long-term partnerships between firms is limited (Whitley, 1999, pp. 149-151). 
By dissecting the diversity of business system in East Asia, it is expected, 
theoretically, that financial systems and labour market regimes are structured to 
complement their distinctive business systems, with employers’ preference over 
pension policy being different as well.  
 
3.2.2  The Financial System 
According to the varieties of capitalism perspective, the financial system would 
be complemented to the business system, directly influencing the institutional design 
of the pension system and the operation of pension funds (Hall & Soskice, 2001; 
Jackson & Vitols, 2001). Generally, two models of financial system can be identified: 
bank-based, and market-based (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Jackson & Vitols, 2001; Vitols, 
2001). In the bank-based financial system, capital is mediated through the banking 
system, which takes deposits from households, channelling these savings into loans 
made directly to companies. In the market-based financial system, however, 
households directly, or indirectly, invest in securities issued by companies (Jackson & 
Vitols, 2001, p. 172). The main difference between these two financial systems is the 
degree of pressure levied on pursuing short-term profits.  
The bank-based system is arguably designed to prevent the emergence of a 
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‘market for control’, to emphasise the long-term relationship and profits, rather than 
short-term profits (Estévez-Abe, 2001; Jackson & Vitols, 2001; Vitols, 2001). 
Consequently, a stable long-term finance (patient capital) can be provided to the 
corporate sector, in turn enabling firms to establish long-term commitment to 
employees and other firms, and further, aiding development of industry, or firm, 
specific skills. Hence, the bank-based financial system is often found in the CMEs, 
where an extensive network of cross-shareholding is established on long-term inter-
firm commitments, such as Japan and Germany, and to a lesser extent, Korea. Within 
this financial system, pension funds are regularly redirected to facilitate economic 
development, or to be patient capital through banks (Estévez-Abe, 2001; Jackson & 
Vitols, 2001; Manow, 2001b). In Japan, in order to establish long-termist economic 
coordination, the keiretsu-centred business system relies on the bank-based financial 
system Japanese firms, thereby, have considerable autonomy from property rights 
holders, and the ‘market for corporate control’. In short, Japanese firms have more 
autonomy in corporate governance, and less pressures for short-term financial results. 
As expected, pensions are often utilised as industrial, or patient internal, capital. The 
Korean financial system, to a lesser extent, is closed to the bank-based system, but 
state-led. The Korean authoritarian government channelled massive foreign capital 
into strategies industries, such as policy loans. This is in accordance to its 
developmental aim of directing and governing business activities, when the chaebols’ 
financial capacity was limited in the early stage of industrialisation (Y. J. Choi, 2009; 
Johnson, 1987). Put simply, Korean firms could prevent the emergence of ‘market for 
control’, but their autonomy was constrained by the developmental plans of the state. 
Conversely, in the market-based financial system, the stock market is one such 
financial market that provides capital to the corporations, and within which, short-
term relationship and profits are emphasised. Consequently, employers tend to focus 
on the short-term profits requested by stockholders. The market-based financial 
system is usually found in the LMEs, where flexibility and radical innovations are 
emphasised, such as in the United States and Taiwan. In these countries, pensions 
would be managed by financial institutions, and used to stimulate the capital and 
stock market, but rarely managed as industrial capital for industrialisation. In Taiwan, 
the dominant unit of economic coordination and control in Taiwan is family 
ownership and control. Enterprises are often seen as part of the family property, rather 
than as separate administrative entities (Whitley, 1992, p. 54). Moreover, compared to 
the Japanese keiretsu and the Korean chaebol, SMEs have less demand for capital 
formation. Instead of through banking, or the stock market, these small family 
businesses are often financed by informal financial systems, such as family members, 
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close friends, or revolving credit associations (Y. J. Choi, 2009; Whitley, 1992).3 As a 
result, the SME-dominated business system has no need for funded-type corporate 
pension schemes. 
 
3.2.3  The Labour Market Regime 
In the labour market regime, two key components should be dissected: 
employment relations4 and skill formation. Employment relation and skill formation 
both shape the institutional design of the pension system. In the power resource theory, 
labour power is the key to explaining social policy variations in European welfare 
states (Esping-Andersen, 1985, 1990; Korpi, 1983, 1989), while East Asian labour 
power is widely accepted to be weak, since it lacks a European style, collective 
bargaining system at national level (Deyo, 1989; Pempel, 2002). However, this view 
did not note the difference in employment relations in East Asia. 
At enterprise level, rather than at national level, in Japan and Korea, labour 
power is relatively strong. This is because core workers in the larger firms are often 
organised and unionised. Thus, enterprise unionism is prevalent in Japan (D. Y. Jeong 
& Aguilera, 2008) and Korea (J.-Y. Jeong, 1995, 2007) and had great impacts on their 
social policy developments. Enterprise unions prefer social policies, such as 
fragmented social insurance programmes, and enterprise welfare, that are designed for 
their members- that is, the core workers (P. H. Kim, 2010; Pempel, 2002; Song, 
2012b; J.-J. Yang, 2013). Enterprise welfare is important for three reasons in Japan 
and Korea. First, it helps employers to deal with labour disputes and to create 
economic cooperation; second, it provides incentives for people to invest industry, or 
firm, specific skills; third, the state can externalise the financial cost of social policy 
to enterprise, concentrating financial resources on productive activities. In Japan and 
Korea, enterprises become the community of risk-sharing, or social solidarity. 
Labour in Taiwan, by contrast, is, due to its SME-dominated business systems, 
and authoritarian regime, weak at both national and enterprise level. At national-level, 
labour unions were controlled by the authoritarian government in the post-war period 
so that a productivist-oriented environment could be created (Y.-J. Lee, 1999; Wang 
& Fang, 1992). At enterprise level, labour power is weak because, according to law, 
3 Wade (2004, p. 264) points out the government’s overriding concern: “the bank have not been 
encouraged to take an interest in the well-being of their borrowers… Banks have not developed a 
capacity to analyse company finances, industry structure, or the commercial feasibility of projects.” 
4 In this study, I tend to use the term ‘employment relation’ rather than ‘industrial relation’. This is due 
to labour in East Asia never becoming a critical actor at national level, but labour being strong at 
enterprise level in Japan and Korea. Therefore, ‘employment relation’ is more appropriate to highlight 
this feature.   
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the minimum number of employees required for a labour union to be organised at firm 
level is 30. However, the SME-dominated labour system of Taiwan was atomised, 
with 97.63% of firms (in 2011) being SMEs.5 The Taiwanese labour power, unlike in 
Japan and Korea, was uninterested in enterprise welfare, therefore.  
In analysing employers’ social policy preferences, the skill formation system is 
particularly important (Estévez-Abe et al., 2001; Iversen, 2005). The East Asian skill 
formation system was reduced to the developmental state model, within which the 
state played a crucial role in coordinating the supply and demand of skills that serve 
the broad goal of nation-building and economic development (Ashton et al., 1999). 
However, its variations are rarely scrutinised.  
According to the varieties of capitalism perspective, three types of skill 
formation are developed to fit its product market strategies: firm-specific, industry-
specific, and general skills (Estévez-Abe et al., 2001, pp. 148-149). Mass production 
is often complemented to general skills, it not requiring a highly trained workforce. 
Firm-specific skills are, however, required by a variant of mass production, known as 
diversified mass production. This product market strategy requires workers to perform 
a wide range of tasks in order to solve production line problems. These workers are 
requested to own high levels of knowledge bounded to their company products. Such 
industry-specific skills are stronger in the countries where a high-quality niche market 
strategy exists. Craft-intensive workshops are often at the core of this product market 
strategy. To encourage people to invest in particular skill types, different social 
protections are required by the various skill formation systems.  
The development of a firm-specific skill formation system must resolve the 
problem of the ‘prisoner dilemma’ between the employer and employee. Since firm-
specific skills cannot be used by other firms, employers must, to guarantee their 
investment in firm-specific skills can be rewarded, provide employment protection 
and generous employee benefits as incentive schemes (Estévez-Abe et al., 2001; 
Iversen, 2005). Japanese firms greatly rely on internal training, promoting managers 
with detailed knowledge of, and experience in, one industry or firm (Aoki, 1988; 
Koike, 1995). The degree of skill specificity is high in Japan (appendix 6), and in 
order to encourage people to invest in firm-specific skills, Japanese firms used a 
permanent employment system, and generous enterprise welfare. This enabled 
establishment of a strong employment commitment to workers for investment in firm-
specific skills.  
In Korea, employers also rely on firm-specific skills (Ashton et al., 1999; S.-Y. 
5 Source: http://www.moeasmea.gov.tw/dl.asp?filename=253017242771.pdf.  
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Lee, 2011). Having started industrialisation, based on the Fordist mass production 
notion, Korea diversified being unable to develop a vocational training system of 
craft-intensive workshops. Therefore, the Korean chaebols prefer to pre-empt high-
educated workers, protecting their employment and providing them with incentives, 
such as enterprise welfare, to acquire industry, or firm-specific skills (Chung, 2008; 
S.-Y. Lee, 2011) (appendix 5). Compared to Japan, and due to the absence of 
institutional mechanism for avoidance of ‘skill patching’, the employer-employee 
relationship is relatively limited (Song, 2012b; Whitley, 1999) (appendix 6). Korean 
employers endeavoured to establish an employer association, known to resolve the 
problem of skill poaching, but due to the chaebols having to compete for skilled 
workers from the external labour market, during early industrialisation, it failed (Song, 
2012b). 
By contrast, employers in the general skill formation system prefer to search for 
skilled workers in the external, rather than internal, labour market. Therefore, a short-
term relationship is prevalent. Those with general skills can re-enter the labour market 
as soon as their skills can be utilised by other industries or firms. Consequently, 
employment protection, unemployment protection, and pension insurance are 
relatively meagre (Estévez-Abe et al., 2001; Iversen, 2005). In Taiwan, export-
oriented SMEs rely far more on general skills to create a flexible labour market that 
competes in the world market (appendix 6) (Hu & Schive, 1998). Thus, SMEs have 
no incentive to commit high employment protection, or generous enterprises 
welfare,6 instead relying on public education and training systems to find workers 
from the external labour market.  
Three institutional spheres- the business system, the financial system, and the 
labour market- have been discussed. With the varieties of capitalism argued (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001; Mares 2003), analysing the diversity of East Asian capitalisms helps to 
understand how political actors’ social policy preferences are varied in, and shaped by, 
national capitalist structure. Based on this, we are able also to explain how the 
strategically institutional complementarity is forged. With this institutional 
complementarity not functionally interdependent, or created in a single ‘big bang’, the 
different institutional components are forged during different historical periods 
(Thelen, 2004). The dynamic of the formation of institutional complementarities 
involves the political-economic coalition formation, and the way these coalitions 
6 In fact, long-term commitment and seniority-based promotion practices do exist in Taiwan, but only 
for those workers with strong personal ties to the owner. While previously unknown staff, hired 
through impersonal channels neither expect, nor receive, such commitments. Therefore, the scope and 
length of employer-employee commitments in Taiwanese business, particularly, small and medium 
enterprises that are owned by the family, is limited (Whitley, 1999, p. 151).  
38 
 
                                                  
strategically coordinate institutions (Mares, 2003; Mares & Carnes, 2009).  
 
3.3 Cross-class Coalition – State-Business Relations 
The nature of cross-class coalitions is the key to illustrating cross-national 
variations in social policy arrangements that exist in welfare state theories (Esping-
Andersen, 1990; Mares, 2003; Mares & Carnes, 2009; Swenson, 1991, 2002). In East 
Asia, the developmental state thesis emphasised the state-business coalition as a 
prerequisite of the state-led developmental model (Hundt, 2009; Johnson, 1982, 1987). 
However, the state-business coalition was ignored, since social policy is naturally 
subordinated to economic development when the state is developmental, by the 
studies of East Asian welfare state regime. By analysing state-business coalitions, the 
formation of strategically institutional complementarities between social protection, 
and capitalist production within a historical dynamic framework, can be elucidated. 
As mentioned, the state in East Asia acted as the institutional coordinator, given 
the firm’s incapability to resolve economic coordination in the initial stage of 
industrialisation. However, it should not be simply assumed that employers are 
completely controlled by, or subordinated to, the state. The influences of the firm 
should not be neglected, particularly when the state is productive-oriented 
(Farnsworth, 2004; Gough & Farnsworth, 2000). The capitalists exercise considerable 
discretion over the acquisition, use and disposition of human and material resources in 
the capitalist economies and thus, the productive-oriented state tends to divert 
resources to business activities, enhancing their coordination capacities (Schneider & 
Maxfield, 1997; Whitley, 1992). The state does not dominate society, but negotiates 
with the business sector and the state-business developmental alliance is, therefore, 
key to economic success (Hundt, 2009). 
Johnson (1999, p. 60) writes: “the concept ‘developmental state’ means that each 
side uses the other in a mutually beneficial relationship to achieve developmental 
goals and enterprises viability… The state is a ‘catalytic agency’… and the managers 
are responding to incentives and disincentives that the state established.” Thus, state-
business relation is not a unilateral domination, but a reciprocal relationship (Hundt, 
2009; Schneider & Maxfield, 1997). Even in the authoritarian Korea and Taiwan, the 
states cannot act alone, and their success in economic development and 
transformation is dependent in a large way on how they colluded with businesses 
through the dense network (Fields, 1997). Amsden (1989, pp. 150-151) argues that 
Korea’s economic success should be attributed to the dynamic between two key 
institutions: “the reciprocity between big business and the state” and “the internal and 
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external behaviour of the diversified business group”. Evans (1995) also proposes a 
similar view, arguing that ‘embedded autonomy’, an underlying structural basis for 
successful state involvement in industrial transformation, is conditioned by two 
factors: the internal network of bureaucratic coherence, and the external network 
connecting with the state and large private agents. He concludes that “Mutual 
reinforcement… lies at the core of the developmental state’s success. A robust and 
coherent state apparatus facilitates the organisation of industrial capital; and organised 
class of industrialists facilitates a joint project of industrialisation, which in turn 
legitimates both the state and industrialists” (Evans, 1995, p. 228). Lim (1998) 
elucidates that a mutually dependent relationship, in particular, between the 
government and big businesses, is the prerequisite for economic development. This 
was done by raising the case of the Korean economic miracle in the context of 
treating power in a structural manner. In Hundt’s study on the Korean developmental 
state, the state had to collaborate or collude with big business (chaebol) to implement 
strategic industrial projects. This is not the only case in Korea, and in fact, it can be 
shown that the state-business alliance was (is) also key to the Japanese and Taiwanese 
developmental state (Johnson, 1987; Wade, 2004). These arguments imply that the 
“government should be regarded as an endogenous player interacting with the 
economic system as a coherent cluster of institutions rather than a neutral, omnipotent 
agent exogenously attached to the economic system with the mission of resolving its 
coordination failures” (Aoki et al., 1996, p. 2). 
The developmental state thesis, and the varieties of capitalism, both argue that 
social policy development is inter-embedded with the national capitalist structure and 
its development (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Holliday, 2000). How institutional coherence 
between the welfare state and the national capitalist structure is forged is not well-
scrutinised, but theoretically assumed. For example, it is simply assumed that East 
Asia tended to put more efforts on productive social policies (education and health 
policy) and the creation of a flexible labour market in order to implement export-
oriented industrialisation (Deyo, 1989; Wibbels & Ahlquist, 2011). Recent studies 
demonstrated, however, how the formation institutional complementarity between the 
welfare and production regimes is the result of strategic interaction of political-
economic actors (Mares, 2003; Mares & Carnes, 2009; Swenson, 1991, 2002). This is 
a political process- institutional coherence would not be forged by a single big bang 
according to institutional logic (Thelen, 2004). Instead, political-economic actors 
would forge a cross-class coalition to strategically coordinate institutional linkage. 
For example, Haggard and Kaufman (2008) demonstrate that the ruling coalition is 
the inter-mediated factor, linking developmental strategy and social policy to explain 
social policy variations in East Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe. They argue 
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that, the East Asian governments weakened organised labour, the left, and rural 
political movement to form the conservative state-developmental alliances for the 
adaptation of export-oriented industrialisation. This led the East Asian governments to 
emphasised productive social policies. Conversely, Latin America, featuring import-
substitution industrialisation, tended to create a ruling coalition comprised of 
reformist leaders from the military, middle and urban working classes, since these 
actors are the core of the domestic market. The states must create a large domestic 
market, and gain political support from these actors to support the implementation of 
import-substitution developmental strategy. An employment-related social insurance 
system is favoured, in order to maintain a large domestic market and gain political 
support. Simply put, the inter-embeddedness of capitalist production (the 
developmental strategy) and social protection is politically mediated.  
Analysis of the state-business developmental alliance helps to go beyond 
structural functionalism. Structural functionalism tends to look for ‘causal correlation’ 
between the dependent and exploratory variables. However, this study aims to explain 
how the pension policy was strategically inter-embedded with the national capitalist 
structure to explain cross-national variations in the public-private pension mix and 
politics in Japan, Korea and Taiwan. Thus, the focus is not to search for a ‘causal 
correlation’, but a ‘causal mechanism’, based on configurational thinking.  
Structured by national capitalist structure, the modes of the state-business 
developmental alliance in Japan, Korea and Taiwan vary (Evans, 1995; Fields, 1995, 
1997, 2012). Fields (1997, p. 141) argues that political leaders’ anti-large business 
bias, and ethnic suspicion of the Taiwanese majority, led the KMT government to 
structure a ‘more distance and less dense’ relationship of coordination between the 
public and private sectors of Taiwan. Instead, the KMT government tended to 
politically incorporate employers and labour into its ruling regime in order to forge 
the state-dominated developmental alliance. Thus, pension politics dominated the 
state. Conversely, state-business relations in Japan and Korea were much closer. In 
Korea, state elites fostered a close relationship of quasi-internal collaboration with 
industrial chaebols. Through massive financial subsidies and other incentives, the 
state gained the compliance of the chosen chaebols, and these nascent, industrial 
chaebols were unilaterally guided by the government before becoming their fully-
fledged, symbiotic partners (Fields, 1997, p. 124). In Japan, state-business relations 
were symbiotic, and reciprocal. The state protected the keiretsu from any legal or 
financial challenges made by outsiders, as well as the domestic market from 
international competition. The state, moreover, actively promoted private sectors, 
through such means as tax breaks, government-supervised investment coordination, 
41 
  
and government-guaranteed financing. Hence, the private sectors (keiretsu) could 
enjoy a more stable, cooperative environment. The private sector, however, offered 
the state a much greater degree of social goal-setting, and influence over private 
decisions (Johnson, 1982, p. 311).  
The symbiotic and reciprocal relationship between the state and large businesses 
reduced the state’s autonomy in policy making in Japan and Korea. The influences of 
employers are significant, but rather than being static, cross-class coalition is dynamic 
when preferences of political actors, and their power balances, are contingent on 
political-economic structures. For example, Johnson (1982, 1999) pointed out that 
during 1931-1940 the state tended to delegate control to private agents (mainly, 
cartels) for each industry. The state directly established, however, control associations 
to displace private cartels, private ownership, private labour organisations, and private 
management from 1940-1952 in order for war mobilisation. After 1952, state-business 
relations were cooperative and symbiotic. In Korea, the state-business developmental 
alliance was dynamic, and the influences of employers contingent on political-
economic transformations (E.-M. Kim, 1988, 1997). For example, democratisation in 
the mid-1980s, the two oil crises in the early 1970s and 1980s, and the Asian 
Financial Crisis in 1997, weakened the influences of the chaebols, shifting the power 
balance of political actors (D.-J. Chang, Kim, & Park, 2012; Mo & Moon, 2003).  
Further, the cases of Japan and Korea remind us that social policy preferences of 
political actors changed along with the transformation of developmental strategies. In 
Korea’s period of labour-intensive, export-oriented industrialisation, for example, 
employers did not want to bear the cost of skill formation and social insurance. When, 
in the 1970s, the development strategy was shifted to capital and skill-intensive, 
heavy and chemical industrialisation, however, they tended to be in favour of the 
company-based skill formation system and corporate welfare (Song, 2012b; Woo, 
2004). It is clear that political actors’ social policy preferences are not fixed, but 
dynamic.  
The diversity of state-business relations in the three East Asian welfare states 
provides evidence that the configurations of political-actors are different, and is 
determined by institutional structures. Additionally, with the power balance and 
preferences of political actors being determined by institutional structures, the state-
business developmental alliance is dynamic. Accordingly, pension politics can be 
expected to vary across three East Asian welfare states, with the causal mechanism 




Conclusion: The Analytic Framework and Theoretical 
Assumptions 
Figure 3.1 is the analytic framework of this study, showing how the 
developmental state thesis and the varieties of capitalism perspective are synthesised 
to analyse similarities, and variations, in the public-private pension mix in Japan, 
Korea and Taiwan. To start with, this framework must be understood in the context of 
less developed countries, meaning that the state (or other special institution) has to 
actively intervene with the capitalist economy. This is does to enhance market 
efficiencies, and create stability, and in order for economic catch-up, the state must be 
productivist-oriented or developmental.  
Then, the varieties of capitalism perspective’s concept, that capitalist production 
and social protection are inter-embedded was accepted. In the sphere of capitalist 
production, three institution were included and inter-embedded: the business system, 
the financial system and the labour market regime. It was preferred to define the 
business system as the size of the business and inter-firms relations, having a great 
influence on how the financial system and labour market (which are also inter-
embedded) are structured. This inter-embedding allows the forging of different 
national capitalist structures in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. The national capitalist 
structure then shapes the political actors’ preferences and strategy in coordinating the 
pension system and capitalist production, also determining how cross-class coalition 
is forged. The state, rather than the firms, is the main institutional coordinator in this 
framework, unlike the varieties of capitalism.  
I then accepted the developmental state thesis’s argument that the state has to 
play a role in strategically coordinating institutional coherence between the pension 
and national capitalist structure. Yet, unlike the developmental state thesis, this study 
sees the state as institutional coordinator rather than an omnipotent actor. It argues 
that the state must collaborate, or collude, with the capitalists in order to achieve its 
developmental goals (economic catch-up) and to enhance the private agents’ 
coordination capabilities. Further, analysing the state as the institutional coordinator 
enables avoidance of the varieties of capitalism’s static analysis (Schmidt, 2009). The 
analysis of how the state and other political actors, typically the capitalists, cooperated 
will help to understand how the pension system is designed to be embedded into 
national structure. Nevertheless, this state-business, developmental alliance is 
dynamic, not static. Political actors have their preferences and strategies shaped by 
institutional structure, but also want to take advantages of institutional structure to 






















Figure 3. 1 The Analytical Framework 
 
Accordingly, I have argued that cross-national variations in the public-private 
pension mix in East Asia are the result of the diversity of national capitalist structures. 
In Japan, the keiretsu-centred business system is complemented by the bank-based 
financial system, and the firm-specific skill formation system. In the keiretsu-centred 
capitalist structure, political actors’ pension preferences would be structured to favour 
the utilisation of pensions that support its industrialisation, and resolve economic 
coordination problems. It is assumed, in the case of Japan, that its public pensions 
would be designed as a policy instrument of capital formation, in order to facilitate 
industrialisation through financially supporting the keiretsu. In the face of economic 
coordination problems, additionally, corporate pensions would be considered as a 
resource that can help employers to resolve economic coordination problems, in skill 
and capital formation. It helps, for instance, to encourage workers to develop both 
firm-specific skills, and internal capital for firms. Thus, we can expect Japan to 
develop a hybrid pension system, within which public pensions are relatively less 
generous, but corporate pensions are well-developed. In the keiretsu-centred capitalist 
structure, the state can be expected to collaborate with the keiretsu to coordinate the 
institutional linkage between pension system, and national capitalist structure. This is 
due to its reliance on keiretsu to facilitate economic development. Labour would be 
divided by the keiretsu-centred capitalist structure, with employers likely to develop 
some management practices, such as corporate pensions and welfare. Further, the 
permanent employment and seniority-based systems would be expected to develop 
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firm-specific skills, thus, core workers with firms-specific skills would become 
‘growth-minded’, and incorporated into the state-keiretsu developmental alliance.  
In Taiwan’s SMEs-dominated capitalist structure, SMEs typically need to rely on 
informal financial channels and a general skill formation system which in turn results 
in a flexible labour market system to exploit flexibility- its comparative institutional 
advantage. This feature is expected to weaken the incentives of employers to develop 
corporate pensions and welfare, the preference being to exploit cheap labour and 
flexibility. Thus, corporate pensions are assumed to be under-developed in Taiwan. 
Shaped by the SMEs-dominated capitalist structure, public pensions would not be 
mobilised as industrial capital. Instead, the state tends to use fiscal incentive schemes 
to encourage export-oriented SMEs. Within this SMEs-dominated capitalist structure, 
political power of employers and labour was expected to be weak due to the problem 
of collective action. We expect that the role of business in pension politics is not 
explicitly significant in Taiwan, instead, welfare and pension politics is dominated by 
the state. Taiwan, therefore, would develop a statist pension system, within which the 
state is not only a direct pension provider but also a pension policymaker.  
In Korea, the chaebol-dominated business system would be inter-embedded with 
the state-dominated, bank-based financial system, and high-specific skills. Thus, it 
would be expected that, shaped by this chaebol-dominated capitalist structure, 
political actors would utilise the pension system to facilitate industrialisation and 
resolve economic coordination problems in skill and capital formation. Employers are 
expected to be in favour of corporate pensions and welfare to resolve economic 
coordination problems in skill and capital formation by avoiding skill poaching. 
Public pensions would be favoured as a policy instrument of capital mobilisation to 
support the state’s developmental strategy. In the chaebol-dominated capitalist 
structure, we can expect that nascent chaebols would gradually grow to become the 
symbiotic partner of the state. Thus, a state-chaebol developmental alliance could be 
observed. As in Japan, however, chaebol workers would be, expectantly, politically, 
and economically incorporated into the state-chaebol developmental alliance when 
they must rely on chaebols’ growth to secure their welfare and job security. It can 
therefore be assumed that Korea would develop a hybrid pension system, with 







Chapter 4 – Research Design 
This study aims to understand and explain the cross-national variations in the 
public-private pension mix of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. A comparative study will be 
a suitable research method since its typical goal is to study ‘diversity’: “to unravel the 
different causal conditions connected to different outcomes” (Ragin, 1994, p. 108). I 
will adopt two methods. 
Firstly, comparative institutional analysis will be used to dissect the diversity of 
East Asian capitalisms; secondly, comparative historical analysis will elucidate how 
the pension system was designed to complement national capitalist structure. In the 
first part of this chapter, the reasons for the case selection will be explained. Based on 
the logic of the most similar system method, Japan, Korea and Taiwan will be 
selected to control some systematically independent variables, enabling the researcher 
to focus on the ‘differences’. The two methods – comparative institutional analysis, 
and comparative historical analysis – will then be introduced.  
 
4.1 Case selection – Japan, Korea and Taiwan 
In East Asian welfare state studies, four tigers (Korea, Taiwan, Hong-Kong and 
Singapore) and Japan are often compared, both for geographical reasons and their 
experience of economic development (Aspalter, 2001; Deyo, 1989; Holliday & 
Wilding, 2003c; Ramesh, 2004; K.-L. Tang, 2000). Nevertheless, this thesis attempts 
to focus on three northeast Asian welfare states – Japan, Taiwan and (South) Korea. 
China, Hong-Kong and Singapore, due to their political regime, and -economic 
developmental model being different to Japan, Korea and Taiwan, will be excluded 
(Haggard, 1990; Pempel, 2002; Ramesh, 2004).  
By selecting only Japan, Korea and Taiwan, some variables commonly shared by 
these countries can be controlled (such as Confucianism, conservative-dominated 
politics, weak labour power, state-led developmental pattern, and similar experiences 
of democratic transition). Principally, the comparative study “attempts to develop 
explanations by the systematic manipulation of parameters and operative variables” 
(Smelser, 1976, p. 158). By selecting substantial cases, variables can be controlled 
(Goertz & Mahoney, 2012; Przeworski & Teune, 1970). Thus, this study is designed, 
by selecting only Japan, Korea and Taiwan, to be the ‘most similar systems method’.  
The ‘most similar system method’ is based on the assumption that “systems as 
similar as possible with respect to as many features as possible constitute the optimal 
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samples for comparative inquiry (Przeworski & Teune, 1970, p. 32). By comparing 
the most similar systems, common systematic features are perceived as ‘controlled 
for’, and inter-systematic differences are regarded as ‘explanatory variables’ 
(Przeworski & Teune, 1970, pp. 33-34). That is, the number of independent variables 
can be minimised, and the differences emphasised. By eliminating potential 
explanatory factors, one can evaluate different, potential explanations to eliminate 
rival explanations (Mahoney, 1999, pp. 1158-1160).  
 
4.2 Research Methods 
It should be noted that the concern of this research is not ‘variables’, but 
configuration. The focus is on how to elucidate institutional complementarities 
between the capitalist structure and pension systems of Japan, Korea and Taiwan. 
Hence, it may be impossible to identify a set of clear-cut variables in order to 
delineate the significant independent variable to explain the change in dependent 
variable. Comparative institutional analysis will, therefore, be a suitable method in 
dissecting the diversity of East Asian capitalisms. Through this, we can understand 
how sub-institutions are inter-embedded to forge an institutional totality. This 
comparative institutional analysis of East Asian capitalisms will be the theoretical 
foundation for understanding how the pension system was designed for embedding 
into national capitalist structure. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the national 
capitalist structure shapes political actors’ pension preferences, and the nature of 
cross-class coalition. Elucidating these factors will enhance understanding of the 
causal mechanism of institutional inter-embeddedness. Therefore, I will incorporate 
comparative historical analysis to establish how the different interactions between 
actors and actors’ preferences are shaped and constrained by the given institutional 
contexts. This will enable understanding of the causal mechanism of the pension 
system and national capitalist structure. The combination of comparative institutional 
analysis and comparative historical analysis helps to employ the controlled 
comparison on the one hand, and to deal with some methodological problems raised 
from the controlled comparison on the other (George & Bennett, 2005: Ch. 8).  
 
4.2.1 Comparative Institutional Analysis 
This study is comparative. Comparative institutional analysis studies how 
institutions shape forms of economic organisation, and the consequence of this on 
performance outcomes (Morgan et al., 2010, p. 5). It departs from the perspective of 
defining an institution as a monolithic entity. Instead, comparative institutional 
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analysis tends to recognise that institutions are composed of interrelated, but distinct 
components. These manifest themselves as an organisational configuration (Crouch, 
2005; Hall & Soskice, 2001).  
A feature of comparative institutional analysis is that it considers institutions to 
be interrelated, and inter-embedded. Leading to an equilibrium in which the structure, 
constituted by these institutions, influences political-economic actors’ behaviours, 
these behavioural responses in turn reproducing the institutions (Greif, 2006, pp. 14-
15). It is a holistic, or configurational thinking. Thus, the interaction between 
institutions and actors is a reciprocal process: on the one hand, institutions shape and 
constrain actors’ preferences, and their strategic action; on the other, actors’ strategic 
action and preferences reproduce institutions that are beneficial to them (P. Pierson, 
2004). As shown in figure 3.1, three inter-embedded institutional spheres will be 
compared: the business system, the financial system, and the labour market. Chapter 5 
will compare three East Asian capitalisms, and to show how these institutional are 
inter-embedded.  
 
4.2.2 Comparative Historical Analysis: “Process-Tracing Analysis” 
This study is historical. As argued, institutional complementarity cannot be 
forged by a single ‘big bang’ reform, but coordinated at different historical junctures 
through actions of political coalitions. Thus, institutional complementarity should be 
studied within a longitudinal period. “There is no reason to think that the various 
‘pieces’ will necessarily fit together into a coherent, self-reinforcing, let alone 
functional, whole” (Thelen, 2004, p. 285). Thelen (2004, pp. 286-287) insists, 
therefore, that a more political version, focusing on political-economic actors’ 
preferences, actions and strategic choices, is the key to understand historical and 
political dynamic of the institutional complementarities. 
The process of interaction between institutions and actors should be studied as a 
historical process. Through analysis of how the pension system was designed to be 
embedded into the national capitalist structure, configurational thinking is required. 
This study set outs not to identify correlations between independent variables and 
outcomes, but to trace causal mechanism between the pension system and the national 
capitalist structure. Causal mechanism is defined as “a complex system, which 
produces an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts” (Beach & Pedersen, 
2013, p. 1). Thus, “it assumes that the activation of a mechanism actually generates an 
outcome in the sense that the mechanism is sufficient to produce the outcome of 
interest; that is, if the mechanism actually operates, it will always produce the 
outcome of interest” (Mahoney, 2001, p. 580).  
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In order to study causal mechanism, systematic process-tracing analysis is 
needed to dissect the theory-based mechanism that actually links causal factors to 
outcomes (George & Bennett, 2005; Goertz & Mahoney, 2012). It attempts to 
“identify the intervening causal process – the casual chain and causal mechanism – 
between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent 
variable” (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 206). Systematic process-tracing analysis is 
used to assess and/or highlight the causal mechanism between explanatory variables 
(or factors) and outcome. Also, to enrich theoretical debates by emphasising the 
intervening variables, and the detail of causal mechanisms connecting explanatory 
variables and outcome (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 182).  
The point of departure of systematic process-tracing analysis is that 
“observations bearing on a theory’s predictions about the process, whereby an 
outcome is caused, provide as relevant a test of that theory as predictions about the 
correspondence between a small number of casual variables and the outcomes they 
are said to produce” (Hall, 2003, p. 393).  The key, therefore, is to study a process, 
since the explanatory power or causal inference is predominantly derived from how a 
process is studied. In short, “systematic process-tracing analysis examines the process 
unfolding in the cases at hand, as well as the outcomes in those cases”. Hall (2003, 
2008) points out that systematic process-tracing analysis should include four steps: 
(1) Theory formation: The investigator must formulate a set of theories that identify 
those potential casual variables thought to have great impacts on the outcome. 
Further, these theories help to understand how causal mechanism is operated (Hall, 
2008, pp. 309-310). This part has been shown in chapter 2, within which five 
potential explanations were discussed. 
(2) Deriving predictions: After different theories have been discussed, the investigator 
derives predictions, through observation, to establish whether the theoretical 
assumptions are valid or false (Hall, 2008, p. 310). This was shown in the 
previous chapter.  
(3) Making observations: in systematic process-tracing analysis, observations from 
empirical cases cannot be explained through a clear-cut causal correlation between 
independent and dependent variables, but through the ‘process’ linking these 
variables to the outcomes (Hall, 2003, p. 394). Thus, the point is to analyse which 
independent variables are linked, and how, to explain the outcome through 
process-tracing. In this study, through this process-tracing analysis, we can 
understand how actors coordinate institutions by a series of attempts.  
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In this regard, chapter 5’s comparative institutional analysis of East Asian 
capitalisms will offer a theoretical foundation to elucidate how political actors 
were shaped, and the nature of cross-class coalitions were determined by national 
capitalist structure. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 will then focus on each country to show 
political actors’ pension preferences, and how they interacted within each national 
capitalist structure. This will be done in order to elucidate the casual mechanism 
of institutional linkage between the pension system and national capitalist 
structure. In each chapter, two periods will be analysed- the post-war period (1945 
to mid-1980s), and mid-1980s to the present day. Under pressure from the U.S., 
the mid-1980s was a turning point for East Asian welfare states, which gradually 
liberalised the financial and labour markets (Haggard, 1990; Vogel, 2006). 
Simultaneously, Korea and Taiwan underwent political liberalisation (Haggard & 
Kaufman, 2008). Political and economic liberalisation not only changed the ‘rules 
of the game’ but also the preferences of political actors, in turn shaping pension 
policy and politics.  
(4) Drawing conclusions: The final step of systematic process-tracing analysis is to 
make judgement about the relative merits of each theory (on the basis of 
congruence between the prediction of each theory and their observations) (Hall, 
2003, p. 394; 2008, p. 311). Though I have argued that the combination of the 
developmental state thesis and the varieties of capitalism perspective is key to 
understanding the similarities and variations in East Asian welfare states, other 
theories will be assessed simultaneously. Chapter 9 will draw conclusion, first, by 
comparing the three countries, then by reviewing and comparing the five 
explanations with the integrated political-economic explanation. This will allow 
establishment of which is better in explaining the public-private pension mix of 
East Asia.  
Finally, with regard to data source, this study uses secondary data. As argued, 
this study aims not to find correlations between variables, but to use configurational 
thinking to dissect how institutions (capitalist production and pension) are 
strategically complemented. In turn, this should explain the cross-variations in 
pension policy and politics in Japan, Korea and Taiwan. Secondary quantitative and 
qualitative data are needed. Quantitative data will be collected from international 
organisations, such as the OECD and the International Monetary Fund, and national 
statistical bureaus, with some being recalculated. Quantitative data, further, may help 
sketch an overall picture of the three East Asian welfare states. Qualitative data will 
be collected mainly from historical documents, such as newspapers, government 
documents and literature. This will be to understand how actors (in particular, state 
51 
  
and business) collude to utilise the pension system to deal with the contradiction of 
the welfare state: capital accumulation (such as the problem of prisoner dilemma in 
skill formation) and political legitimacy. With respect to the Korean case, however, I 
will rely on English references, to a large extent, because of language problems. The 
combination of quantitative and qualitative data helps to understand national 
variations in the structure of capitalist production and pension, as well as to discern 






Chapter 5 – The Diversity of East Asian Capitalisms 
East Asia is often defined as the state-led capitalism, due to the state’s deep 
involvement in guiding economic development (Amable, 2003). When we take a 
closer look, however, and examine the three institutional spheres of national capitalist 
structure – business system, financial system and labour market regime – through 
comparative institutional analysis, the diversity of East Asian capitalisms will be 
highlighted, providing the focus of this chapter. Examining business systems in East 
Asia, it is evident that Taiwan is a SMEs-dominated capitalism, while Japan and 
Korea are dominated by business-conglomerates. This difference not only results in 
different inter-firm relationships but different financial systems and labour market 
regimes too. Further analysis of comparative business systems has shown that 
financial systems in East Asia also differ. The financial systems of Japan and Korea 
are both bank-based, but differences can be found. In Taiwan, SMEs tend to look for 
capital from informal channels rather than banks. Thirdly, skill formation systems in 
Japan and Korea are characterised with firm-specific skills while Taiwan’s SMEs rely 
on general skills. This difference mirrors those in employment relations. Labour is 
weak at national and firm level in Taiwan but in Japan and Korea, enterprise unionism 
prevails. These institutional spheres are institutionally complementary, though as I 
argued in the previous chapter, the institutional linkages of these spheres are not 
naturally forged, but intentionally, through the state’s intervention. This chapter will 
lay a foundation for the comparative historical analysis of the public-private pension 
mix in Japan, Korea and Taiwan.  
 
5.1 Business Systems in East Asia  
Business systems are very different across East Asia (Whitley, 1992, 1999; Witt 
& Redding, 2013). In Japan and Korea, business-conglomerates dominate their 
economy; whereas SMEs dominate Taiwan’s export-oriented sector, while public 
enterprises and large private firms control domestic-oriented sectors.  
 
5.1.1 The Keiretsu-dominated Capitalist Production in Japan  
Japan’s production regime is dominated by ‘keiretsu’, business groups, defined 
as “clusters of firms, linked through overlapping ties of shareholding, debt, 
interlocking directors, and dispatch of personnel at other levels, shared history, 
membership in groupwide clubs and councils, and often, shared brands” (Ahmadjian, 
2006, p. 30). The origin of Japanese business groups can be dated back to the period 
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of the Meiji Restoration (since 1868). Due to late development, the Meiji government 
established state-owned enterprises in a wide range of capital-intensive industries. 
These include railroads, mining, shipbuilding and steel, which were associated with 
high risks in the initial stage of industrialisation, based on the consideration of 
national security (Gerlach, 1992; Johnson, 1982). These state-owned enterprises were 
privatised to political merchants with close ties to state officials and politicians, at 
relatively low prices in the late 19th century, and became “zaibatsu” (financial 
cliques)7 (Carney, 2008, pp. 66-73; Sasada, 2013, pp. 23-24; Wright, 1996, p. 120). 
These zaibatsu grew and prospered before the Second World War. 
After the war, zaibatsu were dissolved by the American military occupation, due 
to the commitment of the ‘demilitarisation and democratisation’ of Japan (Wright, 
1996).8 However, the policy goal of the Allied government fundamentally changed 
after 1948-49, due to changes in US domestic politics, the beginning of the Cold War, 
the Chinese Revolution, and the outbreak of the Korean War. This ‘reverse course’ 
ended the anti-zaibatsu programmes, forging a conservative regime that included 
conservative parties, big business, and financial institutions (Shinkawa, 2005b). Since 
the 1950s, the Japanese government started to encourage the reorganisation of former 
zaibatsu. For example, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry discriminated 
against SMEs by preventing their entry into strategic industries, favouring large 
private firms (Gao, 2001). Japanese companies endeavoured to cooperate in the form 
of either joint ventures, or further development of business groups to form a new type 
of business network, known as ‘keiretsu’ (Carney, 2008; Gao, 2001). Within the 
keiretsu, economic power and managerial authority are fragmented into the hands of 
professional managers of operating companies, rather than controlled by holding 
companies or interlocking directorship (Carney, 2008; Wright, 1996).9  
During the post-war period, keiretsu adopted the strategy of diversification to 
grow (Schaede, 2008). For the state, the growth of keiretsu could help maintain 
political stability. The reorganisation and rationalisation of the economy inevitably 
came with social dislocations and political instability, and therefore, a series of state 
interventions were used to support big corporations. This was done in order to help 
private firms institutionalise a permanent employment system to accommodate 
7 Zaibatsu can be defined as “a group of diversified business owned exclusively by a single family or 
an extended family” (Carney, 2008, p. 63). During the pre-war period, the big four zaibatsu were 
Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, and Yasuda.    
8 For example, in 1947, the Antimonopoly Law was introduced to prohibit any type of joint action. 
During the Occupation, Mitsui and Mitsubishi, the two largest zaibatsus, were each dissolved into more 
than 130 companies (Gao, 2001, p. 83).  
9 In fact, compared to other Asian countries, Japan has the lowest levels of large, family-owned 
enterprises, this pattern persisting (Carney, 2008, pp. 80-81).  
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interests of the incumbent sectors and industries (Gao, 2001, p. 43). The keiretsu saw 
these state interventions as opportunities which could be exploited to diversify their 
business. Through the strategy of diversification, the keiretsu could reduce the risk of 
corporate failure and institutionalise cross-shareholding, and the main bank system. 
These features, due to the main bank being more interested in stable growth through a 
regular increase in sales revenues, furthered the demand of the keiretsu on the strategy 
of diversification. The increase in sales revenues enabled the keiretsu to maintain a 
permanent employment system and other managerial practices. Institutions increasing 
returns to one another restricted, and limited, the capacity of the keiretsu to adopt 
breaks from previous activities (Kushida & Shimizu, 2013; Whitley, 1992). Thus, the 
dominant role of the keiretsu in post-war Japan could be witnessed, and is still evident 
today, although the strategy of keiretsu has shifted to put more emphasis on short-
term profit (Schaede, 2008).  
 
The Inter-firms Network of the Keiretsu  
One of the features of the Japanese keiretsu is that they tended to restrict their 
major economic activities to a single industrial sector, diversifying within it through a 
subcontracting network (Whitley, 1992). Thus, the keiretsu should be understood as a 
production (or subcontracting) network (Gerlach, 1992; Wright, 1996).  
The formation of keiretsu was organised around long-term commitment between 
particular firms, ranging across a variety of exchanges. Within the keiretsu, the 
general trading company (sogo shosha) played an intermediary between suppliers and 
customers, matching different clients’ inputs and outputs, and coordinate materials 
and information flows (Whitley, 1992). Whitley (1992, p. 31) argues, therefore, that 
they function as a ‘system integrator on a quasi-contractual basis’. For the general 
trading company of the keiretsu, it is particularly important to establish a production 
network based on long-termism, enlarging the scope of the production network, in 
order to reduce transaction costs.  
Additionally, the relationship between the main city bank and the keiretsu is 
mediated by the general trading company. By borrowing from the main banks, credits 
and project finance are channelled to SMEs in the production network. More 
importantly, through this main bank system, cross-shareholding can be 
institutionalised, and prevails to reinforce economic coordination within the keiretsu 
(Gao, 2001; Whitley, 1992).  
This cooperative inter-firms network, organised on long-termism, has some 
benefits. To begin with, and thanks to long-term economic coordination, uncertainty 
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and transaction costs can be significantly reduced through less negotiation between 
firms when information and technology are exchanged within the network (Witt, 2006, 
p. 89). Then, it helps to ensure the production network of the keiretsu can react to 
contingencies quickly, with consistently high quality and ‘just-in-time’ delivery (ibid). 
Through the establishment of this coordinated production network, which for 
outsiders would be extremely difficult to enter, competitive pressures can be 
minimised. The keiretsu are then able to develop a firm-specific skill formation 
system (Whitley, 1992). Finally, this cooperative network enables Japanese firms to 
combine (internal) flexibility with firm-specific skills (see below) (Aoki, 1988; Koike, 
1997; Miura, 2012).  
 
5.1.2 Chaebol as the Heart of the Korean Capitalist Production 
Following the Second World War and the Korean War (1950-53), the Korean 
government sold the factories, production equipment, and inventory of the Japanese 
colonial government to ‘individuals’10 with the closest relationship to officials. These 
developed into chaebols which dominated the post-war Korean economy. Chaebol 
originally meant ‘financial clique’ and was used to refer to “a group with a vast 
fortune” (S.-J. Chang, 2003, p. 9). During the 1950s, American aids were channelled 
into chaebols for the implementation of import-substitution industrialisation. The 
chaebols (for example, Hanwha, Doosan, Samsung and Hyundai) with closer political 
connections could gain preferential access to government-controlled resources and 
other government favours (Fields, 1995, p. 34). Under the protective conditions of 
import substitution, these chaebols could gain windfall profits through rent-seeking 
behaviours that expand the business activities to create a financial base for the future.  
Since the 1960s, these chaebols have rapidly developed. In order to establish and 
consolidate his military ruing regime, the General Park Chong-Hee needed to select 
‘friendly and capable’ entrepreneurs, channelling resources to them for 
implementation of export-oriented industrialisation (Fields, 1995, p. 34). This 
selective strategy gradually nourished the chaebols, increasing their industrial 
concentration (T. J. Cheng, 1990; Kang, 1996; D.-M. Shin, 2003; Woo, 2004). The 
growth of the chaebols was reinforced during the 1970s when capital-intensive heavy 
and chemical industrialisation was implemented. During the period of the Park regime 
(1961-79), the expansion of chaebols was significant, table 5.1.1 demonstrating that 
sales of the top ten chaebols reached 15.1% of GNP, before increasing to 48.1% in 
1980. Since then, Korea’s economy was dominated by the chaebol.  
10 These assets accounted for 30% of the Korean economy (S.-J. Chang, 2003, p. 46) 
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Table 5.1.1 Combined sales of top ten chaebols, as a percentage of GNPa 
Groups   1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984 
1  4.9  4.3  4.7  7.9  6.9  8.3  8.3  10.5  10.4  11.8  12.0 
2  7.2  7.5  8.1  12.5  12.9  12.8  16.3  19.1  19.0  21.2  24.0 
3  9.0  9.8  11.3  16.0  16.9  17.6  23.9  27.6  27.4  3.5  35.8 
4  10.3  11.4  12.9  18.2  20.7  22.1  30.1  35.2  35.6  38.7  44.3 
5  11.6  12.8  14.5  19.8  22.9  24.6  35.0  41.3  42.2  46.7  52.4 
6  12.7  14.1  16.1  21.3  24.7  26.6  38.2  44.9  46.0  51.0  56.2 
7  13.5  15.3  17.5  22.8  26.4  28.5  41.0  48.0  49.2  54.2  59.4 
8  14.3  16.2  18.4  24.0  27.7  30.3  43.6  50.9  52.2  57.1  62.1 
9  14.7  16.7  19.3  25.2  28.9  31.6  46.0  53.3  55.1  59.8  64.8 
10  15.1  17.1  19.8  26.0  30.1  32.8  48.1  55.7  57.6  62.4  67.4 
a (Aggregate net sales of the largest ten business groups/GNP) * 100 for each year 
Source: adopted from Amsden (1989, p. 116) 
 
The Inter-firms Network of the Chaebol  
Generally, chaebol is defined as “any group of two or more legally independent 
firms producing goods and/or services within various product sectors of the Korean 
Economy” (Fields, 1995, p. 32). Practically, some common features among chaebols 
existed. 
The chaebols were usually family-owned, their management thus underpinned on 
filial piety to forge an authoritarian hierarchy, and establish close inter-firms relations 
(E.-M. Kim, 1997, p. 63). The strongly centralised authority allowed chaebols to be 
efficient in decision making and information transferral (E.-M. Kim, 1997, p. 65). The 
state played an active role in enhancing it (E.-M. Kim, 1997, p. 65): providing low-
interest policy loans for chaebols to help the founder’s family retain the ownership of 
their businesses; the inherent law enabling businesses to be transferred to other family 
members without tax burdens.   
The chaebol, organised by different member’s companies and owned and 
managed by one or two families, have great ‘internal flexibility’ in mobilising and 
exchanging capital and technology among member’s companies. The chaebol, 
therefore, usually mobilise capital, or transfer technology, within its network (Fields, 
1995; E.-M. Kim, 1997). 
The Korean chaebols tended to develop, for three reasons, by horizontal 
diversification into unrelated sectors. For one thing, it helped chaebols, who had to 
diversify its business to unrelated but strategic sectors (believing their loss would 
eventually be covered by the state), to grasp the state’s financial supports (S.-J. Chang, 
2003; B.-K. Kim, 2012; E.-M. Kim, 1997). Next, the diversification of businesses 
57 
  
helped the chaebols to socialise business risks. Through diversification, the affiliate 
subsidiaries could be provided to each other through cross-shareholding or even 
circular shareholding, relieving the need to seek equity capital (B.-K. Kim, 2012, pp. 
37-38; E.-M. Kim, 1997). It minimised the risks of hostile takeovers, thereby being 
able to grow and protect family ownership and management. Lastly, in the 
circumstance of lacking institutionalised market coordination, diversification of 
business helped the chaebols to establish non-market coordination through an internal 
exchange within the chaebols, increasing its comparative advantage in lower sectors 
(E.-M. Kim, 1997, p. 77).  
 
5.1.3 Taiwan: The Dual Business System 
The Taiwanese business system is dualist: SMEs dominated the export-oriented 
sectors, while public enterprises and large private firms were domestic-oriented (C.-H. 
Chen, 1994; Fields, 1995). This dual business system was intentionally coordinated 
by the state (Fields, 1995). In contrast to Korea, the KMT government took over firms 
of the Japanese colonial rule following the war. For the KMT government, after the 
retreat from the mainland China in 1949, the main challenge was to ‘retain its 
hegemony in a capitalist system’ (T. J. Cheng, 1990, p. 143). The control of the KMT 
over these domestic-oriented enterprises became the prerequisite for the 
implementation of import-substitution industrialisation, and political legitimacy to 
support its war economy (T. J. Cheng, 1990; Z. R. Lee & Chen, 2011). In the 1950s, 
the KMT government channelled American aids to domestic-oriented enterprises to 
strengthen the state’s control over the economic system (Haggard, 1990). In 1951, 
over half of the total industrial production were out of state-owned enterprises 
(Haggard, 1990, p. 86). The significance of large companies is limited in Taiwan, 
when compared to Japan and Korea (table 5.1.2). In 1980, the largest 5 firms and 
chaebols contributed 5.52% and 18.4% of GNP, respectively, in Taiwan and Korea.  
Table 5.1.2 Contribution to Gross National Product by Firm Size in Taiwan (in 
percentages) 
Numbers of Firms   1980  1981  1982  1983 
5 largest  5.52  4.90  5.02  5.45 
10 largest   8.70  7.91  7.69  8.23 
20 largest  12.66  11.73  10.96  11.85 
Source: Diao (1983), adopted from Hamilton and Biggart (1997, p. 120). 
 
Following the end of American Aids in the 1960s, the KMT endeavoured to 
transform import-substitution industrialisation to export-oriented industrialisation, and 
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so the significance of domestic-oriented enterprises declined (Haggard, 1990; K. D. 
Lee, 2005). This transition resulted in the growth of export-oriented SMEs, although 
the foundation had been laid before it.  The Japanese colonial government (1895-1945) 
and the KMT government restricted indigenous Taiwanese to small-scale industries, 
businesses and land development (Haggard, 1990, pp. 78-79), and further prevented 
the centralisation of the economic power of Taiwanese to challenge the ruling KMT 
government (C. H. Huang, 2010; Ku, 1997; G. C. Liu, 2001).  
The KMT government launched the ‘Statute for the Encouragement of 
Investment’ to nourish export-oriented SMEs through tax exemption (K. D. Lee, 2005, 
p. 278). Table 5.1.3 shows that the significance of SMEs had been increasing since 
the 1960s, though Shieh (1997) and C.-H. Chen (1994) highlighted that in order to 
reducing labour cost, families were often used as invisible factories (subcontracting 
points) and female workers within were self-exploited (L. Cheng & Hsiung, 1992). 
That is, the significance of SMEs was higher than shown by official data.  
Table 5.1.3 Firm size and the percentage of employees in manufacture sector (%) 
Firm size   1966  1971  1976  1981  1986 
less 10  
(employees) 
71.6  68.7  68.7  69.6  63.3 
10-19  13.6  13.3  12.8  12.2  -- 
20-49  9.1  9.7  10.0  9.9  27.9 
50-99  2.7  3.7  4.3  4.2  4.8 
100-499  2.5  3.8  4.1  3.7  3.6 
500-  0.5  0.8  0.6  0.5  0.4 
Source: C.-H. Chen (1994, p. 31) 
 
Inter-Firm Relations – ‘Cooperative Production Network’ 
Inter-firm relations in Taiwan are based on neither long-term commitments like 
Japan, Korea or other CMEs, nor a short-term market mechanism. Rather, a 
‘cooperative production network’ is developed to reduce labour cost, decentralise 
business risks and increase flexibility (C.-H. Chen, 1994; Pan & Chang, 2001). SMEs 
are very sensitive to production costs in Taiwan, being labour-intensive industries 
(Wang, 2010a); and having flexibility of adaption of new technologies and skills (Hu 
& Schive, 1998). Consequently, the essential issue is how a production network may 
be developed in order to reduce production cost and enhance flexibility. 
A cooperative production network is defined to be: “horizontally integrated, 
made up of primary small and medium-sized companies that provide intermediated 
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goods and services for export-producing firms” (Hamilton, 1996, p. 23).11 In general, 
the capacities of an independent firm should include skills, management, capital, a 
marketing network, and so on, and for SMEs to own all of the production factors is 
impossible. Thus, through subcontracting, a cooperative production network can be 
forged to include large firms in the upstream sectors with a marketing network, and 
small companies in the downstream sectors with skills and medium enterprises in the 
intermediate sectors (C.-H. Chen, 1994; Fields, 1995; Whitley, 1992, 1999). In other 
words, a cooperative production network is a unit of production (Pan & Chang, 2001). 
A cooperative production network has two advantages. One is flexibility, and 
although an owner’s personal ties are crucial in a cooperative production network (C.-
H. Chen, 1994), a competitive nature exists (Pan & Chang, 2001). In a cooperative 
production network, a subcontractor can always be replaced by other subcontractors if 
difficulties are evident, and through competition, ‘risks’ in the process of production 
can be decentralised. Then, through a cooperative production network, SMEs can 
effectively reduce production costs (C.-H. Chen, 1994; Pan & Chang, 2001). Fixed 
production cost can be distributed into the cooperative production network and 
increase profits by cooperation. Essentially, the formation of a cooperative production 
network is the result of ‘the pressure of maximising profits and development’ (C.-H. 
Chen, 1994, p. 35). 
In short, Japan, Korea and Taiwan, though quite often described as the state-led 
capitalism, have different business systems and inter-firm relations. The differences in 
business systems results in different financial systems and labour market regimes.  
 
5.2 Financial Systems in East Asia 
In East Asia, a common feature of financial systems is the role that the state 
played as coordinator in guiding financial resources to strategic industries. Thus, the 
East Asian financial system would easily fit into the bank-based system (Witt & 
Redding, 2013).12 If examined carefully, however, differences between them would 
be highlighted.  
 
11 Fields (1995) describes this cooperative production network as ‘quanxiqiye’ (related enterprise). 
Although the definitions of cooperative production network and quanxiqiye are not consistent, they are 
common in describing the feature of Taiwan’s inter-firms relations.  
12 Witt & Redding (2013) argue that the financial systems in Japan, Korea and Taiwan could be fitted 
into the bank-based financial system. But this perspective, based on official data, ignores the 
significance of informal financial institutions, particularly in Taiwan. 
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5.2.1 The Main Bank System in Japan 
The financial system of Japan is bank-based (Vitols, 2001; Witt & Redding, 
2013). Initially, the Meiji government adopted a laissez-faire financial system in order 
to abolish the old system. But financial crises of the late 1920s led state elites to 
construct a regulated bank-based financial system.13 This helped the state actively 
steer war mobilisation and industrialisation in the pre-war period (Vitols, 2001). In the 
post-war period, though the Allied government endeavoured to export the U.S.-style 
market-based financial system to Japan to dissolve the zaibatsu (Whitley, 1992, p. 
146),14 conflict of interests between the Japanese government and the Allied 
government saw its failure (G. Park, 2011). To support its economic reconstruction, 
the Japanese government wanted to use expansionary fiscal policy, and its ‘priority 
production’ was implemented in 1946. This was aimed at channelling financial 
resources to basic industries, particularly, the energy sector. The state-run 
Reconstruction Finance Bank was therefore established in order to provide long-term 
credit for investment when the private sector lacked capital.15 Since significant 
inflation was caused by the Reconstruction Finance Bank during the late 1940s, the 
Allied government prioritised the control of inflation.16 They believed that this would 
weaken Japan’s capacity in war mobilisation. The bank-based financial system was 
still maintained in the post-war period.  
Principally, two distinctive features of Japan’s bank-based system can be 
observed. Firstly, the degree of its state involvement was high due to late 
development and war mobilisation (Vitols, 2001; Whitley, 1992). During the post-war 
period, the Japanese government played two more systematic roles in regulating the 
financial system. The indirect method of controlling banks’ behaviour was by the 
Bank of Japan providing ‘administrative’ or ‘window’ guidance.17 By allocating loans 
13 In Japan, the Banking Act of 1927 was passed in response to the banking crisis of 1927, endowing 
the state with regulatory power. 
14 In 1948, the Securities and Exchange Act was introduced to create an independent securities 
regulatory commission based on the model of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Vitols, 
2001, p. 188). It was soon abolished, in 1952, and its function was taken over by the Ministry of 
Finance.  
15 72 % of all capital investment in 1947 came from the Reconstruction Finance Bank, and 65% in 
1948 (G. Park, 2011, p. 58).  
16 The Reconstruction Finance Bank was financed through the issuance of bonds, the majority of which 
were purchased by the Bank of Japan. In 1946, the Bank of Japan purchased 94% of all Reconstruction 
Finance Bank bonds, and 76% and 64% in the following two years (G. Park, 2011, p. 58). This 
financial mechanism led to the increase in wage and retail prices. In 1949, wages and retail prices were 
168 and 220 times of the pre-war base between 1934 and 1936 (ibid). This was known as “RFB 
inflation”.  
17 Windows guidance is a policy used by the Bank of Japan to quantitatively adjust the total loans made 
by private banks. By this, the Bank of Japan can use it to control the distribution of capital for the 
priority production, and as a tool of macroeconomic policy. To resolve the dilemma faced by the 
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to banks that followed the state’s wishes, state guidance could help the central bank to 
restrict credit growth (Whitley, 1992). More directly, the Japanese government 
controlled financial resources through state-controlled specialist banks: the Industrial 
Bank of Japan, the Export-Import Bank, and the Japan Development Bank. More 
importantly, the Ministry of Finance established the Fiscal Investment and Loan 
Programme in 1952, which mobilised and allocated savings in the form of investment 
and loans to serve policy purposes (G. Park, 2011).18 It is known, therefore, as 
Japan’s ‘second budget’.  
The Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme included three parts, as shown in 
figure 5.2.1. The financial sources include postal savings and public pension funds, 
Postal Life Insurance and Annuity, and state-owned enterprises dividends and so on 
(Calder, 1990; G. Park, 2011). These funds are then collected, managed and 
transferred, to support economic development through the intermediaries, chief being 
the Trust Fund Bureau (introduced in 1951) which endowed the Ministry of Finance 
with great authority to manage the investment of these financial funds (Calder, 1990, 
p. 42). These intermediaries decided how these funds were channelled to support 
economic development and for political purposes, and are therefore often influenced 
by politicians (G. Park, 2004). Finally, Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme funds 
were directed to local governments, and a range of governmental, and quasi-
governmental entities. Local governments borrow funds from the Fiscal Investment 
and Loan Programme to finance their debts; otherwise, other financial institutions 
may channel these funds to key strategic industries and public infrastructures. 
Through the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme, the Japanese government could 
“keep taxes low and budgets balanced, all without having to restrain public spending” 
(G. Park, 2011, p. 1). Public pensions could then be mobilised as long-term industrial 
capital (Calder, 1990; G. Park, 2011).  
 
Japanese government: by supplying industrial capital to support economic development and to 
discipline the private banks’ lending behaviour (Gao, 2001, pp. 78-79).  
18 The Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme in fact is the product of the U.S. Occupation. In order to 
deal with inflation, the U.S. sent a banker, Joseph Dodge, to Japan, and the Allied government 
implemented a nine-point stabilisation package to bring down inflation. The Reconstruction Finance 
Bank were prohibited to sell its bonds, and was eventually abolished in 1949. This marked the end of 
the priority production. However, simultaneously, these deflation measures resulted in economic 
hardship in the early 1950s. The U.S. provided new financial aid to Japan, asking the Japanese 
government to create the Counterpart Account under the authority of the Ministry of Finance to 
manage these new funds. In order to respond to the budget restrictions imposed by the U.S., after the 
end of the Allied government, the Japanese government introduced the Fiscal Investment and Loan 
Programme (G. Park, 2011).  
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 Japan’s bank-based system is centred on long-term commitment between the 
main city bank and firms, and is thus known as the main bank system. Before the war, 
the holding company of zaibatsu played a central role in capital allocation, but its 
function was dominated by the large city banks (Gerlach, 1992). In the main bank 
system, a main bank provides the largest share of loans to a firm with other lenders in 
turn not monitoring the company, but relying on the judgement of the main bank (Gao, 
2001). This system helps keiretsu to strengthen coordination through cross-
shareholding (Gao, 2001). In the 1950s, cross-shareholding was a strategy to maintain 
close relationships with banks in order to secure capital; in the 1960s, it was 
reinforced in order to avoid hostile takeovers (Gao, 2001). Principally, cross-
shareholding is grounded on agreements to hold stock on a ‘long-term friend’ basis 
(Sheard, 1994, p. 311). Thus, it helps to avoid hostile takeovers and promote 
information sharing within the keiretsu (Aoki, 1988; Gao, 2001; Gerlach, 1992). 
Through this, transaction costs can be minimised, and the main bank can have a better 
position in risk assessment (Odagiri, 1992). More importantly, it effectively reduces 
the pressures of pursuing short-term profits from shareholders, instead pursuing the 
collective survival of all employees, and developing long-term commitments to 
institutionalise the employment system (firm-specific skill formation and seniority 
wage and the permanent employment system) (Sheard, 1994, pp. 322-325).  
In short, Japan’s financial system helped mobilise pension funds as industrial and 
patient capital: public pension funds through the Fiscal Investment and Loan 
Programme, and private pensions through the main bank system and cross-
shareholding (Estévez-Abe, 2008; G. Park, 2004, 2011). Additionally, the bank-based 
financial system helped develop firm-specific skills through long-term credit loans, 
with the institutional linkage of pension system and capitalist production established.  
 
5.2.2 Korea: The State-Dominated Financial System  
In Korea, the state was a crucial, institutional coordinator in channelling 
financial resources to the selected chaebols, facilitating the strategically chosen 
industries (B.-S. Choi, 1993; B.-K. Kim, 2012; E.-M. Kim, 1997). During the period 
of the Rhee government, under the pressures of the U.S., the former Japanese 
commercial banks were privatised (Fields, 1995, p. 95). Thus, the state could not 
effectively guild banks’ behaviours, instead relying on American Aids (B.-S. Choi, 
1993). After Park Chong-Hee seized power in 1961, he controlled the financial 
system by nationalising private commercial banks in order to implement export-
oriented industrialisation (Fields, 1995, p. 94). “It provided the state with the means 
for assuring chaebol compliance with state goals” (Fields, 1995, p. 96).  
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The Park regime authorised the borrowing of foreign funds by the Korea 
Development Bank, guaranteeing foreign commercial loans due to the decline of 
American Aids (B.-S. Choi, 1993). The Park regime, because of his economic 
nationalism, tended to rely on foreign loans, rather than foreign direct investment (D.-
M. Shin, 2003). The Park regime used low interest rate policy loans to facilitate 
strategically selective industries- at first, labour-intensive light industries in the 1960s, 
and then, capital-intensive heavy and chemical industries in the 1970s (Fields, 1995). 
Through this, the Park regime not only empowered its state autonomy and authority 
over the private agents (chaebols), but more importantly, coordinated a strong linkage 
between the financial system and industrial policy.  
 
Table 5.2.1 Source of Funds for the Corporate Sector (% of total) 
Source  1963-65  1966-71  1972-76  1977-81  1982-86  1987-91 
Internal Funds   47.7  25.4  32.9  23.3  33.5  26.4 
External Funds  52.3  74.6  67.1  67.1  66.5  73.6 
Total   100  100  100  100  100  100 
External Fund  
Borrowing from 
Monetary 
           
Institutions  48.4  41.8  51.1  53.7  41.8  36.0 
         Banks  33.5  32.8  34.3  32.6  22.6  17.0 
         Nonbanks  15.0  9.0  16.8  21.1  19.2  19.0 
Securities (direct finance)  27.6  14.3  21.8  24.8  27.5  37.4 
         Debts  1.2  0.7  2.5  4.2  11.0  14.5 
         Stocks  21.4  11.8  18.1  14.4  16.5a  22.9a 
         Capital paid in  5.0  2.7  1.3  1.9  --  -- 
    Corporate bills  --  --  1.8  5.5  3.9  3.3 
    Government and curb                
         market loans  
8.5  7.8  -0.3  0.8  24.9b  20.2b 
Borrowing from abroad  15.4  36.2  26.6  15.2  1.9  3.1 
Source: adopted from Fields (1995, p. 106). a stocks and capital paid in; b other included.  
 
A heavy reliance on bank loans and foreign borrowing was, therefore, the feature 
of the financial structure of the chaebols. During the first half of the 1960s, Korean 
firms greatly relied on internal funding (47.7%) with the remainder coming, mostly, 
from monetary institutions and banks (Table 5.2.1). Bank and foreign loans became 
the dominant source of corporate financing after the Park regime had established a 
system of bank guarantees for foreign loans in 1963, and introduced interest rate 
reforms in 1965. From 1966 to 1971, internal sources dropped to 25.4%, while 
external funds rose to 74.6%. In the 1970s, Korea’s firms continued to rely on indirect 
external financing, the financial system being banking-based. This heavy reliance on 
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the bank’s loans and foreign borrowing from the state’s credit, as patient capital, 
enabled the chaebols to establish long-term relationship with banks, then to devote 
financial resources in skill-upgrading and innovation (Wang, 2010a).  
This institutional linkage led, however, to a moral hazard for the chaebols- in 
order to attract the private agents needed to enter newly strategic industries, the state 
guaranteed the loss of banks’ loans. Thus, the banks failed to take the evaluation of 
economic and financial feasibility of the projects seriously. The chaebols, as rent 
seekers, exploited this by diversification of their businesses (B.-S. Choi, 1993, p. 28). 
A heavy reliance on bank and foreign loans for corporate financing resulted in the 
chaebols being more vulnerable to changing international economic situations, and is 
often suggested to be one of the main causes of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 (D. 
J. Chang et al., 2012; S.-J. Chang, 2003; J. S. Shin & Chang, 2003).  
In short, having great reliance on chaebols as the drive of economic development 
led the Korean state to endeavour to mobilise public pensions or other financial 
sources to support its chaebol-dominated capitalist structure.   
 
5.2.3 Taiwan: The Dualist Financial System 
The Taiwanese dualist financial system is complemented to its dual-business 
structure (domestic-oriented public enterprises, and large private firms and export-
oriented SMEs). Unlike Japan and Korea, long-term cross-shareholding is not 
prevalent in Taiwan, and the role of the state is much more directly involved with the 
control of Taiwanese financial resources and institutions (T. J. Cheng, 1993; Haggard, 
1990). Initially, the KMT government almost completely controlled the financial 
system (Z. R. Lee & Chen, 2011, p. 72). For indigenous Taiwanese, the KMT 
government was seen as an ‘alien’ regime, controlled by a minority of Chinese 
mainlanders. The KMT government needed, for its political stability, to control the 
financial system to prevent the rise of large private capital, controlled by indigenous 
capitalists (T. J. Cheng, 1993, pp. 58-59). Consequently, Taiwan’s financial system is 
relatively undeveloped, and controlled by the KMT government (Haggard, 1990, p. 
93). Ten banks were either state, or province-owned, with private commercial banks 
essentially controlled, or managed, by state and party-owned enterprises (Z. R. Lee & 
Chen, 2011, p. 72).  
This state-controlled financial system was significant in the channelling of 
financial resources (included American aids) to public enterprises and large private 
firms. In the 1950s, 60% of all loans were made by the leading bank, the Bank of 
Taiwan, but of these, more than 80% were made to state-owned enterprises, or the 
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military (Z. R. Lee & Chen, 2011, p. 72). This was due to conservative monetary 
policy, which constrained the credit of banks- a measure that helped maintain price 
stability and prevent the concentration of indigenous Taiwanese-controlled private 
capital (T. J. Cheng, 1993, pp. 57-58). Therefore, in the period of import-substitution 
industrialisation, the Taiwanese financial system was a state-dominated system that 
could mobilise resources to public enterprises and strategic industries, instead of 
entrepreneurs of capital and credit (Z. R. Lee & Chen, 2011, p. 72). The KMT, 
however, did not facilitate industrial concentration. 
With export-oriented SMEs relying more on informal sectors (friends, family, 
Rotating Credit) than formal financial institutions, although the KMT government 
controlled the financial system, the link between the financial system and industrial 
policy was not established (T. J. Cheng, 1993, p. 57).19 SMEs could not receive 
financial credit from state-controlled banks (C.-H. Chen, 1994, p. 86). To begin with, 
SMEs were predominantly family-owned, and had sufficient capital only to enter 
labour, rather than capital, intensive industries (p. 86). Then, the owners usually saw 
bank loans as liabilities for firms (p.86-87). Alongside this, the Taiwanese state-
owned banks were too conservative to be the source of entrepreneurial capital and 
developmental capital for SMEs (p.87-89). Lastly, the KMT government wanted to 
restrain the growth of private capital due to its political calculation (T. J. Cheng, 1990, 
p. 57). It was for these reasons that SMEs relied more on informal financial channels 
for entrepreneurial capital than formal financial institutions (C.-H. Chen, 1994).  
This dualist financial system has two consequences. SMEs didn’t need to collect 
capital as large firms did, but had to establish a cooperative production network for 
reduction of cost and increase of profits (C.-H. Chen, 1994, pp. 102-107). The 
establishment of cooperative production network can be seen as the demand of this 
particular dual financial system (C.-H. Chen, 1994). Also, SMEs in Taiwan are, in the 
majority, not capital-intensive industries and are consequently, sensitive to labour 
costs (Wang, 2010a); small employers are reluctant to introduce corporate pensions 
for employees and are unwilling to rely on it for capital collection. 
 
5.3 Labour Market Regimes in East Asia 
Complemented with business and financial systems, Japan, Korea and Taiwan 
developed different labour market regimes. In Taiwan, general skills are adopted by 
19 In the 1980s, the KMT government authorised strategic industry loans to accelerate industrial 
upgrading. However, it only accounted for 4.3% of total loans from state-owned banks in 1988 (T. J. 
Cheng, 1993, p. 57).  
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SMEs, but labour is also decentralised; while in Japan and Korea, both adopted the 
firm-specific skill formation system and established enterprise unionism.  
 
5.3.1 Japan 
Three main pillars of labour market regime in Japan are the permanent 
employment system, the seniority-based system (the nenko system), and company 
welfare, which were developed for the institutionalisation of the firm-specific skill 
formation system (Levine & Kawada, 1980; Thelen, 2004). Enterprise unionism 
emerged as the result of such a system, and these pillars, together with enterprise 
unionism, constitute so-called ‘welfare corporatism’ (Weiss, 1993).  
 
The Firm-specific Skill Formation System 
Japan’s firm-specific skill formation system is rooted in the Meiji period 
(Nishiguchi, 1994; Thelen, 2004). The Meiji government launched a broad 
liberalisation policy that aimed to abolish all barriers to labour mobility with the 
traditional privileges of the artisanal sectors undermined (Thelen, 2004, p. 151). In the 
face of a shortage of skilled labour, the Meiji government, firstly, sent Japanese 
students to foreign countries and recruited foreign engineers (ibid, p. 153). Secondly, 
the state attempted to develop more skilled workers through the establishment of 
factory-based technical schools (ibid, p. 154). These public enterprises became not 
only the model of skill formation, but also the main source of skilled workers for 
private firms (Levine & Kawada, 1980, p. 151). 
Conversely, larger private firms recruited traditional artisans (oyakata) for 
apprentice training, through ‘continuous skill teaching’, in order to adapt traditional 
skills to new tasks (particularly following the First World War) (Suzuki & Kubo, 2012; 
Thelen, 2004, p. 155). Large, Japanese manufacturers introduced more in-plant 
training, devising firm-specific job classifications, breaking away from the traditional, 
handcraft mode of production (Nishiguchi, 1994, p. 23). Skill formation in either 
public enterprises or private firms was plant-based, relying on the traditional master-
apprentice relationship. Through this system, “firms could minimise the costs 
associated with finding appropriate skills, and overcome the problems of imperfect 
information (for example, about a worker’s skill level) in the absence of any kind of 
formal certification or standard” (Thelen, 2004, p. 155). 
To dampen labour mobility through consolidation of the company-based training 
system, several measures were adopted (Levine & Kawada, 1980, p. 130; Thelen, 
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2004, pp. 158-162). Core workers could receive ongoing, broad but firm-specific, 
training, devised to enable flexible deployment in response to the firm’s needs 
(Thelen, 2004, p. 164). The permanent employment and the seniority-based wage 
system, and retirement severance payments were introduced to core skilled workers in 
large companies (Gordon, 1985; Levine & Kawada, 1980; Thelen, 2004). Most 
importantly, employers established collective economic coordination to avoid skill 
poaching (Thelen, 2004, p. 161; Weiss, 1993, p. 335). Employer associations in some 
industries, for example, established regulations ensuring the exclusive right to re-
contract former employees under sanction of heavy fines (Weiss, 1993, p. 335). 
Thanks to these strategies, the labour turnover rates in large-scale manufacturing 
sectors decreased dramatically since the 1920s (Nishiguchi, 1994, pp. 21-22). 
Meanwhile, the haphazard practice of recruiting skilled workers from the labour 
market resulted in a shift towards the periodic recruitment of elementary school 
leavers as apprentices (ibid, pp. 23-24).  
In post-war Japan, public education failed to achieve an essential influence on 
skill formation, where the overriding goal of education reforms of the Allied 
government was to eliminate ultra-nationalism and establish a democratic outlook 
(Levine & Kawada, 1980, pp. 103-105). It was insufficient for industrialisation and as 
a result, private enterprises continued maintaining, and expanding, their own training 
programmes. In the post-war period, larger firms commonly recruited graduates of 
general education courses, offering on, and off-the-job job training programmes to 
these new employees. The off-the-job training begins with two entry courses. The first 
is a one-year, full-time course,20 the other as short as one week long. While off-the-
job training attempts to offer skills for typical work, the primary means of skill 
formation in Japan is through on-the-job training (Brown, Green, & Lauder, 2001; 
Busemeyer, 2009; Koike, 1987), a system of learning-by-doing. It is, therefore, 
informal, and inseparable from work itself. Through on-the-job training, employees 
can reduce the rigidity of job specialisation by learning how to cope with local 
emergencies (Aoki, 1988; Koike, 1987). This must be achieved through a wide range 
of job experiences, and thus, job rotation plays a critical role in Japan’s skill formation. 
The job rotation system has three crucial implications. It helps employees to gain 
firm-specific skills (so-called intellectual skills) to cope with unusual work (Aoki, 
1988; Koike, 1987); employees can gain an overall picture of the production process, 
promoting internal coordination (Brown et al., 2001); and it also facilitates knowledge 
sharing, helping to enhance workers’ capacities to process information relevant to 
shop floor efficiency (Aoki, 1988, pp. 15-16). 
20 Originally, this full time course was for three years. The expansion of secondary education led 
private enterprises to shorten it to one year however (Koike, 1987, p. 297).  
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The versatility of workers and flexibility in job demarcation enables Japanese 
firms to gain internal flexibility and comparative institutional advantage (Aoki, 1988; 
Busemeyer, 2009; Miura, 2012). This firm-specific skill formation system, however, 
relies on the long-term relationship between employers and employees (Busemeyer, 
2009; Estévez-Abe, 2008), the incentive system making employees’ investment in 
firm-specific skills particularly critical. It includes the hierarchical ranking system, 
seniority-base wage system, and generous company welfare benefits. The 1950s and 
1960s witnessed the institutionalisation of these incentive schemes, such as the 
expansion of the Retirement Allowance, and other corporate pension schemes. 
Simultaneously, it is complemented by enterprise unionism (Busemeyer, 2009; Koike, 
1987). 
 
The Evolution of Enterprise Unionism in Japan  
The core feature of employment relations in Japan is ‘enterprise unionism’ (D. Y. 
Jeong & Aguilera, 2008; Kawanishi, 1992) which was forged in the 1950s, and 
consolidated and incorporated into the conservative coalition in the 1960s and 1970s 
(D. Y. Jeong & Aguilera, 2008). Pre-war, labour was limited, or even prohibited or 
subordinated to, and was considered as a part of the company for military 
mobilisation (Weiss, 1993). In the process of the institutionalisation of the Japanese 
employment system, the foundation of enterprise unionism was laid down.  
After the war, the Allied government empowered labour with three labour laws 
(Kume, 1998).21 The Densan (Conference of Electricity Unions) invited a new wage 
demand formula to address post-war hyperinflation: “a fixed minimum wage based on 
the cost of living, adjusted to reflect regional variation, additional pay to reward 
ability, seniority, and attendance, the elimination of imbalances based on rank on 
educational background, and a commitment to adjust wages in the future to reflect 
price change” (Gordon, 1985, p. 352). This principle was quickly reflected by most 
industries, and accepted by employers. Closely linked to “objective characteristics of 
age and seniority that were likely to rise with need” (ibid, p. 356), it was described as 
a ‘livelihood wage’ that guaranteed a sufficient wage for workers. Additionally, secure 
employment within the enterprise in uncertain economic situation was demanded by 
the workforce (ibid, p. 365). Principally, these requirements were accepted by most 
employers and the notion of enterprise as a community was enhanced by these 
21 In December 1945, 509 labour unions were formed and covered 0.38 million members; two years 
later, the number of labour unions had increased to 28,000, covering 6.27 million members. In 1949, 
union density hit a historical record- 55%, compared to 7.9% in 1931 (Shinkawa, 2005b, p. 49). 
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practices. Factories or enterprises became the basic ‘unit’ of union organisation 
(Kume, 1998). 
This political opportunity for establishing corporatist institutions was not seized 
by labour, and the extremely favourable environment for labour unions did not last 
long. Although labour endeavoured to establish national corporatist institution, their 
confrontational attitudes led to the break of corporatist consensus (Gordon, 1998; 
Kume, 1998; Shinkawa, 2005b). In addition, the Allied government shifted its policy 
goal from democratisation to reconstructing Japan as a fortress against communism 
(Kume, 1998; Shinkawa, 2005b). The conservative coalition was forged in the 1950s 
from conservative parties, big business, the agricultural sector, and to a lesser extent, 
small business, to emphasise on ‘production first’ (Gordon, 1998; Shinkawa, 2005b). 
Therefore, the Japanese and Allied government, and Nikkeiren (Japan Federation of 
Employer’s Association) worked together to dissolve industrial unionism (Gordon, 
1998). Employers did not adopt an antagonist attitude towards labour, rather made 
compromises with labour to stabilise labour-management relations. These were done, 
though, within enterprises through the creation of second unions and provision of 
financial resources (D. Y. Jeong & Aguilera, 2008, p. 119; Gordon, 1998). Since firm-
specific skills could be mobilised, within firms, as a potential political power by the 
enterprise unions, management is made to depend on skilled workers (Koike, 1987; 
Kume, 1998). Enterprise unionism, therefore, was forged in the 1950s. 
In the 1960s, enterprise unionism was consolidated, with large enterprise unions 
withdrawing from the Sohyo (General Council of Trade Union), and the Churitsu 
Roren (Federation of Independent Unions of Japan), in order to establish a loose 
federation of private sector enterprise unions- the International Metalworkers 
Federation-Japan Council, in 1964 (D. Y. Jeong & Aguilera, 2008). It, from 1965, 
dominated the ‘shunto’ (spring offensive) (Kume, 1998). This ‘pushed’ the Japanese 
labour movement towards a more cooperative way. In the 1970s, the unfavourable 
economic conditions led labour to legitimise enterprise unionism to secure job 
security for core workers. The Rengo (Japanese Trade Union Confederation) even 
endorsed the principles of enterprise unionism. 
Although Japan’s labour relations are characterised with enterprise unionism, 
national-level wage negotiations were developed as well. Since 1951, employers and 
labour both endeavoured to establish a new wage bargaining system that could 
response the rationalisation, and reorganisation, of Japanese industries. It did not 
reach a compromise until 1954, labour declaring that labour unions should limit their 
goals to: “protect workers’ economic interests and should refrain from political 
activities” (Kume, 1998, p. 81). The new wage bargaining system, known as ‘shunto’ 
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was established in 1954 and implemented in March 1955. The aims of shunto were (1) 
“to cooperate with management in raising productivity” and (2) “to seek an 
enlargement of their own share through negotiations with management which would 
focus on the ‘base-up’” (Kawanishi, 1992). Principally, shunto is designed to be 
coordinated by five major industrial federations. This strengthened the functions of 
the federations, allowing the weakness of enterprise unionism to be overcome (by 
coordinating wages once annually, and by standardising wage increases across 
industries) (Kawanishi, 1992; Kume, 1998).  
The formation and consolidation of enterprise unionism resulted in labour 
divide- core versus non-regular workers. Core workers of enterprise unionism have 
great interests in defending their welfare and employment status, with higher 
organisational capacities; but non-regular workers are less organised and enjoy less 
welfare and employment security, therefore prefer public welfare.  
 
5.3.2 Korea 
In Korea, the company-based skill formation was established in the 1960s, and 
gradually consolidated in the 1970s and 1980s, after its developmental strategy shifted 
towards heavy and chemical industrialisation. Along with the formation of the 
company-based skill formation system, enterprise unionism was developed. However, 
the enterprise union system was implemented directly by the state, using force, and 
reinforcing it by law. 
 
The Company-Based Skill formation  
In Korea, the state played an active role in resolving the market failure of skill 
formation through the control of demand and supply sides of skills, establishing the 
company-based skill formation system (Ashton et al., 1999; S.-Y. Park, 2012; Yoon & 
Lee, 2010). Initially, the Rhee regime aimed to provide primary education for children, 
and literary for adults, but failed to coordinate the social demands for education and 
economic needs. This resulted in high unemployment amongst college graduates 
(Ashton et al., 1999; S.-Y. Park, 2012). 
Since the 1960s, a set of policies were adopted to promote vocational training, 
and create prerequisites for the labour-intensive, export-oriented industrialisation. For 
example, the state established public and private vocational training systems in 1964, 
devoting substantial public funds to secondary vocational schools. It also established 
13 company-based training facilities (Yi, 2007; Yi & Lee, 2005). In 1967, the Park 
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regime introduced the Vocational Training Law, hoping to establish a vocational 
training system, and to conform to a second five-year economic plan. However, with 
employers reluctant to develop company-based training systems, under labour-
intensive export-oriented industrialisation, the in-plant vocational training system was 
not expanded (S.-Y. Park, 2012; Yi, 2007, p. 94). 
The Park regime furthered company-based skill formation in the 1970s when its 
developmental strategy was shifted towards heavy and chemical industrialisation, 
achieved through the responsibility of vocational training being transferred to 
employers. The ‘Special Measure Act for Vocational Training’ was introduced in 1974, 
although it was postponed following the first oil crisis (Yi & Lee, 2005, p. 151). The 
‘Basic Law for Vocational Training’ was then introduced in 1976 to resume its 
vocational training policy. Under the Basic Law, employers with more than 300 
employees were encouraged to establish a company-based training system to train a 
proportion of their employees. Failing to would see a training levy applied. The law 
significantly increased in-plant training schemes in the private sector (table 5.3.1). 
This result could be, partly, attributed to the consistence in the interests of the state 
and chaebols. Chaebols, requiring a skilled workforce for the new industries (Yoon & 
Lee, 2010, p. 171), were encouraged by the state to invest in heavy and chemical 
industrialisation through policy loan. Economic liberalisation in the 1980s, however, 
resulted in a weakened company-based training system. 
 
Table 5.3.1 Training of craftsmen by training authority in Korea (numbers of 
individuals) 
  1972-1976  1977-1981  1982-1986 
Government training   81,294 (25.99%)  120,117 (24.23%)  121,044 (44.31%) 
In-plant training  177,388 (56.72%)  337,388 (68.06%)  114,773 (42.02%) 
Authorised training  54,092 (17.29%)  38,234 (7.71%)  37,334 (13.67%) 
Total  312,736 (100%)  495,739 (100%)  273,151 (100%) 
Source: Lee (1990, p. 96); adopted from Ashton et al. (1999, p. 72) 
 
In Korea, however, two leading business associations- the Federation of Korean 
Industries and the Korea Employer Federation- failed to establish a coordinating 
mechanism on the issue of skill poaching. The tenure rate in Korea was thus higher 
than in Japan (appendix 6). In the absence of a skill poaching coordination mechanism, 
employers developed a set of interdependent labour market institutions, which 
included permanent employment practices, seniority-based wage systems, and 
corporate welfare (Song, 2012b, pp. 241-243). From the mid-80s, with the lifting of 
the state’s labour control policy, these institutions consolidated the company-based 
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skill formation system, particularly stabilising labour mobility. This lifting of policy 
was due to political democratisation, which endowed organised chaebols unions with 
greater political power in the fight for improvement of working conditions and 
corporate welfare (E.-H. Jung, 1993; Song, 2012b; Yi, 2007). 
 
Enterprise Unionism in Korea  
In Korea, labour is militant but organised at enterprise level (Y.-K. Lee, 2011). 
The state politically demobilised labour in the authoritarian period, by decentralising 
labour into the enterprise level (J.-Y. Jeong, 2007). During the Korean War, the 
shortage of workforce increased the relative power of labour, weakening state 
autonomy (Yi, 2007, p. 62). In response, the Rhee regime launched four critical labour 
legislations in 1953: the Labour Standard Act, the Trade Union Act, the Labour 
Council Act, and the Labour Dispute Arbitration Act. The latter three guaranteed a 
worker’s rights to association and collective action, but, to maintain Rhee’s legitimacy. 
These laws essentially endowed the state with higher authority over labour unions. 
The Trade Union Act gave the government the authority to investigate and audit the 
financial operation of unions, and to decline any decisions made. Moreover, it 
confined bargaining activities to enterprise level (Yi, 2007). These laws aimed to 
force labour unions to act as “the labour arm of the ruling party in maintaining labour 
peace and encouraging productivity” (Deyo, 1989, p. 120). 
When Park came to power in 1961, labour was repressed to maintain Park’s 
political legitimacy, and to create a business-friendly environment for labour-intensive 
export-oriented industrialisation (Deyo, 1989; Y.-K. Lee, 2011). The Park regime 
reorganised labour unions, striving to focus on economic and social benefits (instead 
of focusing on class issues at enterprise level) by de-politicising labour unions (Y.-K. 
Lee, 2011; Song, 2012b; Woo, 2004). To begin with, the Federation of Korean Trade 
Unions was established, a national-level labour union. It was initially a government-
sponsored, centralised union, structured along industrial lines, and consisting of 16 
industrial unions (Deyo, 1989, p. 121). The government, however, controlled the 
selection and decision of leader of the Federation of Korean Trade Unions. 
Furthermore, the Park regime revised labour laws to prohibit unions from 
participating in political activities in 1963 (Y.-K. Lee, 2011; Song, 2012b; Yi, 2007).22 
The goal of planting the idea that the functions of labour unions should be classless, 
22 According to the laws, labour unions had to obtain authorisation from the government to acquire 
legal status, and the government could also cancel the licence of a labour union. Furthermore, these 
laws introduced a closed-shop system to replace the union-shop system, prohibiting the involvement of 
a third party in the collective bargaining of the enterprise (Yi, 2007, p. 98).  
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and cooperative, into the Federation of Korean Trade Unions was successfully 
achieved. The result was the further disempowering of the Federation of Korean 
Trade Unions, and its functions, restricted to narrowly defining economic interests at 
firm level (Y.-K. Lee, 2011; Song, 2012b; Yi, 2007). The state’s labour control policy 
failed to change in the 1970s, but was reinforced with the establishment of a hard 
authoritarian regime, the Yushin regime (Y.-K. Lee, 2011). Table 5.3.2 shows some 
indicators of labour power in Korea. Keeping in mind, unionised workers are chaebol 
workers, empowered after political democratisation (D. I. Kim, 2006). 
 
Table 5.3.2 Indicators of Labour Unions in Korea from 1970 to 2007  














1970  473  3,500  12.6  4  1 
1975  750  4,091  15.8  52  10 
1980  948  2,635  14.7  206  49 
1985  1,004.3  2,534  12.4  265  28.7 
1986  1,035.8  2,658  12.3  276  46.9 
1987  1,267.4  4,086  13.8  3,749  1262.2 
1988  1,707.4  6,124  17.8  1,827  293.4 
1989  1,932.4  7,861  18.6  1,616  409.1 
1990  1,886.8  7,676  17.2  322  135.9 
1995  1,615  6,606  12.5  88  50 
2000  1,527  5,698  11.4  250  178 
2005  1,506  5,971  9.9  287  118 
2006  1,559  5,889  10.0  138  131 
2007  1,688  5,099  10.6  115  93 
Source: B.-H. Lee (2012, p. 302) and D.-M. Shin (2003, p. 109) 
 
Political alienation and incorporation of core workers into the state-cahebol 
developmental alliance made core workers more growth-minded. Unlike Japan, the 
state played a more critical role in not only actively encouraging chaebol workers to 
focus on non-political issues, but also aggressively repressing labour movement. This 
resulted in a social cleavage between chaebol and non-chaebol workers and, in turn 







Compared to Japan and Korea, Taiwan’s labour market more relies more on 
general skills, and labour was disempowered at national and firm level due to its 
SMEs-dominated capitalist structure.  
 
Skill formation 
The role of the state was significant in skill formation for political legitimacy and 
economic development (Ashton et al., 1999; Ku, 1997). During the 1950s, the 
provision of primary education (six years compulsory education) was treated as the 
priority in order to upgrade the quality of the people, legitimating the KMT’s 
authoritarian regime. The emphasis of the education system was on population control, 
rather than a statutory vocational system (Ashton et al., 1999; Wade, 2004).  
As export-oriented industrialisation was adopted in the 1960s, however, the state 
argued that the education system should be designed to harmonise with the needs of 
economic development (Ashton et al., 1999, p. 91; C. F. Chang & Tsay, 2006, p. 72). 
The KMT government devoted financial resources to the provision of vocational 
education, rather than lengthening the period of compulsory education (although it 
was extended to nine years). The share of vocational education increased significantly, 
but did not play a critical role in skill formation, since skills learning from vocational 
schools could not be used in the rapidly changing labour market (C. F. Chang & Tsay, 
2006, pp. 73-75). The export-oriented sector in Taiwan was dominated by SMEs, and 
these were both reluctant, and unable, to develop highly specific skills. However, they 
could exploit advantages through quick adaption of new technologies and skills, 
relying on cheap labour and flexibility as comparative advantages (Hu & Schive, 
1998). This ‘fast follower’ model results in SMEs relying on general skills (Wang, 
2010a).  
Ashton et al. (1999, pp. 83-84) concluded that skill formation in Taiwan has 
three distinctive features. The education system in Taiwan has extremely high 
demands for academic education. Thanks to government commitment to education, 
public education spending is relatively high (appendix 2). Finally, Taiwan’s skill 






Employment Relation  
Employment relations in Taiwan is asymmetric, favouring the capitalists, and it 
was enhanced after democratisation due to the KMT’s political strategy and the 
developmental strategy (Y.-J. Lee, 1999). Politically, labour was incorporated into the 
KMT’s authoritarian regime (H.-Y. Peng, 2006; Wang & Fang, 1992), while 
economically, the implementation of export-oriented industrialisation needed 
disciplined skilled labour force (Deyo, 1987, 1989; Haggard & Kaufman, 2008).  
The KMT adopted the strategy of ‘include in order to exclude’ to control labour 
(Wang & Fang, 1992). The authoritarian KMT government particularly encouraged 
the establishment of trade unions in public enterprises and large private firms, 
however, incorporated them into the KMT ruling regime and intervened internal 
affairs of labour union (such as finance and the elections of union leaders) (Y.-J. Lee, 
1999; Shieh, 1997). It helped consolidate the political loyalty of the KMT’s 
constituencies and weaken labour mobilisation (Y.-J. Lee, 1999; H.-Y. Peng, 2006). 
Under the Labour Union Act and martial law, the right of strike was restricted with 
labour consequently weakened further (Wang & Fang, 1992, p. 14). This strategy 
provided a political base for labour discipline at the outset of export-oriented 
industrialisation (Y.-J. Lee, 1999, pp. 89-90, 127; Wang & Fang, 1992, p. 13).  
As discussed, the KMT as a minority, émigré regime, pre-empted the 
empowerment of local Taiwanese by limiting them in small businesses. As Stephens 
(1979) argues, one of the prerequisites of the concentration of labour power is the 
concentration of capital. Consequently, the SMEs-dominated capitalist structure 
impeded the concentration of labour power in Taiwan. The working class 
consciousness is weak in Taiwan. Taiwan’s SMEs did not develop long-term 
employment relations in order to enhance ‘flexibility’ (Y.-J. Lee, 1999), and the 
widespread consciousness of ‘opportunistic diversification’ (everyone wants to, and 
has opportunities to become boss) furthered these short-term employment relations 
(Shieh, 1997; Whitley, 1992). The nurturing of workers’ hopes of rising to 
management being helped them to be voluntarily subordinated to this unequal 
employment relation (Shieh, 1997). Also, export-oriented SMEs were often labour-
intensive industries and consequently, workers could be easily replaced, their skill 
level lower, relatively. The staff turnover rate in Taiwan is quite high (appendix 6), 




Figure 5.3.1 Union density in Taiwan from 1960-85 (the number of union members/ the size of the 
labour force) (unit: %) 
Source: Y.-J. Lee (1999, p. 59); http://www.cla.gov.tw/; and my own calculation.  
 
Employment relations in Taiwan were coordinated by the state to serve the 
interests of the KMT. This facilitated the adaption of developmental strategy, 
conditioned by its decentralised SMEs-dominated capitalist structure. Employment 
relations in Taiwan can be described as ‘paternalist authoritarianism’ (Y.-J. Lee, 1999, 
p. 101), leading to a paradoxical phenomenon in Taiwan. Union density in Taiwan is 
relatively high (figure 5.3.1 and appendix 5),23 but labour power in Taiwan is 
relatively weak, not even changing after democratisation. Overall, in Taiwan, labour 
was organised, but paradoxically, not mobilised. In the case study chapter of Taiwan, 
we will witness that labour did not have influence in pension politics.    
 
Conclusion 
This chapter compared three East Asian capitalisms by focusing on three aspects: 
the business system, the financial system and the labour market regime. Their features 
are summarised in table 5.4.1. In Japan and Korea, the state intentionally assisted 
business-conglomerates to develop a national champion, and these business-
conglomerates eventually became the core of the national capitalist structure; however, 
23 In fact, this value is underestimated due to the problem of lacking data. According to official data, 
the union density at national level in 1989 is 38.1% and then increased to 49.5% in 1993, but declined 
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SMEs in Taiwan dominated the export-oriented sector, when the state tended to use 
tax-exemptions to facilitate exports. Inter-firm relations in Japan and Korea 
underpinned on “vertically-integrated, tightly-controlled sets of firms” (Fields, 1995, 
p. 67); but Taiwan’s inter-firms relations can be described as “agglomerations of 
different-sized firms, mostly small, in different economic sectors” (ibid). Japan and 
Korea develop the bank-based financial system, based on long-term relationships, but 
this was not the case in Taiwan.  
Financial systems in Japan and Korea are both bank-based systems. In Japan, the 
state channelled public pension funds, and other financial funds, into industrial capital 
through the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme; further, the main bank system 
helped Japanese firms to use corporate pension funds as patient capital. In Korea, the 
state controlled banks, using policy loans to guide chaebols to support its 
developmental strategies. The linkage between banks and chaebols was therefore 
established. Unlike Japan, however, Korea attempted to mobilise public pension funds 
as industrial capital, in order to reduce its heavy reliance on foreign loans- it was not 
institutionalised. In Taiwan, public enterprises and large private firms could be 
financed through banks, but SMEs had to rely on informal financial channels, such as 
family. Public pension funds were not used as industrial capital.  
By relying on the bank-based financial system, Japanese and Korean firms could 
be protected from the pressures of short-term profits, developing long-term 
commitments to employees to nurture firm-specific skills. Enterprise unionism could 
be established in Japan and Korea since the state intentionally dissolved industrial 
unionism so that a cooperative, and production-oriented business environment, could 
be created. In Taiwan, SMEs rely on general skills in order to maximise its 
comparative institutional advantage- flexibility, rather than the development of long-
term commitments is important. As an émigré regime, the KMT repressed labour 
power, politically incorporating labour into its ruling regime. Labour is thereby weak 
at national and firm level, and appendix 5 and 6 shows indicators of labour power, and 
skill profiles.  
The diversity of East Asian capitalisms has been highlighted in this chapter. With 
the varieties of capitalism argued, shaped by national capitalist structure, the 
interaction between political actors and the nature of cross-class coalition, as well as 
the social policy preferences of political actors, should be different in Japan, Korea 
and Taiwan (Amable, 2003; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Swenson, 2002). In the following 
three chapters, process-tracing analysis would be used to attest this theoretical 
argument, and to explain the variations in the public-private pension mix in Japan and 
Korea and Taiwan.  
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Compared to Japan and Korea, Taiwan’s pension system is distinctive. First, 
corporate pension is negligible; second, the state was/is dominant in pension policy, 
the coordinating of pensions, and national capitalist structure. This chapter argues that 
the SMEs-dominated capitalist structure that relies on ‘flexibility’ as its main 
comparative institutional advantage, constrained the state’s capacity for adopting 
corporate pensions. This led employers to put more emphasis on short-term profits, 
given their reluctance to bear high labour costs, eventually leading to a statist pension 
system.  
 
Table 5.4.1 The Diversity of National Capitalist Structure in post-war Japan, Korea 
and Taiwan 
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Chapter 6 – Japan  
As shown in the previous chapter, Japan’s national capitalist structure is 
characterised by the keiretsu-dominated business system, the main bank system, and 
the firm-specific labour market regime (firm-specific skills and enterprise unionism). 
This chapter will show how the keiretsu-centred capitalist structure shaped political 
actors’ pension preferences, and their interaction and cooperation. To begin with, the 
focus will concentrate on the origins and development of Japan’s public-private 
pension mix. It will show how the state actively, and intentionally, designed a pension 
system that could resolve economic coordination of skill and capital formation in the 
early industrialisation period. The focus will be shifted to explain how financial 
liberalisation, and non-regularisation of the labour market (although not 
fundamentally differing Japan’s capitalist structure) forces Japanese firms to adopt a 
dualist strategy to cope with the pressure of pursuing short-term profits: to reduce 
labour costs through the employment of more non-regular workers with low-general 
skills and externalising their pension costs to the state, while maintaining core 
workers with firm-specific skills. After the 1980s, pension reforms were principally 
introduced to fit this dualist strategy- the universalisation of public pensions, and the 
introduction of DC corporate pensions- for the increasing non-regular workers, 
though core workers still enjoyed generous public and private pensions.  
 
6.1 The Origins of the Japanese Pension System (1945-1980) 
Japan’s public pension system is traceable to the late-19th century, when several 
pension schemes were initiated, as the role model for private firms to resolve the 
problems of skill formation, for state officials, military, public enterprises workers. 
These pension schemes were reformed as the ‘Mutual Pension Schemes’, with the 
Employees’ Pension Insurance and the National Pension Insurance introduced for 
private workers, and functioning as a means of capital mobilisation for the state. 
Corporate pensions (the Retirement Allowance) were developed in the late 19th 
century, growing in the 1920s to facilitate firm-specific skill formation and to dampen 
labour mobility. In the post-war period, two main corporate pensions then 
institutionalised the coherence between the national capitalist structure and corporate 
pensions, as an incentive system for employees to invest in firm-specific skills, and as 





6.1.1 Public Pension Schemes: Towards “Pension for All” 
From 1875-94, the Meiji government launched various pension schemes for 
military and state officials, and public school teachers. Unified in 1923 (Chiu, 2009; 
Shinkawa, 2005a), these schemes constituted the largest proportion of social spending 
in the 1920s (Anderson, 1993). Aside from these, the Employees’ Pension Insurance 
and the National Pension Insurance are particularly important.  
 
The Employees’ Pension Insurance 
At first, the Japanese government opposed the introduction of pension schemes 
for private workers, due to concerns, shared with employers, that it would contribute 
to unionisation across the firms (Shinkawa, 2005a, p. 162). The Second World War 
was a turning point (Kasza, 2006; Weiss, 1993), with, in 1939, the Sailor’s Pension 
Plan being introduced to secure the manpower necessary for marine transport during 
the wartime (Kasza, 2006; Shinkawa, 2005a). The Ministry of Welfare, in 1941, then 
introduced the Workers’ Pension Act for muscle workers that work in workplaces of 
more than ten workers. As a funding pension scheme, its primary aim was to mobilise 
financial resources to support military mobilisation, and public infrastructure 
(Shinkawa, 2005a, p. 162). Nearly all contributions were collected for the war (Kasza, 
2006, p. 40). Thus, this act was for military mobilisation and economic goal, rather 
than purposes of welfare. In 1944, the Workers’ Pension Act was renamed as the 
‘Employees’ Pension Insurance’, extending the coverage to other private workers 
(such as white-collar, and female workers) in firms with more than five employees.24 
In 1952, the Ministry of Welfare proposed a draft to improve the benefit level of 
the Employees’ Pension Insurance to address hyperinflation and change its structure 
to the combination of earning-related25, and flat-rate components (Chiu, 2009, p. 96). 
Initially, employers opposed this draft, with Nikkeiren (the peak-level federation of 
employers’ associations) arguing that the earning-related pension benefits should be at 
the discretion of firms, since most of them had corporate pensions. As such, public 
pensions should only offer meagre, flat-rate benefits, especially in the face of wage 
rises caused by labour mobilisation26 (Campbell, 1992, pp. 58-59; Estévez-Abe, 2008, 
pp. 121-122; Kume, 1998, pp. 78-79). This is because the immediate post-war period 
(1945-48) saw employers wanting to use corporate pensions to regain management 
24 The coverage was greatly extended from 3.46 million to 8.44 million from1942-44 (Kasza, 2006, p. 
40). 
25 The Minister of Welfare considered the part of earning-related benefit as a critical institutional 
design in attracting support from core male workers (Estévez-Abe, 2008, p. 120).  
26 See chapter 5, where it has been mentioned in the discussion of the formation of enterprise unionism.  
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authority (see section 6.1.2, this chapter). For employers, corporate pensions had 
higher discretion than public pensions in corporate governance and human resource 
management.  
In the face of capital shortage, however, the state wanted to maintain the pre-
funding financial mechanism in order for capital mobilisation, and its fiscal capacity, 
particularly, was severely constrained by the Allied government’s conservative fiscal 
policy (Gao, 2001; G. Park, 2011). Thus, a prefunding public pension was particularly 
important for the Japanese government, in terms of capital formation. Further, the 
Korean War resulted in a significant increase in economic demands, in turn hiking the 
demand for capital (Nishinarita, 2009, pp. 283-286), which led employers to request 
access to the reserves (Campbell, 1992, pp. 58-59; Estévez-Abe, 2008, pp. 120-122). 
In the exchange of accessing reserves, and the demands of the state’s financial 
assistance, employers reluctantly accepted the government’s proposal. This reform 
could, therefore, be argued as collusion between the state and employers, though the 
state had higher authority in dominating its institutional design.  
On the other hand, labour was disempowered after 1948, due to the reverse 
course,27 despite its power in the immediate post-war period (1945-48) (Kume, 1998; 
Shinkawa, 2005b). Following the reverse course, the Japanese and Allied 
governments began intentionally repressing labour power to avoid its negative 
impacts on economic development, and the development of the Communist 
(Kawanichi, 1992; Kume, 1998). Although labour asked that coverage should be 
extended to firms with less than 5 employees, resisting the increase in the retirement 
age, they were both rejected (Campbell, 1992, p. 59; Chiu, 2009, p. 96).  
A revision of the Employees’ Pension Insurance was passed in 1954, including a 
shift from full to partial funding of the financial mechanism; the improvement of 
benefit level;28 and the combination of flat-rate and earning-related benefits. In short, 
the 1954 reform could be argued to be economical and social simultaneously, since it 
not only aimed at improving the benefit level of the Employees’ Pension Insurance, 
but also wanted to use it for capital mobilisation. Since this reform, the Employees’ 
Pension Insurance was not fundamentally changed until 1985 (Campbell, 1992; 
Shinkawa, 2005a, 2005b).  
 
27 Initially, the Allied government aimed to dissolve the old Japanese political and economic system 
through political and economic liberalisation. But the Allied government changed their attitude due to 
the civil war of China and the Korean War to favour conservative parties and big businesses. This is so-
called the ‘reverse course’ (Kume, 1998; Shinkawa, 2005b).  
28 It included ¥2,400 a month as a flat-rate portion, and an earning-related portion that would bring the 
total to about ¥3,500 a month for an average couple (Campbell, 1992, p. 60).  
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The National Pension Insurance 
Unlike the Employees’ Pension Insurance, the National Pension Insurance was a 
result of party competition, and employers played no role in the policy discussion. In 
the early post-war period, the Japanese government attempted to introduce a 
universalistic pension scheme that covered all citizens, but this was vetoed by the 
Allied government. Following revision of the Employees’ Pension Insurance in 1954, 
the state began thinking about extending the coverage of the pension system to the 
entire population. The LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) proposed the idea of ‘Pension 
for All’, which soon became a guideline under the Kishi cabinet (Shinkawa, 2005b). 
This is because the realisation of a comprehensive welfare state was a part of the 
LDP’s statist agenda, and a strategy for uniting and consolidating the conservative 
regime, weakening political influence of the communist, and promoting national 
integration and national mobilisation for economic growth (Miura, 2012, pp. 49-50).  
In 1955, the conservative regime was forged, underpinned by the coalition 
between the conservative ruling party (the Liberal Democratic Party), and employers 
(mainly keiretsu) (Pempel, 1998; Shinkawa, 2005b). The formation of the state-
keiretsu developmental alliance was due to the state having to rely on big businesses 
to promote economic development, and then to maintain political legitimacy (Gao, 
2001). Through the state’s financial supports and administrative guidance, the keiretsu 
could promote industrialisation, create jobs and offer employment and economic 
security to their employees (through the permanent employment system, the seniority-
based system, and generous corporate welfare). Through this strategy, the state could 
gain, and maintain, its political legitimacy and supports. The keiretsu, meanwhile, 
also required state assistance, their capacities being very limited in the early 
industrialisation period. 
The conservative state-keiretsu developmental still faced great competition from 
the left (Anderson, 1993; Campbell, 1992), however, with the process of 
industrialisation widening the gap between agricultural and industrial sectors. The 
Japan Socialist Party, established in 1955, thus criticised the LDP’s pro-business 
stance in order to mobilise rural voters and workers in small firms (Estévez-Abe, 
2008). In 1955, the Japan Socialist Party proposed the idea of establishing a new 
comprehensive pension scheme that attracts peasants (Campbell, 1992; Estévez-Abe, 
2008). In 1956, the LDP reacted, promising to establish a universalistic pension 
scheme in the Upper House elections (Shinkawa, 2005b). This issue did not receive 
attention after the elections until the Lower House election in 1958. 
This issue resurfaced again, due to the Japan Socialist Party announcing a draft 
of national pension bill in late 1957. The LDP, thereby, announced that “the most 
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notable aspect of our platform this time is the establishment of the National Pension” 
in the 1958 election campaign (Campbell, 1992). Initially, the LDP called for the 
unification of the existing, fragmented public pension schemes, with the Ministry of 
Welfare initially supporting the idea of universalism. They tended to expand the 
coverage of the Employees’ Pension Insurance, rather than introducing a new non-
contributory pension scheme (Estévez-Abe, 2008, p. 144). This was resisted by the 
Japan Socialist Party, and labour unions. Shaped by enterprise unionism, labour 
unions of large firms were reluctant to share risks with peasants and the self-
employed (Campbell, 1992, p. 72). These core workers had been well-protected by 
generous corporate welfare and the Employees’ Pension Insurance. Thus, in the 
consideration of practicality, the state saw a fragmented national pension plan as a 
more realistic option.  
The Japanese government, likewise, wanted to use the National Pension 
Insurance as a source of capital mobilisation. The LDP saw the welfare state as a part 
of national integration and mobilisation for economic growth (Miura, 2012). It is, in a 
large part, because the state required financial resources to promote the growth of 
keiretsu, and in turn to create jobs and employment, and economic security, to 
maintain its political legitimacy (Gao, 2001). To start with, however, the LDP and the 
Japan Socialist Party were both proponents of a non-contributory pension scheme, 
since it would maximise political benefits. This idea was rejected by the Ministry of 
Finance, however, who argued that the National Pension Insurance should be financed 
by contributions to minimise the budgetary cost, and collect capital for investment 
(Campbell, 1992, pp. 74-81). This was due to the conservative fiscal policy, which 
was posed by the Allied government to control inflation (Gao, 2001; G. Park, 2011). 
Thus, in order to gain the support of the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Welfare 
agreed to adopt the social insurance principle, but a one-third subsidy came from 
general revenues, with the Ministry of Finance’s Fiscal and Investment Loan 
Programme able to gain funds. 
The National Pension Insurance was legislated in April 1959 and implemented in 
1961. All those not enrolled in other pension schemes were compulsorily enrolled, 
and this was financed by flat-rate contributions, and subsidies from general revenues. 
Its benefits were flat-rate, and it was a funded scheme also. The fragmented public 
pension system had settled down, not having a structural change until 1985. During 
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the 1960s and 1970s, Japan’s public pensions were not fundamentally reformed, but 
some benefit levels were improved due to rapid economic growth.29 
Due to the conservative fiscal policy of the Allied government and its keiretsu-
centred capitalist structure, the Japanese state had, in the face of capital shortage, 
great interest in mobilising public pension funds to support its industrialisation 
(Estévez-Abe, 2008; Gao, 2001; G. Park, 2004, 2011). This is particularly important. 
In the keiretsu-centred capitalist structure, the state and employers had to rely on 
continuous growth to maintain political legitimacy, and employment practices, 
respectively (Gao, 2001; Nomura, 1998; Schaede, 2008). By devoting financial 
resources to industrialisation, the state could create more new jobs, favouring the 
oligopolies in its competition policy, in turn enabling keiretsu to institutionalise the 
employment practices. This strategy not only facilitated the growth of the keiretsu but 
also ensured employment security for keiretsu employees. In the post-war period, 
however, the Japanese government faced a dilemma: making a small government 
compatible with industrialisation and social welfare expansion (G. Park, 2011). Thus, 
the state’s mobilisation of financial resources, to support its industrialisation 
ambitions, was required. The answer, the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme, 
was introduced in 1952, and helped the state to mobilise post-savings and public 
pension funds as industrial capital. The mechanism has been explained by figure 5.2.1. 
It collected capital from different sources, as shown in table 6.1.1. Since the 1960s, 
postal savings were the most crucial financial source of the Programme, with public 
and Postal Pensions also playing a critical role in its financing.  
The allocation of the funds of the Programme for different goals is shown in 
Table 6.1.2. When Japan focused on capital-intensive industries, industry/technology 
was initially the core policy area of the Programme. The funds of the Programme 
were then channelled to housing and living environment, due to issues of 
environmental pollution (Shinkawa, 2005b). SMEs also received a significant portion, 
mainly because the LDP, as an inclusive conservative party, wanted to vie for their 
political support when they were the main target of rationalisation, and reorganisation 
of industries, in the 1950s and 1960s (Gao, 2001; G. Park, 2011; Pempel, 1998). Thus, 
the Programme played as a buffer in industrial rationalisation. In short, the Fiscal and 
Investment Loan Programme established an institutional linkage of how the state 
mobilise public pension funds as industrial capital.  
 
29 For example, in the 1960s, the LDP government initiated the Income Doubling Plan, which was 
considered as a way to minimise the need for formal welfare policies (G. Park, 2011). This led to the 
Japanese government improving benefit levels of public pensions.  
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Table 6.1.1 The Sources of Fiscal and Investment Loan Programme Funds, 1960-1999 
(unit: %) 
  1960  1965  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  1999 
Postal Savings  24  26  37  44  43  30  12  31  9 
National and Postal 
Pension  
15  21  27  19  21  18  18  15  10 
Postal Life Insurance  19  6  11  9  8  9  16  14  14 
Industrial Investment 
Special Account 
6  2  3  1  0  0  0  0  0 
Bonds and Bond 
Guarantees 
19  25  13  4  7  11  5  6  6 
Reabsorbed Funds  17  20  9  23  20  33  49  35  61 
Source: Adopted from G. Park (2011, p. 27) 
 
Table 6.1.2 the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme Plan Allocation by Policy 
Area, 1953-2000 (unit: %) 
  1953  1955  1960  1965  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000 
Housing   5.2  13.8  12.8  13.9  18.1  21.4  26.2  25.4  30.3  35.3  34.1 
Living Environment  7.8  7.7  9.3  12.4  11.7  16.7  14.1  15.7  15.3  16.4  17.8 
Social Welfare  1.6  2.1  1.8  3.6  2.7  3.4  3.5  2.8  3.1  4  4.2 
Education  4.5  4.5  3.5  3.1  2  2.9  4.4  3.6  2  2  2.3 
Small and Medium 
Enterprises 
7.9  8.1  12.7  12.6  17.2  15.6  18.7  18  15.7  15.3  16.7 
Agriculture, Forestry, 
and Fisheries 





14  7.7  6.5  3.1  1.5  1.2  1.7  2.3  1.2  1.3  1.9 
Road Construction  3.7  3.7  3.6  7.9  8.1  8  5.7  8.8  9.8  7.8  9.3 
Transportation/ 
Communication 
11.3  12.2  14.1  13.9  13.4  12.7  9.6  8.4  8.3  4.6  1.8 
Regional 
Development 
3.7  8.5  7.1  7  4.1  3.3  2.6  2.4  2.5  2.6  2.9 
Industry/technology  29.1  15.8  13.6  7.8  5.8  3  3  2.9  2.9  3.1  1.8 
Trade/Economic 
Cooperation 
0  7  7.9  7.5  10.7  7.7  5.6  5.4  5.8  4.7  4.9 
Source: Adopted from G. Park (2011, p. 35) 
 
6.1.2 Corporate Pension Schemes 
Corporate pensions were introduced in the late 19th century. Not only a role 
model but also a regulator, played by the state in stimulating the development of 
corporate pensions, in order to facilitate firm-specific skill formation and dampen 
labour mobility. In the post-war period, the Retirement Allowance was included as a 
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part of labour contract, proliferating another two corporate pension schemes- the 
Employees’ Pension Funds (1964), and the Tax-Qualified Pension Schemes (1962). 
These were incentive schemes, and a means of capital mobilisation, enhancing the 
institutional coherence between the corporate pension system, and the Keiretsu-
centred capitalist structure. They were the three main corporate pension schemes in 
post-war Japan.  
 
The Retirement Allowance 
The first corporate pension scheme, the Retirement Allowance, was adopted 
much earlier than its public counterpart, and has a history of over 100 years 
(Nishinarita, 2009). First reported at firm level in 1905,30 it was followed by 
nationwide legislation in 1936, and merged into the Employees’ Pension Insurance in 
1944 (Kimura, 1997, p. 200). Initially, the Meiji government liberalised the labour 
market in order to destroy feudal institutions, resulting in an unregulated labour 
market (Thelen, 2004). In order to address it, the state acted as a role model in 
developing private pensions and management practices (Manow, 2001b, p. 100). At 
first, public enterprises consolidated the in-plant training system, and launched a 
series of strategies- such as life-time employment, the ‘nenko principle’ (seniority-
based payment and advancement) and retirement bonus (the Retirement Allowance) to 
develop and secure skilled workers. These management practices were then diffused 
to large private companies (Gordon, 1985, pp. 54, 138; Manow, 2001b, pp. 102-103; 
Nishiguchi, 1994, pp. 24-25). These strategies “offset the reluctance of workers to 
invest in such company-specific training” (Thelen, 2004, p. 164). Thus, it can be 
concluded that these management practices were “made instrumental for the 
expansion of the market” (Manow, 2001b, p. 101).  
The Retirement Allowance was a ‘book reserves’ scheme, providing a lump-sum 
payment to workers who left the firm for retirement, or other reasons. It effectively 
functioned, therefore, as a retirement bonus, and unemployment insurance, and so in 
the absence of national unemployment insurance, there was significant attraction to 
the Retirement Allowance for workers. The labour turnover rate in the four main 
zaibatsus declined from around 35-50% to less than 10%, from 1919 to 1930 
(Nishiguchi, 1994, p. 21-24). However, it was volunteerism, with the benefits and 
entitlements varying (Gordon, 1985, pp. 200-201). It was institutionalised in 1936 
30 It was said that Kanebo introduced the first corporate pension plan in 1905. The employees had to 
contribute 3% of wages; meanwhile the employer contributed more than half of the total contributions. 
This type did not spread until 1914, when Mitsui & Co. introduced a similar corporate pension plan 
(Katsumata, 2004).  
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through the Retirement Fund Law, introduced as an alternative to national 
unemployment insurance in coping with economic crises in the 1920s and 1930s 
(Krämer, 2013; Nishinarita, 2009; Yamazaki, 1988). Before the War, its coverage was 
limited (table 6.1.3), with only around 20% of employees covered. Even in larger 
firms, only 31.5% of employees could be covered.  
 
Table 6.1.3 the Timing of the Introduction of the Retirement Allowance by Industries 
and Firm Size 
  Total   Before 
WWII 
1945-50  1951-52  1953-54  1955-56 
(September) 
Total  21,759  21.1%  34.5%  17.2%  14.8%  11.3% 
Industries 
Mining  711  36.6%  29.7%  17.2%  8.2%  8.4% 
Manufacturing  11,395  8.3%  39.9%  19.2%  17.5%  13.7% 








3,100  40.4%  26.7%  13.3%  10.9%  9.2% 
Constructions  1,080  21.2%  36.7%  15.5%  13.3%  11.1% 
Firm Size 
500 and more  1,353  31.5%  38.9%  12.7%  6.4%  10.0% 
100-499  6,353  23.3%  36.7%  16.4%  13.6%  9.0% 
30-99  14,053  19.1%  33.1%  17.9%  16.1%  12.4% 
Source: Yamazaki (1988, p. 46).  
 
After the Second World War, labour, empowered by the Allied government, 
began negotiating working conditions with employers, when the ‘Production Control’ 
strikes were adopted since the fall of 1945 (Tsutsui, 1998). Labour argued that the 
Retirement Allowance should be included as a part of working conditions, since it 
should be seen as a deferred wage, rather than as a bonus from employers (Nishinarita, 
2009; Yamazaki, 1988).31 Thereby, the Retirement Allowance was expanded in the 
early post-war period. Thus, some argue that labour played a critical role in the 
expansion of enterprise welfare in the early post-war period (Cho, 1996; Gordon, 
1998). Bearing in mind these ‘Production Control’ strikes had negatively impacted the 
Japanese economy and society, the Allied government were thus, since the winter of 
31 The Densan (electrical) unions insisted, in the face of economic difficulties, that the Retirement 
Allowance should be seen as a part of working conditions, and used to cope with unemployment and 
retirement in the 1946 labour dispute (Yamazaki, 1988, pp. 51-52). This idea was widely accepted in 
other industries and the Retirement Allowance, as a deferred wage, was accepted.  
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1946, led to suppress labour movement (Gordon, 1998). In other words, labour had 
been weakened. Hence the expansion of corporate welfare could not be completely 
attributed to labour movements. 
On the employers’ side, and following defeat, the Japanese government was too 
weak to address labour questions, and employers had to establish a cooperative way 
of restoring management autonomy, and to stabilise capitalist economy (Gordon, 
1998; Tsutsui, 1998). In the absence of the state, for employers, these labour contracts 
were seen as a strategy for establishing cooperative employment relations, and 
restoring management autonomy.32 Since 1945, a significant expansion in the 
Retirement Allowance could thus be witnessed, though most were in large firms 
(Table 6.1.3). The pre-war Retirement Allowance was based on volunteerism, and 
employers’ discretion, and as such was preferred over a bonus from employers; the 
post-war Retirement Allowance however, was based on labour contract, thus a part of 
working conditions and social rights (Yamazaki, 1988). 
Based on these labour contracts, the Japanese management practices- the 
permanent employment system, the seniority-based system and generous corporate 
welfare- were retained. Simultaneously, it meant that employees became very growth-
minded, having had to rely on cooperative employment relations, and firms’ 
continuous growth for job and economic securities (Aoki, 1998; Gao, 2001; Nomura, 
1998). As a result, cooperative and growth-minded enterprise unions were effectively 
incorporated into the state-keiretsu developmental alliance.  
In the early 1950s, with the Korean War increasing the demands of heavy and 
chemical industries, employers asked for tax revisions for the Retirement Allowance 
to mobilise capital and reduce labour costs (Nishinarita, 2009). Employers, 
particularly, claimed that an increase in life expectancy, and the wide adaptation of 
permanent employment, resulted in hiking expenses for the Retirement Allowance, 
and so, in 1951, called for tax deductions to reduce labour costs and resolve capital 
and labour shortages (Yamazaki, 1988). The 1951 revision applied separate taxation 
on the Retirement Allowance, as retirement income. Employers were thereby 
permitted to maintain up to 50% of all the Retirement Allowance they were required 
to pay. The revision of 1952, meanwhile, raised corporate income tax from 35% to 
42%, and the state decided to provide tax deduction on the Retirement Allowance to 
help employers to introduce the internal reserve fund. In 1954, employers demanded 
tenure-rated income tax deductions, on the receipt of the Retirement Allowance, to 
32 Nikkeiren pointed out that 30 working years was the basic condition for the entitlement of the 
Retirement Allowance (Yamazaki, 1988, p. 73). This rule encouraged employees to stay in the same 
company, and was complemented with other management practices.  
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offer, with lower cost, more payments to their loyal workers. Furthermore, employers 
were encouraged to create internal saving accounts for their employees through tax 
provisions. Employees could receive higher interest rates, while employers could 
borrow from their workers with lower interest rates (Estévez-Abe, 2008, p. 122). Put 
another way, the payment of the Retirement Allowance acted as an effective legal 
means of reducing taxes (Katsumata, 2004, p. 60).  
In the face of capital shortage, and the constraints of conservative fiscal policy, 
the Japanese government’s ability of maintaining political legitimacy by expanding 
public welfare was severely constrained (Gao, 200; G. Park 2011). As such, the 
Japanese government hoped to reduce the demand of public welfare by encouraging 
the keiretsu to develop corporate welfare and employment security. These tax 
advantages not only eased the capital shortage of large companies in the 1950s 
(helping employers to use it as a part of an incentive system for skill formation, 
through reduced labour costs) (Estévez-Abe, 2008; Koike, 1994; Nishinarita, 2009; 
Yamazaki, 1988), but also helped the state to externalise the cost of public welfare to 
employers, reducing its financial burdens and maintaining political legitimacy (Gao, 
2001). Consequently, the Retirement Allowance has, since the 1950s, been widely 
introduced in larger companies as part of management practices, in the face of the 
shortage of skilled workers and capital.  
 
The Tax-Qualified Pension Schemes  
  The Tax-Qualified Pension schemes were one of three main corporate pension 
schemes in post-war Japan, particularly for smaller firms. Although, since the 1950s, 
some tax revisions were introduced to encourage the development of corporate 
pensions, they did not significantly benefit firms. Principally, tax deductions only 
went to those with an entitlement of annuities (20 years working career in the same 
company). Most retirement reserves could not, therefore, be non-taxable. Nikkeiren, 
consequently, requested further tax deduction for corporate pensions in 1956. In 1957, 
Nikkeiren and the Life Insurance Association both proposed that (1) tax-qualified 
pension should be introduced; (2) retirement reserves should be counted as business 
expenses for tax deductions; and (3) the profits of pension funds should be non-
taxable (Nishinarita, 2009, p. 303). Initially, however, the Ministry of Finance 
adopted a passive attitude, arguing that tax deductions for corporate pensions would 
only benefit large firms (Chiu, 2009, p. 152). 
Following the introduction of the National Pension Insurance in 1959, life 
insurance companies started to devote more efforts to this issue, thinking the 
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introduction of tax-qualified pensions would enhance the development of life 
insurance industries (Nishinarita, 2009, pp. 303-304). Thus, the Life Insurance 
Association, together with the Trust Association and Nikkeiren, asked for further tax 
deductions for corporate pensions in 1960 and 1961. Nikkeiren, particularly, 
suggested that internal and external retirement funds should be counted as business 
expenses, and made non-taxable (ibid). At the end of 1961, the Ministry of Finance 
accepted it, and in1962, Tax-Qualified Pension Schemes were introduced through the 
revision of tax law, rather than new legislation. This was partly because the Japanese 
government wanted to use expansionary monetary policy to promote economic 
growth. The keiretsu-centred capitalist structure, as argued, strongly needed 
‘continuous growth’ to maintain its employment practices (Schaede, 2008). 
Conservative fiscal policy, however, severely constrained the state’s financial 
capacities. Thus, the Japanese government had to adopt expansionary monetary policy 
to promote continuous growth. They thought the development of non-bank financial 
institutions, and the encouragement of long-term loans, would help to achieve this 
goal (Gao, 2001).  
The Tax-Qualified Pension Schemes allowed firms with more than 500 
employees to set up corporate pension funds, their contributions to the fund and 
capital gains both enjoying tax exemptions. Thus it was popular for smaller 
enterprises (table 6.1.4). Pension funds had to be managed by either insurance 
companies or trust banks. The size of funds, and the numbers of Tax-Qualified 
Pension Schemes, was small in 1965, it was increased to around ¥130 billion, and 
51,264 schemes in 1969. By 1981, the total assets of the Tax-Qualified Pension 
Schemes had reached around ¥ 3,052 billion.  
 
Table 6.1.4 the Trend of the Tax-Qualified Pension Schemes 
  The Numbers of Tax-Qualified 
Pension Schemes 
The number of 
enrolees 
(thousands) 






  Numbers  Cases with more 
than 1000 
employees 
1965  2,472  66  452  -- 
1969  51,264  180  2,770  130 
1973  60,147  245  4,031  481 
1977  57,011  292  4,636  1,315 
1981  61,437  488  5,837  3,052 




The Employees’ Pension Funds 
The Employees’ Pension Funds was another critical corporate pension scheme in 
Japan, but mainly for larger firms. The revision of the Employees’ Pension Insurance 
in 1954 greatly improved its level of benefits. As such, employers began to ask for 
adjustment of the coordination of public and private pensions, in order to reduce 
financial burdens on firms (Yamazaki, 1988, p. 149). In 1961, employers, together 
with insurance companies and trust banks, called for the introduction of an opt-out 
pension scheme to contract out of the Employees’ Pension Insurance. They further 
argued that the coordination of public and private pensions was necessary, and unless 
considered, would see opposition to the revision of the Employees’ Pension Insurance 
(Chiu, 2009, p. 99).  
However, the inconsistency in labour’s interests weakened labour power’s ability 
to resist the introduction of an opt-out corporate pension scheme. This is because, as 
shown, keiretsu workers were covered by Japanese management practices, becoming 
growth-minded, and were incorporated into the state-keiretsu developmental alliance. 
The inconsistency between radical, and cooperative enterprise, unions, therefore, 
emerged. The General Council of Trade Unions of Japan, for instance, announced in 
1962 that they were against the introduction of an opt-out pension scheme since social 
protection should be the duty of the state, and the level of benefits should see 
significant improvement (Yamazaki, 1988, pp. 151-152). The International 
Metalworkers’ Federation-Japan Council united big business unions in the metal and 
machine industries, under the banner of enterprises unionism, together with the 
Japanese Confederation of Labour (Domei)33 focused on the importance of the 
coordination of the public-private pension mix in labour management, and retirement 
income security (Chiu, 2009, p. 100). The resultant 1963 discussion of the upcoming 
Fiscal review of public pensions was not agreed on by employers and labour.   
The state subsequently adopted a conciliatory attitude, adding conditions to the 
employers’ plan, such as worker’s approval being needed; benefits needing to be at 
least 30% higher than under the Employees’ Pension Insurance; and funds needing to 
be managed by either insurance companies or trust banks (Campbell, 1992, pp. 90-91). 
In 1965, the amendments of the Employees’ Pension Insurance were passed, to 
introduce the Employees’ Pension Funds.  
33 Domei, the Japanese Confederation of Labour, consisted of private-sector enterprise unions, since the 
electric power industry labour unions, being the core of enterprise unionism in post-war Japan, were 
affiliated with Domei. Its position was more conservative, and it tended to go along with management’s 
plans (Kawanich, 1992).  
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The Employees’ Pension Funds were implemented in 1966, and was also known 
as the Adjustment Pension due to its intention to adjust for the increasing burden on 
firms, from the Employees’ Pension Insurance and the Retirement Allowance (but 
only for firms with above 1000 employees).34 The establishment of the Employees’ 
Pension Funds was based on the agreement of labour and employers, and on condition 
it could offer better benefits (at least 30% more than possible by staying in the 
Employees’ Pension Insurance). Under this scheme, employers were allowed to 
contract-out of a certain portion of the earning-related component of the Employees’ 
Pension Insurance to the Employees’ Pension Funds. This partial contract-out portion 
had two critical implications. First, the non-contract-out portion was still covered by 
the state, ensuring the right to benefits from the Employees’ Pension Insurance, in the 
case of ensured employees’ pension fund going bankrupt. It also avoided the 
deepening dualisation of the labour market- a full contract-out pension scheme being 
adopted would see large firms tend to contract out of the Employees’ Pension 
Insurance to the Employees’ Pension Funds, with the Employees’ Pension Insurance 
only covering workers in smaller businesses.  
In 1966, 142 companies or consortia established funds covering about 500,000 
employees. By 1970, the number of funds had increased five times, covering around 
3.9 million employees- some 17.6% of the Employees’ Pension Insurance’s insured 
joined the Employees’ Pension Funds. This gradually increased to over 1,200 funds, 
almost 8 million workers, and over ¥17 trillion ($94 billon) by the early 1980s 
(Campbell, 1992, p. 91).  
 
Table 6.1.5 the Trend of the Employees’ Pension Funds 
  The numbers of funds  The numbers of enrolees.  
  The numbers of 
enrolees (thousands) 
The ratio to the number 
of the Employees’ 
Pension Insurance’s 
insured (%) 
1966  142  500  2.6 
1970  713  3,908  17.6 
1974  917  5,331  22.5 
1978  957  5,578  23.0 
1980  991  5,971  23.7 
Source: Yamazaki (1988, p. 162) 
 
34 The number of employees was reduced, however, to 700 employees in 1986; and then to 500 
employees in 1989.  
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Table 6.1.6 summarises three main corporate pension schemes. Principally, the 
Tax-Qualified Pension Schemes, and the Employees’ Pension Funds, were rooted in 
the Retirement Allowance which aimed to reduce financial burdens on employers 
(Katsumata, 2004, p. 59). Japan’s corporate pensions were designed to resolve 
economic coordination in skill, and capital formation, through the state-keiretsu 
developmental alliance. Firstly, Japan’s firm-specific skill formation must rely on 
long-term commitments. In the pre-war period (particularly, from 1910-1930), and in 
order to establish long-term commitments with employees to reduce labour turnover 
rate, employers launched schemes such as the permanent employment system, the 
seniority system, and corporate welfare and pensions, as incentives to secure their 
jobs, and economic security (Estévez-Abe, 2008; Koike, 1994, 1997). In the pre-war 
period, the state acted as a role model to facilitate these management practices, which 
were retained following the war, as employers attempted to regain management 
authority. This was because the Japanese government could not help employers, at the 
start, to coordinate it. Thus, the institutional design of these corporate pensions was 
essentially unfavourable for young, and mid-career, workers who left employment 
voluntarily.35 It aimed to avoid the loss of the cost of hiring and training, and, simply 
put, these management practices were designed for firm-specific skill formation (Aoki, 
1988; Busemeyer, 2009; Koike, 1997). In the post-war period, the role of the state 
was more a facilitator that helped employers reduce their labour costs, when these 









35 If the amount of Retirement Allowance paid to workers who voluntary left was 100, and compared to 
laid-off workers with the same tenure, the ratios were: 200 for three years of tenure, 165 for five years, 
138 for ten years, 128 for fifteen years and 109 for thirty years. It demonstrates that the institutional 
design of the Retirement Allowance tended to suppress turnover rates of young, and mid-career, 
workers (Estévez-Abe, 2008, p. 173). Likewise, the TQPSs and the EPFs were both designed as non-
portable pensions in favour of long tenure.  
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Table 6.1.6 the Features of Three Major Corporate Pension Schemes 
Type of plan 
or fund 
Year 




1952  Traditional way of providing severance payment to departing 
workers 
Benefit in the form of a lump sum 
Unfunded pay-as-you-go method financed by employers alone 
Earmarked reserves as a liability on the company balance sheet 






1962  Based on U.S. Defined Benefit model 
Plan must be externally funded, and assets managed by contract with 
life insurance companies and trust banks 
Employer's contributions are 100%  tax deductible, as a business 
expense 
Plan must contain a provision for annuities, although a lump-sum 
option is provided 
No tax on investment earnings 
Used primarily by small and medium-sized firms with more than 
15 employees 





1966  Defined Benefit plan contracted out from social security 
Must be established as a legal entity, independent to the employer 
In return for a lower social security contribution, firms must provide 
benefits equivalent to the earnings-related portion of social security, 
and a supplementary benefit (lump sum or annuity), financed by the 
employer 
Plan must be funded and assets held outside the firm in a trust fund or 
in an insurance contract 
Life annuities must be provided 
Tax treatment virtually the same as TQPP 
Used by large companies and by multiemployer groups 
Regulated by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 
Source: Adopted from Rajnes (2007, p. 91) 
 
The implementation of these management practices was underpinned by the 
bank-based financial system, which helped prevent firms from the pressures of 
pursuing short-term profits, especially as employers faced a problem of capital 
shortage in the post-war period (Aoki, 1988). Corporate pension funds could be 
mobilised as patient capital, either through internal retirement reserves, or external 
pension funds by cross-shareholding (Estévez-Abe, 2001, 2008; Jackson & Vitols, 
2001; G. Park, 2004). As mentioned, employers collaborated with life insurance 
companies and trust banks who should be allowed to manage corporate pensions, in 
order for employers to access to corporate pension funds. These financial institutions 
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were either the centre, or part of the keiretsu. Thus, corporate pension funds could be 
rechanneled to the core company of keiretsu through cross-shareholding. This was 
particularly encouraged by the state’s preferential policy- partly as the conservative 
fiscal policy prompted the Japanese government to adopt an expansionary monetary 
policy, through encouragement of financial institutions to offer more long-term loans 
to companies, thus ensuring keiretsus’ continuous growth. This, in turn, helped the 
state to maintain, and vie for, political supports. In the 1960s, the state encouraged life 
insurance companies and trust banks to invest in key strategic industries. The 
significance of the life insurance industry on cross-shareholding increased from 
7.19% to 13.28% between 1961 and 1986 (table 6.1.7), which helped Japanese 
companies to avoid market pressure, particularly, when facing financial liberalisation 
in the 1960s.  
In short, Japan’s pension system was developed to help skill and capital 
formation. Public pensions, firstly, were mobilised as industrial capital to support the 
state’s developmental strategy. This was through the Fiscal and Investment Loan 
Programmes, and corporate pension funds. These could, in the face of capital shortage 
and conservative fiscal policy during the post-war period, be mobilised as patient 
capital through the state’s tax and preferential policies. Second, corporate pensions, 
together with other management practices, were designed to develop long-term 
commitments with employees, so that firm-specific skills could be developed. 
Corporate pension funds could be mobilised as patient capital, through cross-
shareholding, to prevent firms from market pressures. By developing these 
management practices and firm-specific skills, the core workers became more growth-
minded, and were incorporated into the state-keiretsu developmental alliance in order 
to secure their job, and economic, security. Figure 6.1.1 shows Japan’s pension 
system in the early 1980s. The National Pension Insurance and the Employees’ 
Pension Insurance both offered flat-rate benefits to the retired, with the latter also 
providing earning-related benefits to beneficiaries. There were three corporate 
pension schemes- the Retirement Allowance, the Tax-Qualified Pension Schemes, 
and the Employees’ Pension Funds. A certain portion of the earning-related portion 





Table 6.1.7 Distribution of Shareholding (by Shareholder Type) 
    Financial Institutions         




















1961  0.20  29.97  8.91  9.94  -  7.19  3.53  3.40    2.79  18.70  46.68  1.66 
1962  0.21  30.73  8.98  11.03  -  7.29  7.29  3.94    2.45  17.68  47.13  1.80 
1963  0.25  30.85  9.23  11.17  -  7.58  7.58  3.55    2.24  17.89  46.68  2.10 
1964  0.21  29.50  9.32  8.89  -  7.88  7.88  3.27    4.45  18.38  45.55  1.91 
1965  0.20  28.95  9.86  6.54  -  8.73  8.73  4.09    5.81  18.43  44.79  1.82 
1966  0.25  29.83  10.85  4.29  -  10.91  10.91  3.91    5.39  18.61  44.10  1.82 
1967  0.26  30.56  12.75  2.43  -  10.24  10.24  1.61    4.43  20.54  42.36  1.85 
1968  0.27  32.01  13.50  1.67  -  10.80  10.80  2.33    2.09  21.42  41.92  2.30 
1969  0.26  31.91  13.84  1.19  -  11.02  11.02  -  1.93  1.39  22.05  41.11  3.29 
1970  0.24  32.34  13.99  1.38  -  11.11  11.11  -  1.83  1.19  23.09  39.93  3.22 
1971  0.25  33.91  15.05  1.30  -  11.26  11.26  0.88  1.01  1.45  23.63  37.19  3.58 
1972  0.23  35.13  15.71  1.27  -  11.29  11.29  1.08  1.18  1.82  26.58  32.71  3.52 
1973  0.24  35.08  16.20  1.25  -  11.12  11.12  0.88  1.06  1.48  27.53  32.71  2.96 
1974  0.22  35.46  16.29  1.59  -  11.17  11.17  0.80  0.10  1.28  27.12  33.45  2.47 
1975  0.23  36.04  16.42  1.58  -  11.47  11.47  0.82  1.06  1.43  26.28  33.46  2.56 
1976  0.22  36.50  16.76  1.40  -  11.84  11.84  0.74  1.01  1.36  26.45  32.92  2.55 
1977  0.20  37.83  16.93  1.97  -  12.15  12.15  0.87  1.12  1.51  26.17  32.02  2.27 
1978  0.21  38.79  17.38  2.16  -  12.38  12.38  2.00    1.76  26.29  30.81  2.14 
1979  0.22  38.85  17.15  1.92  0.48  12.33  12.33  2.10    2.01  26.11  30.36  2.45 
1980  0.22  38.85  17.31  1.52  0.40  12.48  12.48  2.23    1.73  25.96  29.21  4.03 
1981  0.21  38.65  17.29  1.32  0.41  12.58  12.58  2.15    1.72  26.33  28.45  4.65 
1982  0.21  38.90  17.59  1.22  0.37  12.66  12.66  2.16    1.79  25.98  28.04  5.09 
1983  0.20  38.98  17.92  1.01  0.43  12.70  12.70  2.07    1.91  25.88  26.78  6.25 
1984  0.20  39.62  18.35  1.08  0.51  12.72  12.72  2.19    1.90  25.94  26.29  6.05 
1985  0.75  42.22  19.57  1.34  0.71  13.51  13.51  2.59    1.96  24.11  25.22  5.73 
1986  0.91  43.50  20.50  1.86  0.92  13.28  13.28  2.57    2.51  24.46  23.87  4.75 































Figure 6.1.1 Pension structure in Japan, 1980s 
 
6.2 The Dualisation of the Pension System since the 1980s 
The Japanese keiretsu-centred capitalist structure was underpinned by rapid 
economic growth that maintained its long-term commitments in inter-firm, and 
employment, relations (Gao, 2001; Schaede, 2008). Since the 1980s when its 
economy was under the pressures of economic liberalisation, mainly caused by 
America, it has been challenged. Financial liberalisation forced the Japanese firms to 
put more emphasis on short-term profits. But instead of an overall, neo-liberal 
economic liberalisation, Japan adopted a dualist strategy. This is because the Japanese 
keiretsu-centred capitalist structure weakened the system’s capacity to fundamentally 
restructure its capitalist structure. The labour market had been deregulating, allowing 
employers to externalise the cost of economic liberalisation to non-regular workers, 
and increasing labour market flexibility- putting more emphasis on short-term profits. 
Conversely, a certain portion of core workers with firm-specific skills were preserved 
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to maintain its comparative institutional advantages. Along with this dualist strategy, 
public pensions were gradually universalised to absorb the cost of economic 
liberalisation, and corporate pensions were reformed to allow employers to introduce 
DC pensions for non-regular workers, though DB pensions were still dominant for 
core workers.  
 
6.2.1 Public Pension: Towards Universalism? 
The 1985 Pension Reform  
Since 1975, the financial sustainability of public pensions was challenged due to 
the first oil crisis and increasing budget deficits (Campbell, 1992). The 
beneficiaries/contributors ratio of public pension schemes, particularly the National 
Pension Insurance, had been deteriorating since the 1970s.36 Owing to the 
transformation of industrial structure, the agricultural population shrank from 13.65% 
of the total economically active adults in 1960, to 5.56% in 1980 (appendix 1). The 
number of enrolees of the National Pension Insurance, thereby, significantly declined 
to 25.7 million in 1983 from 27.9 million in 1979, but the beneficiaries increased to 
6.2 million in 1983 (Chiu, 2009, p. 121).    
In order to address this, the LDP government established the Second Provisional 
Council for Administrative Reform in 1981, which pushed Japan’s overall fiscal 
problem to the top of the national agenda, pension reform thus included by 
Administrative Reform. The focus of the pension reform was concentrated on the 
unification of the existing public pension schemes and financial problems. The 
bureaucracies argued that the financial problems of the National Pension Insurance 
could be resolved through inter-fund borrowing of public pension funds. This pension 
reform did not encounter serious resistance, thanks to its incorporation as a part of the 
Administrative Reform (Shinkawa, 2005b). In 1984, a draft of it was sent to the Diet, 
and soon passed.  
The 1985 pension reform included two critical measures. First, a basic pension 
introduced through integration of the flat-rate components of public pensions. This 
measure not only established a basic pension for all citizens but also relieve financial 
pressure on the National Pension Insurance by means of financial interflow between 
public pension schemes. Second, the relationship between contributions and benefits 
were further tightened, considered as the first step of pension retrenchment (Shinkawa, 
36 According to official statistics, the beneficiaries/contributors ratio of the public pension system was 
15.9%, which increased to 23.8% by1985 (Chiu, 2009, p. 121).  
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2005b). The 1985 pension reform established the basis of the universalisation of the 
Japanese public pension system, but also triggered the first step of pension 
retrenchment. Further measures of pension retrenchment were adopted over the last 
two decades, through raising of the statuary retirement age (the 1994 pension reform) 
and benefit cuts (the 2000 and 2004 pension reforms).  
 
The 2000 and 2004 Pension Reforms  
Since the 1990s, financial liberalisation, and the collapse of the bubble economy, 
resulted in the increase in non-regular workers with low-general skills, changing 
actors’ preferences over the pension system. As mentioned, Japan’s main bank 
financial system enabled its firms to avoid the pressure of short-term profits (Aoki, 
1988; Sheard, 1994). Since the 1980s, with financial liberalisation, Japanese firms 
were gradually forced to face more pressure from shareholders (Schaede, 2008; Vogel, 
2006). However, “the reorientation and reorganisation of the economy inevitably 
entails social dislocations and political conflicts” (Zysman, 1983, p. 53). Deeply 
constrained by its national capitalist structure, Japan adopted the dualist strategy to 
avoid social dislocations and political conflicts, endeavouring to keep everyone in 
business (Gao, 2001; Song, 2012c). Employers still treasured core workers with (firm-) 
specific skills to enable them to compete on the world market, through quality-based 
production strategy; despite this, an increasing move to the new practice of replacing 
low-general skills full-time workers with non-regular workers, such as temporary and 
part-time workers, was seen, to increase labour market flexibility, and enabling them 
to adjust to economic liberalisation (Ito, 2013; Miura, 2012; Song, 2012a). This 
dualist strategy could be witnessed in Nikkeiren’s report, entitled ‘the Japanese-style 
Management in the New Era’, published in 1995. In the report, Nikkeiren (1995) 
argued that workers should be classified into three groups: (1) workers with long-term 
accumulated ability; (2) workers with highly professional ability; and (3) workers 
with flexible employment. The traditional employment practices (the permanent 
employment system, the seniority-based system, and generous corporate welfare) 
should only be provided for those workers with long-term accumulated ability, or, 
according to Fleckenstein et al.’s concept of skill categories (2011), specific skills 
which should be trained through the firm-specific skill formation system; professional 
and flexible-type workers, owning either high- or low-general skills, however, should 
be supplied by the external labour market, and should rely on public welfare. 
Especially, low-general skills occupations should be non-regularised in order to 
reduce labour cost. This dualist strategy had two implications- it avoided fundamental 
system restructuring in order to maintain the state’s political legitimacy, while 
103 
  
preserving its comparative institutional advantages of the keiretsu-centred capitalist 
structure; and employers wanted to externalise the cost of labour market deregulation 
to the state.  
Figure 6.2.1 the Trend of the composition of Employment Status in Japan (1992-2012) 
Source: http://www.works-i.com/surveys/yearly.html  
 
According to Nikkeiren’s report (1995), employers wished to reduce ratio of the 
regular workers to the total workforce from 80% to 70% (Miura, 2012, p. 94). Over 
the following years, the state therefore increased labour market flexibility by 
liberalising rules and regulations for non-regular workers (Ito, 2013; Miura, 2012; 
Song, 2014).37 Consequently, the numbers of non-regular workers with low-general 
skills (part-time and temporary workers and others) has been increasing from 1990, 
reaching one-third of total employment since 2007 (figure 6.2.1, also see appendix 
5). Furthermore, these non-regular workers, in large part, are those low-general skill 
workers, such as clericals, sales workers and so on (appendix 6), which could be 
provided through the external labour market. Therefore, they are often excluded from 
corporate welfare. In Japan’s ‘welfare through work’ system, the institutional 
dualisation38 of welfare is a clear feature, although it was minimised in the period of 
37 Labour resisted the deregulation of the labour market, but did not show their determination to resist it 
(Zendocho, 2012).  
38 The concept of dualisation does not have a clear-cut definition, but is multifaceted (Häusermann & 
Schwander, 2012). Häusermann & Schwander (2012) and Rueda (2007) argue that the concept of 
dualisation should be analysed through insider-outsider divides. Rueda (2007) defines insiders as those 
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rapid economic growth. But this institutional dualisation has been widening and 
becoming significant since the 1990s. Labour market outsiders, including self-
employed, family workers, part-time workers and temporary workers and others, are 
excluded from formal employment-related welfare benefits.  
The main problem with the non-regularisation of employment is that the labour 
market outsiders experience financial difficulty in paying social insurance 
contributions (Keidanren, 2002; Mainichi news, 26/10/2013). The consensus was that 
a more universalistic pension, therefore, was required to address it. In 1996, to begin 
with, employers argued that the Basic Pension should be funded ‘completely’ by 
general revenue, and that the benefit level of the earning-related component should 
take into account other (macroeconomic) factors (Keidanren, 1996). In 1998, an even 
more radical idea was proposed by employers, who felt the earning-related component 
should be completely privatised to corporate pensions (Keidanren, 1998a). These 
proposals demonstrated that employers were reluctant to share risks with labour 
market outsiders, wishing for the cost to be externalised to the state, when they began 
using more and more non-regular workers with low-general skills who were not the 
core source of comparative institutional advantage.  
Likewise, the preferences of labour were inconsistent, with growth-minded core 
workers with (firm-) specific skills also supporting the employers’ suggestions of 
avoiding risk sharing with non-regular workers of low-general skills. As reported, the 
National Pension Insurance suffered from collection problems, with around 40% of 
those insured failing to pay their contribution in 2000 (Keidanren, 2002). Inevitably, 
this would increase the contribution rate of public pensions. For these growth-minded 
core workers, such as in the automobile and electrical industries, job security was 
more important in the face of economic difficulty (Song, 2014). Some private-sector 
enterprise unions thus asked for the dismantling of the earnings-related tier of public 
pensions (Estévez-Abe, 2008, p. 278). The Rengo, the peak-level labour federation, 
preferred to maintain the current earning-related contributory pension scheme, 
however (ibid, pp. 278-279).  
who are those workers with highly protected jobs and employment-related welfare, since their specific 
skills and behaviour of unions contribute to high level of employment and social protection that 
characterise ‘insiderness’ (p. 14-15). In contrast, outsiders are those either unemployed or hold jobs 
characterised with low level of employment and social protection and lower wages. Thus, involuntary 
fixed-term workers and part-time workers can be categorised as outsiders. However, self-employed and 
family workers are defined as outsiders because they are also excluded from formal employment-
related welfare system in Japan and Korea, even they have relatively stabe working careers, in contrast 
to part-time and temporary workers. Thus, dualisation can be defined as ‘a process that is characterised 
by the differential treatment of insiders and outsiders and that can take the form of newly created 




                                                                                                                                             
Given it could maximise political benefits with the increase in non-regular 
workers, the two political parties- the LDP and the main opposition party (the 
Democratic Party of Japan)- both supported a tax-financed basic pension scheme. 
Furthermore, to avoid major reform, the welfare bureaucracies favoured benefit cuts, 
although this was also resisted by labour (Estévez-Abe, 2008, p. 279). As mentioned, 
labour’s interests were inconsistent, and as such, the main debate between actors 
concentrated the level of benefit that should be cut, and whether the earning-related 
component should be completely privatised or not. A consensus was soon reached in 
the Diet, with the amendment passed in 2000 (Shinkawa, 2005b). This amendment 
introduced various measures for cutting benefits, promising to increase, from a third 
to one half, the level of state subsidies of the total cost of the Basic Pension. Simply, 
this amendment could be seen the result of a compromise between actors (mainly 
between the state and employers)- the state (welfare bureaucracies) avoided a major 
reform, but accepted the employers’ suggestion of reducing benefits, and increasing 
subsidies to restrict the increase in contribution rate of public pensions.  
Further pension reform was soon initiated, however. According to fiscal 
calculation, the 2000 reform ‘successfully’ reduced the 2025 contribution from 34.3% 
to 27.8% (Shinkawa, 2005b, p. 317).39 In 2002, the Ministry of Health, Labour and 
Welfare listed ideas for further pension reform, such as the state financing a reduced 
cost of the Basic Pension; the contribution rate being increased; benefit cuts; and most 
importantly, macroeconomic factors should be added to the benefit formula (Chiu, 
2009, p. 268).  
An employers’ main preference in the new round of pension reforms was to 
externalise the pension costs of non-regular workers to the state. In 2002, keidanren40 
argued that the public pension system should be overhauled (Keidanren, 2002). First, 
the Basic Pension should be financed by indirect tax, in the context of the ageing 
society; second, the contribution of the Employees’ Pension Insurance should be 
reduced. These ideas were repeated in 2003 (Keidanren, 2003; Keidanren, 9/12/2003 
and 15/12/2003), and in 2004, the Japan Association Corporate Executives (Doyukai), 
a more radical employer association, recommended that a new basic pension should 
be introduced to provide ¥70,000 to the retired, and be completely financed by the 
consumption tax (Doyukai, 2003). 
39 In 1999, the contribution rate of the Employee’s Pension Insurance was 17.35%.  
40 Keidanren is another peak-level employer federation in post-war Japan, and mainly focused on 
economic and financial policies. Conversely, Nikkeiren, as a peak-level employer federation, was 
mainly represented by big businesses, focusing on labour relations and policies. In 2002, these two 
employer federations were unified as the main employer federation, but still named as ‘Keidanren’.  
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Although a tax-financed basic pension was widely suggested to address the 
problem of non-regularisation of employment, the LDP government faced a dilemma: 
a tax-financed basic pension (and other universalistic, welfare policies) was required; 
conversely, it would be difficult to increase tax given its negative impact on elections 
(Estévez-Abe, 2008). The LDP, therefore, favoured the rise of contribution and 
benefit cuts being constrained, while the Democratic Party of Japan tended to 
maintain the current benefit levels (Yoshida et al., 2006).  
In the 2004 election, the LDP and its partner (New Komeito) gained the majority 
of votes, forming the LDP-coalition government, and dominating the pension reform. 
The Democratic Party of Japan and the Rengo opposed the LDP-coalition 
government’s plan, and proposed a radical plan (Rengo, 9/4/2004, 26/4/2004, 
15/7/2004 and 28/9/2004; the Democratic Party of Japan, 2004). When it was rejected 
in 2004, the LDP-coalition government’s plan was instead passed. This reform would 
increase the contribution rate of the Employees’ Pension Insurance from 13.58% to 
18.3% in 2017 by 0.354% per year; adding macroeconomic factors (the decline in the 
number of participants and the increase in life expectancy) into the benefit formula to 
cut benefits. These two measures changed Japan’s public pension system from a 
policy of expenditure-oriented revenue, to a revenue-oriented expenditure policy 
(Hinrichs & Kangas, 2003).  
In short, Japan launched, since the late 1970s, a series of pension reforms that 
addressed the fiscal pressure of public pensions, and the consequences of economic 
liberalisation. In the face of economic difficulty and economic liberalisation, Japanese 
employers, constrained by its national capitalist structure, adopted a dualist strategy to 
increase labour market flexibility by increasing non-regular workers. It also 
maintained a certain portion of the core workers for preservation of its comparative, 
institutional advantage, based on firm-specific skills. Employers were reluctant to 
share risks with non-regular workers of low-general skills due to their relatively weak 
capacity of paying social insurance contributions that would increase the contribution 
rate of public pensions (as well as other social insurance programmes), thus wanted to 
externalise it to the state by asking it to completely finance the Basic Pension (or at 
least increase subsidies, through general revenues). Overall, employers’ pension 
preferences were clearly to ask that the state bears more financial burden of the Basic 
Pension, and to overhaul the earning-related component of the Employee’s Pension 
Insurance. Labour’s interests were inconsistent, however, and pension retrenchments 
could not be resisted. Growth-minded core workers with (firm-) specific skills 
presented more concern about job security than public pensions, while the Rengo, the 
peak-level labour union, tended to resist employers, and the LDP’s plans, in order to 
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protect non-regular workers with low-general skills. Japan’s public pension system 
was thereby directed towards universalism through the establishment of the Basic 
Pension, and, to address the non-regularisation of labour market, increasing the state’s 
subsidies to fund the Basic Pension (from one-third to a half). Finally, the 2004 
pension reform changed the nature of Japan’s public pension system policy, from one 
of expenditure-oriented revenue, to a revenue-oriented expenditure policy. Simply put, 
although slowly, these public pension reforms changed the Japanese public pension 
system to fit employers’ dualist strategy, which also affected corporate pension 
reforms.  
 
6.2.2 Private Pension: The Modernisation of Corporate Pensions 
Japan’s corporate pension system, prior to 2001, was not fundamentally reformed. 
The establishment of the National Pension Fund, in 1989, which was mainly for those 
without second-tier pensions, was one exception. The number of those insured by the 
National Pension Fund was negligible (figure 6.2.2), and in 2001, it was replaced by a 
new corporate pension scheme. As such, it would not be discussed. As mentioned, 
corporate pensions allowed Japanese employers to develop firm-specific skills, and a 
long-termist financial system. From the late 1980s, economic difficulties and 
liberalisation led employer to both the adoption of the dualist strategy to reform the 
labour market, but also the dissolving of corporate pensions. Employers began, 
therefore, to ask for an overhaul of the corporate pension system in order to adapt to 
the dualist strategy, and address the dissolution of corporate pensions from the mid-
1990s. Two corporate pension laws, introduced in 2001, are the focus of this section.  
 
The Introduction of New Corporate Pensions in 2001 
Since the 1980s, the state and employers began to stress the need for the 
deregulation of labour and financial markets, due to the changing international, 
political economic environment. Particularly important, following the Plaza Accord in 
1985,41 was the significant appreciation of the Japanese yen, which in turn weakened 
the international competitiveness of Japanese companies (Pempel, 1998; Vogel, 2006). 
The bubble economy was broken, and the arrival of the lost decade (the 1990s) 
hastened the path of the deregulation of the labour, and financial markets in the 1990s. 
In 1995, Japan and the U.S. forged an agreement for an open pension market for 
41 In 22nd September 1985, the G5 (France, Wset Germany, the UK, the USA and Japan) reached an 
agreement to depreciate the US dollar in relation to Japanese yen and the Germen Deutsche Mark in 
order to address the unfavourable balance of trade of the USA at the Plaza Hotel in New York. 
108 
 
                                                  
foreign managers, easing restrictions on securities transactions and cross-border 
financial services (Vogel, 2006, p. 84). In 1996, a Big Bang reform was launched, 
which included, among other things, a series of financial market reforms, such as the 
openness of foreign exchange markets, the liberalisation of mutual funds, pension and 
trust markets. These reforms deregulated the financial market, prompting employers 
to adopt a dualist strategy that pursued short-term profits through the increase of non-
regular workers. This enabled higher labour market flexibility, and preservation of its 
comparative institutional advantages by retaining a certain portion of its core workers. 
As mentioned, Japanese firms were able to develop, in the banking-based 
financial system, firm-specific skills based on long-term cooperative relationships, 
that enabled avoidance of the pressures of short-term profits, and stockholders’ 
interests (Estévez-Abe, 2008; Schaede, 2008). Since they began to rely more on direct 
financing, and less on bank borrowing,42 they had to face the pressure of stockholders 
to pursue short-term profits. This meant that traditional Japanese employment 
practices, relying on long-term cooperative employment relations, had to be reformed, 
even if not fundamentally (Isogai, 2012; Yamada & Hirano, 2012). First, the 
permanent employment system has been dissolving, or is at least being restructured 
(Conrad & Heindorf, 2006; Keizer, 2010; Nishinarita, 2009). Figure 6.2.1 shows that 
non-regularisation of the labour market has accelerated since the early 1990s. Second, 
the seniority-based system gradually shifted towards the performance-based system, 
especially for white-collar workers (Keizer, 2010; Nishinarita, 2009). It has not been 
completely dismantled, however, with Japanese companies tending instead to adopt a 
mixed system, combining the performance, and seniority-based, systems (Conrad, 
2009). Both changes aimed to ‘soften’ (deregulate) the labour market, before reducing 
labour costs (Conrad & Heindorf, 2006; Nishinarita, 2009). 
These factors, together with economic difficulties, dissolved the Tax-Qualified 
Pension Schemes (whose number fell, from a peak of 92,467 in 1993, to 73,582 in 
2001 (Table 6.2.1)) and the Employees’ Pension Funds in the 1990s. Worse still, due 
to Tax-Qualified Pension Schemes being, essentially, a corporate pension scheme with 
tax advantages but no legal status, employers could dissolve it, and fail to maintain a 
minimum level of funding, without legal sanction. Thus, the pension rights of 
beneficiaries in the Tax-Qualified Pension Schemes were unprotected. Further, as 
mentioned, the Tax-Qualified Pension Schemes were designed to help employers 
develop long-term relationships with employees. As such, few Tax-Qualified Pension 
42 According to official data, the Japanese companies have shifted, placing more emphasis on direct 
financing, and a reduction of their reliance on bank borrowing. In 1960, the debt-to-asset ratio was 
around 30%, but declined to around in 2008; while the capital-to-asset ratio increased from around 
25% to more than 42% in the same period (Isogai, 2012, pp. 37-38).  
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Schemes provided portability, though the changes in employment practices led to it 
being outdated. 
Officially, the Employees’ Pension Funds required 5.5% of its return on 
investment funds. According to official data, however, the average return on assets 
managed was just 2% in nominal terms, in the period from 1989-2003 (Conrad, 2011). 
The state lowered the guaranteed rate to 4.5%, reduced the amount of fund reserves 
that an Employees Pension Fund was required to hold, and allowed an employer to 
contribute stock and other securities to his fund to make up shortfalls in the 
Employees’ Pension Funds. Despite this, these measures only had modest effects, 
ameliorating the financial difficulties of the Employees’ Pension Funds. That is, 
despite the Employees’ Pension Funds being principally prohibited, by law, from 
being dissolved (except for in special circumstances, such as the bankruptcy of 
sponsor companies), its number began to decrease following the peak of 1,883 in 
1997, reducing to 1,737 in 2001 (Table 6.2.1). Consequently, the total number of 
employees covered by corporate pension schemes (Tax-Qualified Pension Schemes 
and Employees’ Pension Funds) reduced from 22.76 million to 20.04 million between 
1996 and 2001 (figure 6.2.2). Therefore, employers began requesting a return of the 
‘contract-out’ component of the Employees’ Pension Insurance to the state in the 































1968  305  34,737  --  --  --  -- 
1973  853  60,244  --  --  --  -- 
1978  945  57,001  --  --  --  -- 
1983  1,025  64,008  --  --  --  -- 
1988  1,194  74,423  --  --  --  -- 
1993  1,735  92,467  --  --  --  -- 
1994  1,804  92,355  --  --  --  -- 
1995  1,842  91,465  --  --  --  -- 
1996  1,878  90,239  --  --  --  -- 
1997  1,883  88,312  --  --  --  -- 
1998  1,858  85,047  --  --  --  -- 
1999  1,832  81,605  --  --  --  -- 
2000  1,801  77,555  --  --  --  -- 
2001  1,737  73,582  --  --  70  153 
2002  1,656  66,741  15  0  361  7,481 
2003  1,357  59,162  168  148  845  13,672 
2004  838  52,761  484  508  1,402  21,737 
2005  687  45,090  834  596  1,866  32,234 
2006  658  38,885  1,335  605  2,313  42,178 
2007  626  32,826  2,479  619  2,710  50,561 
2008  617  25,441  4,395  611  3,043  57,279 
2009  608  17,184  6,797  610  3,301  65,340 
2010  588  8,051  9,436  608  3,705  74,752 
2011  577  --  14,377  612  4,135  85,159 
Source: Pension Fund Association (http://www.pfa.or.jp/jigyo/tokei/index.html).  
 
Based on these considerations, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 
proposed a report to discuss the introduction of the DC corporate pension in 1996 
(Nishinarita, 2009, p. 329). Employers then began asking for not only the deregulation 
of financial market (Keidanren, 1995), but also tax revisions for corporate pensions 
and the introduction of DC corporate pension in the mid-1990s (Keidanren, 1996). In 
1997, Keidanren argued that to address the problems of the limits of pension fund 
management, the coordination of public-private pensions, institutional inequality 
between Tax-Qualified Pension Schemes and Employees’ Pension Funds, and the lack 
of portability, new DB and DC corporate pensions should be introduced. Also, the 
contract-out component of the Employees’ Pension Insurance could be allowed to 
return to the state (Keidanren, 1997). In 1998, demand for the introduction of a DC 
corporate pension was proposed again, based on a need for the deregulation of the 
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labour market to be addressed (Keidanren, 1998). In 1999, the return of the contract-
out component of the Employees’ Pension Insurance to the state was also proposed 
again, in order to gain more freedom in pension fund management (Keidanren, 1999). 
Principally, employers’ preferences about the reform of corporate pensions came 
along with its dualist strategy, and aimed to create a more flexible corporate pension 
system. To begin with, it reduced the cost of the traditional DB corporate pension by 
introducing a new one, and returning the contract-out component of the Employees’ 
Pension Insurance. That being said, it was to externalise the cost and risks to non-
regular workers with low-general skills through new DC corporate pensions.  
Comparatively, labour’s preferences on corporate pension reforms, between the 
peak-level Japanese Trade Union Confederation (Rengo) and some individual 
enterprise unions, were inconsistent. Growth-minded core workers with (firm-) 
specific skills showed more concerns about job security in the period of economic 
difficulties. This compromised the issue of corporate pension reform, with employers 
in exchange for job security and the legal framework, to ensure any transfer from the 
old DB pensions to the new DC pensions should be agreed by labour (Conrad, 2011, 
pp. 3059-3060). The Rengo suggested, however, that the benefit level of corporate 
pensions should be maintained; pension rights of the corporate pension should be 
protected (Chiu, 2009, p. 208). Further, the Rengo, in principle, took a negative stance 
towards the introduction of DC pensions, whereas, in some sectors, such as the 
electric power industrial unions, it was not completely resisted, but seen as a 
supplementary pension scheme (Chiu, 2009, pp. 231-232). Overall, labour did not 
concentrate their effort on the issue of the corporate pension reform, in some sectors, 
even cooperating with employers, agreeing to the partial introduction of DC pensions.  
A particularly important reason for the introduction of the new corporate pension 
laws was that the Ministry of Finance aimed to introduce the International Accounting 
System from April 2001. Prior its implementation, the obligation of corporate 
pensions could be dealt with as off-balance-sheet. Under the new system, it would be 
included into the balance-sheet as ‘Projected Benefit Obligation’. Employers, 
believing it would harm the evaluation of corporate performance, became more 
willing to shifting to DC corporate pensions (Katsumata, 2004). This accelerated the 
introduction of new corporate pension laws.  
In January 2000, the draft of the Defined-Contribution Pension Law (the DC 
Law) was sent to the Diet, though was discarded. In September 2000, four employer 
associations announced that new corporate pensions should be legislated as soon as 
possible (Keidanren, 2000). Thus, the politicians of the Liberal Democratic Party 
112 
  
establish the ‘Council of the Introduction of the DC Law’ to speed up its introduction 
(Nishinarita, 2009, pp.329-330). It was legislated in June 2001, under the majority of 
the Liberal Democratic Party and its partners. Simultaneously, the draft of the 
Defined-Benefit Corporate Pension Law (the DB Law) was sent to the Diet, also 
legislated in June 2001. Two corporate pension laws will be introduced later, and I 
will show that a mixed corporate pension system is emerging, alongside the dualist 
strategy.  
 
The Implementation of New Corporate Pension Laws  
The DB law predominantly aims to modernise the old DB corporate pensions to 
reduce pension costs, and to protect the pension rights of employees, and to return the 
contracted-out component of the Employees’ Pension Funds to the state. Thus, it 
allows firms to remove large pension liabilities from balance-sheets, and promote the 
transition from book-reserve schemes to external reserve funds (employees’ pension 
rights would then be protected, even in the face of company bankruptcy). According 
to the DB law, two new types of pension plans exist- the contract-type, and the fund-
type. A third choice is possible, being a hybrid/cash-balance plan. The contract-type 
plan is mainly provided for SMEs, with no minimum number of member requirement. 
As such, it is very similar to the Tax-Qualified Pension Schemes, which it replaced in 
2012. The fund-type pension plan is aimed at replacing the Employees’ Pension Funds, 
and requires at least 300 employees. Generally, the risks and responsibilities of 
pension management are solely borne by employers, but it can be designed so that 
employers and employees share these through the hybrid/cash-balance plan. In this 
plan, each employee has a notional account, into which the employer credits a fixed 
percentage of the basic salary, and an annual interest payment. Following the DB 
law’s introduction, significant decline has been seen in the number of plans and 
members of the Employees’ Pension Funds, and Tax-Qualified Pension Schemes, 
since 2002 (table 6.2.1 and figure 6.2.2).   
The DC law, known as the Japanese-style 401k plan, attempts to reduce labour 
costs and externalise financial risks to individuals, and includes two pension plans: 
the corporate-type, and the individual-type. The individual-type pension was designed 
for those insured under category No.1 (self-employed), and, under the Employees’ 
Pension Insurance, aged less than 60 years, with no other corporate pension plans. 
The corporate-type pension is provided for those insured under category No. 2, 
mainly covered by the Employees’ Pension Insurance but with contributions paid by 
the employers. Both must be managed by either a qualified bank or insurance firm, 
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but in any case, financial risk has been shifted to individuals. Following its 
introduction, the number of plans and members in the corporate DC pension has 
increased (table 6.2.1 and figure 6.2.2). 
 
Figure 6.2.2 The Number of Members by Different Corporate Pensions (millions) 
Source: http://www.pfa.or.jp/jigyo/tokei/index.html.  
 
The Japanese corporate pension system is transforming in line with the dualist 
strategy, rather than towards the neo-liberal pension model. As mentioned, the dualist 
strategy was adopted to increase labour market flexibility by increasing non-regular 
workers, and the preservation of a certain portion of core workers to maintain its 
comparative institutional advantages. Although the new corporate pension system 
allows employers to introduce DC pensions for their workers, the significance of DB 
corporate pensions, offered to core workers with firm-specific skills, is still 
conspicuous. Figure 6.2.2 demonstrates that the DB corporate pensions still cover 
more than two-thirds of the total employees, but also shows that the number of DC 
corporate pension members are increasing. In other words, though employers wanted 
a flexible corporate pension system, and DC pensions are allowed, they do not 
fundamentally dismantle the system.    
Consequently, a new mixed corporate pension system is emerging along with the 
dualist strategy, this fact is demonstrated in table 6.2.2. Overall, around a third of 
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companies simultaneously offered DB and DC corporate pensions in 2012. Smaller 
firms (less than 100 employees) tended to adopt DC corporate pensions solely 
(74.4%), which could help firms reduce labour costs. Meanwhile more than two-thirds 
of larger firms (over 1,000 employees) (68.14%) offered employees other corporate 
pensions in addition to DC corporate pensions. This fact fits to Mares’ (2003) 
theoretical assumption that the firm size determined firms’ financial capacity, and 
their pension preferences. More importantly, larger firms adopted a mixed corporate 
pension system to fit its dualist strategy. DB corporate pension plans are used to 
maintain its core regular workers with firm-specific skills, but conversely, DC 
corporate pension plans are offered to non-regular workers with general skills in order 
to increase labour market flexibility, and to reduce labour costs.   
 
Table 6.2.2 Corporate Pension Plans offered in Addition to DC Plans in 2012 (in 
number) 










2,576  1,297  859  343  77 
DB Plan  2,669  827  611  666  565 
Tax-Qualified Pension 
Schemes 
388  139  110  94  45 
Mutual Aid Fund for 
school Teachers 
10  3  4  2  1 
Employees’ Pension 
Funds/ DB plan 




105  33  32  28  12 
DB plan/Tax-Qualified 
Pension Schemes 
34  9  4  10  11 










Total  16,440  9,212  3,890  2,230  1108 
Source: Pension Fund Association (2012, p. 200) 
 
In short, economic liberalisation and difficulties since the 1980s did not 
fundamentally transform the Japanese capitalist structure, rather changing political 
actors’ preferences, forcing them to put more emphasis on short-term profits (due to 
financial liberalisation). Constrained by the keiretsu-centred capitalist strategy, Japan 
chose the dualist strategy to avoid social dislocations and political conflicts, and 
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maintain its comparative institutional advantages. Non-regular workers with low-
general skills have been increasing, to increase labour market flexibility and reduce 
labour costs but simultaneously, a portion of core workers with firm-specific skills 
were preserved to maintain its comparative institutional advantage, based on quality-
based production strategy. Along with this dualist strategy, public pensions were 
universalised to cover the absorption of non-regular workers’ pension costs, since they 
are not the core source of comparative institutional advantage. The corporate pension 
system was modernised to fit this dualist strategy as well, with a new, mixed corporate 
pension system emerging. Larger employers tended to adopt DC pensions for non-
regular workers with low-general skills, and DB pensions for core workers with 
specific skills. Likewise, the state-keiretsu (employers and core workers) 
developmental alliance dominated pension reforms over the past three decades. 
Labour’s interests over pension reforms were inconsistent, with core workers of 
enterprise unions tending to maintain their job and economic security. However, the 
peak-level labour union (Rengo) tended to vie for economic security for non-regular 
workers, through the universalisation of public pensions. Thus, labour had no great 
influence on pension reforms.  
The structure of the Japanese pension system is illustrated in Figure 6.2.3. The 
first-tier public pension scheme is the Basic Pension, which includes the National 
Pension Insurance and the portion of the flat-rate pension of other public pensions. 
The Basic Pension includes three types of insurants, all treated differently particularly 
in terms of contribution payments. Thus, it is an amalgamation of different schemes, 
not a single, unified scheme (Shinkawa, 2005a, p. 159). The second-tier pension did 
not change (thought the unification of the earning-related component of public 
pensions is hotly debated). The third-tier of the state pillar includes the National 
Pension Fund, and the individual-type DC pension. In the second pillar, various 
corporate pensions are included. The old corporate pensions, such the Employees’ 
Pension Funds and the Retirement Allowance, and the new DB pension plans 
(contract- and fund-type) are grouped into the second tier as their benefits are 
earnings-related. After 2012, the Tax-Qualified Pension Schemes were replaced by 





































Figure 6.2.3 Pension structure in Japan, 2012 
 
Conclusion 
Shaped by the keiretsu-centred capitalist structure, political actors’ (the state and 
employers) preferences were directed to favour a hybrid pension system. This was in 
order to resolve economic coordination of skill and capital formation, with the state 
tending to collude with the keiretsu, to forge a state-keiretsu developmental alliance. 
Labour was intentionally divided, however, by politically and economically 
incorporating core workers into the state-keiretsu developmental alliance, as they 
became growth-minded. In the pre-war period, the state, as the role model, introduced 
corporate pensions, together with other management practices, as incentive schemes. 
These were aimed at establishing long-term commitments with employees, in order to 
reduce turnover rate, and develop firm-specific skills. These management practices 
were diffused into large private firms, and from the 1920s, widely adopted. In the 
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post-war period, this institutional coherence between pension and capitalist structure 
shaped political actors’ preferences and the nature of cross-class coalition.  
Public pensions were initially introduced for public workers, for political 
stability in the Meiji period, with the Employees’ Pension Insurance for core workers 
launched during wartime for capital mobilisation, and to ensure manpower resource. 
However, the state and employers, and core workers of large private firms, resisted 
extending the coverage of the Employees’ Pension Insurance to all citizens. The 
introduction of a universalistic national pension was also resisted in order to avoid 
sharing risks with the marginalised labour market, and outsiders. Instead, employers 
and core workers of large firms put more emphasis on the coordination of public-
private pensions. The goal of a ‘Pension for All’ was achieved following the 
introduction of the National Pension Insurance in 1959. Public Pensions were 
mobilised by the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme, as industrial capital, to 
support Japan’s developmental strategy.  
In post-war Japan, the development of corporate pensions was based on labour 
contracts. Employers utilised it to restore their management authority when the 
Japanese government was weak (in the immediate post-war period from 1945-48). 
These established management practices, including the permanent employment 
system, the seniority-based system, and generous corporate welfare, made core 
workers more growth-minded, both economically and politically. In the 1950s and 
1960s, in the face of a shortage of capital and skilled workers, employers requested 
tax revisions, and the introduction of the Tax-Qualified Pension Schemes and 
Employees’ Pension Funds, to reduce corporate pension costs as well as to mobilise 
corporate pension funds as patient capital. This was partly due to the Japanese 
government wanting to use expansionary monetary policy to facilitate economic 
growth. As well as enabling the Japanese firms to establish long-term commitments to 
inter-firm, and employment, relations (in turn avoiding the pressure of short-term 
profit pursuance), it also developed a quality-based production strategy, underpinned 
on firm-specific skills. Further, continuous growth, through continual, long-term loans 
from financial institutions (particularly from the main banks), could be achieved. 
Since the 1980s, the Japanese model has been challenged, however. Economic 
liberalisation did not fundamentally transform the Japanese capitalist structure, but 
forced employers to put more emphasis on short-term profits. Employers thus adopted 
the dualist strategy that maintained its comparative institutional advantage through 
preservation of a portion of core workers with firm-specific skills, while increasing its 
flexibility and reduce labour costs by replacing low-general skills workers with non-
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regular workers. As such, employers wished to externalise the cost of the basic 
pension to the state, when non-regular workers with low-general skills were employed 
to reduce production costs, and the old corporate pensions overhauled in order to 
reduce financial burdens. Although gradual, Japan’s public pension system is 
changing towards a more universalistic system that combines a flat-rate basic pension 
(half financed by the state) and merger earning-related pensions. Simultaneously, 
alongside the dualist strategy, Japan’s corporate pension system was modernised 
rather than privatised. The 2001 corporate pension reform allowed employers to 
provide DC pensions for employees (though, non-regular workers), but DB pensions 
were dominant for core workers. The institutional logic of the Japanese capitalist 





Chapter 7 – Korea 
This chapter focuses, firstly, on how the Korean state, as the coordinator, has 
encouraged corporate pensions in the post-war period, and then, how and why, since 
the 1980s, public pensions were developed and transformed when Korea underwent 
democratisation and globalisation. In the post-war period, under the pressures of the 
U.S, the Korean government opted to privatise the enterprises of the Japanese colonial 
government, the predecessor of the chaebols. The state actively controlled the 
financial system and established the company-based skill formation system, but a dual 
labour market was forged as well. In the 1950s, the Korean government encouraged 
corporate, rather than public, pensions and welfare, which were volunteerism-based. 
In the 1970s, the Park government shifted its developmental strategy to heavy and 
chemical industrialisation and encouraged corporate pensions and welfare that 
allowed financial resources to be concentrated on strategic industries. Employers in 
this period started using corporate pensions and welfare to resolve economic 
coordination of skill and capital formation. Although the Park government 
endeavoured to introduce the National Welfare Pension in the post-war period, to 
reduce the reliance on foreign loans and to support heavy and chemical 
industrialisation, it was eventually postponed. 
From the 1980s, Korea underwent democratisation and economic liberalisation. 
Under the pressure of democratisation, in 1988, the National Pension Insurance was 
implemented. The dual transformation fundamentally changed the Korean pension 
system into a multi-pillar pension model. Democratisation and economic liberalisation 
(accelerated by the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997) resulted in a deepening dualisation 
of labour market, by the adaption of the dualist strategy. The chaebols and their 
regular workers typically acted as a welfare defender (to defend the existing 
employment-related welfare) and were reluctant to share risks with non-regular 
workers of low-general skills, and SMEs employers, through universalistic social 
policies. Initially, and gradually, the conservative government extended the coverage 
of the National Pension Insurance to peasants and the self-employed, but 
simultaneously cut its benefit level from 70% to 40%. Eventually, 2007 saw the 
introduction of a nearly universalistic, non-contributory pension scheme by the 
progressive government.  
 
7.1 The Origins of the Korean Pension System (1945-1980)   
In Korea, the chaebol-dominated capitalist structure allowed the state to use 
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corporate pensions to maintain its political legitimacy in the face of limited financial 
capacity after the Korean War. Although the transformation of the developmental 
strategy towards heavy and chemical industrialisation led the Park regime to introduce 
the National Welfare Pension as a policy tool of capital mobilisation, it was postponed 
due to the first Oil Crisis. As a result, corporate pensions are significant, but public 
pension for private workers, until the introduction of the National Pension Insurance 
in 1988, was lacking.    
 
7.1.1 Public Pensions  
After the Second World War, Korea was forcefully divided into North Korea 
(Democratic People's Republic of Korea) and South Korea (Republic of Korea), along 
the 38th parallel line in 1948. Rhee Syngman elected as the first president of South 
Korea. The Korean War (1950-53) destroyed more than two-thirds of all production 
facilities, however, (D.-M. Shin, 2003, p. 47). The goals of the Rhee regime, in post-
war Korea, were simply (political and economic) survival and reconstruction. This 
meant the Rhee were greatly reliant on American Aid,43 and had to adhere to Import-
substitution Industrialisation. The Rhee regime thus introduced a number of social and 
labour legislations to address problems resulting from the Korean War.  
The Korean government introduced a public pension for public workers, to 
consolidate the political base and capital mobilisation. The ‘Government Employee 
Pension Scheme’ was introduced for three reasons in 1960 (Yi, 2007, pp. 69-70). First, 
the Act on Civil Servants’ Status and Compensation stipulated that retired public 
workers should receive pension benefits, the scheme’s establishment of which was the 
scheduled policy task, the Rhee government arguing that this pension would be a pilot 
for other social insurance and welfare programmes (p. 69). Second, this pension 
scheme could arguably be utilised as industrial capital (National Assembly Secretariat, 
1959, pp. 45-46; cited from Yi, 2007, pp. 69-70). Finally, the Rhee regime wanted 
civil servants that could work for President Rhee’s re-election campaign in the 
presidential election of March 1960 (p. 70). Though the oppositions argued that issues 
of the implementation of the Labour Standard Act, and unemployment, should first be 
dealt with, the Rhee government (who collapsed in late 1960) introduced it in January 
1960. 
In July 1960, Chang Myun was elected Prime Minister. Although a short-lived 
43 American Aids financed nearly 70% of total imports between 1953 and 1962, and equalled 75% of 
total fixed capital formation (Haggard, 1990, p. 55). 
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regime, the Chang government set ‘Economic Growth First’ as the goal that 
influenced the following social policy and economic developments (Yi, 2007, p. 71). 
Soon, Park Chung-Hee gained political power through military revolution. The Park 
regime shifted from import-substitution industrialisation, to labour-intensive export-
oriented industrialisation, when American aids were terminated in the early 1960s, in 
order to gain political legitimacy through economic development (Fields, 1995; D.-M. 
Shin, 2003; Yi, 2007). Developmentalism was, from the 1960s, thus embedded into 
the Korean chaebol-dominated capitalist structure. When, in the 1960s, the state 
wanted to concentrate financial resources on economic development, public pensions 
were ignored- apart from the Military Personnel Pension Scheme, which was 
introduced to enhance the Park regime’s political bases in 1963 (M.-K. Chung, 2010). 
In the early 1970s, Park shifted the developmental strategy to capital-intensive 
heavy and chemical industrialisation. Like Japan, Korea adopted, in the chaebol-
dominated capitalist structure, a discretionary method that favoured leading chaebols 
to facilitate heavy and chemical industrialisation. These included targeted credit 
subsidies, selective protection, and entry regulations, those facilitated the 
development of national champions (Haggard, 1990; Hwang, 2006; E.-M. Kim, 1997; 
D.-M. Shin, 2003). Though the Park regime relied on chaebols in the promotion of 
economic development, this method increased the demand of capital mobilisation. 
Funding social insurance programmes thus became a primary policy instrument for 
capital mobilisation. In 1972, the president of the Korea Development Institute met 
Park, and suggested that a national pension might provide retirement income security 
and capital (Kwon, 1999, p. 56). Park accepted this idea, claiming that:  
“the National Welfare Pension system builds up and maintains reserves 
and is this a source of savings. The accumulation of substantial reserve 
funds in excess of current requirement for benefit payments would enable 
Korea to use its NWP system as a means of increasing saving in the 
economy” (Park, 1975, p. 80; cited from Hwang, 2006, p. 59). 
 
This idea was central to the institutional design of the National Welfare Pension. 
Soon after Park’s announcement, Park asked that an inter-agency task committee be 
formed, composed of several bureaucrats from the Economic Planning Boards, the 
Korea Developmental Institute, and the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. 
Economic (the Economic Planning Boards and the Korea Developmental Institute), 
and social (the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs) technocrats both submitted 
drafts of the National Welfare Pension. The differences between them resulted from 
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different perspectives on the pension plan’s purposes- For instance, the economic 
technocrats’ proposal estimated that the rate of capital accumulation was over six 
times higher than the estimate of the social technocrats (Hwang, 2006, p. 58). The 
social technocrats did not see the pension as a means of capital mobilisation, rather, a 
means of establishment of a well-organised income security system (S. Kim, 2006, p. 
77). Then, the social technocrats’ proposal was designed to cover the entire population, 
aged 20-60. The economic technocrats’ proposal covered wage earners, but excluded 
those on low incomes, and in small businesses (Hwang, 2006, p. 58; S. Kim, 2006, pp. 
77-78). Third, economic technocrats proposed that the National Tax Service should 
levy the contribution, while social technocrats tended to establish the Bureau of 
Welfare Pensions to manage pension funds, in order to be more responsive to welfare 
needs (Hwang, 2006, p. 58).  
The final version of the National Welfare Pension appeared closer to the 
economic technocrats’ draft in scope (only wage earners), and in the operation of the 
fund, since the national goals were set to give priority to economic development 
(Hwang, 2006; S. Kim, 2006, p. 78). The National Welfare Pension was solely 
financed by the contributions that was equally shared by employers and employees, 
and designed as a funding scheme for capital mobilisation. The National Investment 
Fund was established to manage the pension fund, mobilising domestic financial 
resources to support heavy and chemical industrialisation (Haggard, 1990; Yi, 
2007).44  
The Park regime passed the National Welfare Pension in 1973. However, just 
four days later, Park announced that the implementation of the National Welfare 
Pension would be postponed due to the first oil crisis, under employers’ pressure 
(Hwang, 2006; S. Kim, 2006; D.-M. Shin, 2003; Yi, 2007). During this period, the 
chaebols had grown to be a symbiotic partner of the Park regime (Fields, 1995; Hundt, 
2009; E.-M. Kim, 1997), although “confined to working on the government’s term” 
(Ringen et al., 2011, p. 29). Consequently, employers did not resist the introduction of 
the National Welfare Pension, instead showing a preference for the modification of 
the institutional design of the National Welfare Pension (Y. J. Choi, 2009; H. J. Kwon, 
1999). Park clearly perceived that implementation of heavy and chemical 
industrialisation needed the cooperation of the chaebol, however, so the employers’ 
44 Nam Duck-woo, the Minister of Finance, said: “I created the NIF (National Investment Fund) to 
finance petrochemical industries– we pooled funds from various sources of a public nature. 
Government employees’ pension fund, other similar funds, plus some contributions from the 
commercial banks. I knew very well that tapping resources by mandate is against the rules of the 
market economy, but I had to do it, because President Park wouldn’t give it up” (Clifford, 1994, p. 106; 
cited from D.-M. Shin, 2003, p. 95). 
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preferences could not be ignored. In the face of a deteriorating international economic 
situation, the Federation of Korean Industries showed their concern over the 
additional financial burdens that resulted from the introduction of the National 
Welfare Pension (the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, 1974; cited from D.-M. 
Shin, 2003, p. 96). Consequently, the National Welfare Pension was postponed, 
though the Park regime’s focus had been shifted to corporate welfare and pensions.  
In short, the public pension for private workers in Korea was absent before 1988, 
although the Park regime endeavoured to introduce the National Welfare Pension for 
capital mobilisation. With the absence of a public pension, the corporate pension 
became significant in Korea.  
 
7.1.2 Private Pension – the Retirement Allowance 
During the Korean War, the Korean state’s capacity was undermined, and the use 
of military power to suppress labour power was not a feasible option- it potentially 
leading to widespread demonstrations. Labour, particularly, demonstrated its great 
influence in the constitutional reform (1951-52). Thus, after the War, the Korean 
government introduced a series of social and labour legislations to vie for labour’s 
political support (Yi, 2007, pp. 62-64): the Military Aid and Protection Law in 1951, 
and the Policy Aid and Protection Law in 1951; the National Insurance Law and the 
Postal Pension Law came in 1952, with the Labour Standard Act, the Trade Union Act, 
the Labour Council Act, and the Labour Dispute Arbitration Act in 1953.  
According to the Labour Standard Act, the Retirement Allowance (theoretically, 
as a ‘compulsory’ company-based DB pension scheme) was introduced to provide a 
lump-sum payment to employees in firms of more than 30 employees who leave due 
to retirement, or unemployment, and other reasons. Thus, it was more like a severance 
payment than a ‘retirement benefit’, and actually functioned as a quasi-social safety 
programme- both as an unemployment benefit, and a retirement benefit- particularly 
in the case of the underdevelopment of other public social security programmes prior 
to the 1980s (Phang, 2010). The contribution of funding was entirely from employers 
(at least 8.3% (1/12) of annual salary), or otherwise, it was legally mandatory, but 
privately financed.  
Korea launched the Retirement Allowance for private workers, rather than the 
public pension, at the initial stage of industrialisation. As mentioned, in the immediate 
period following the war, public enterprises of the Japanese colonial government were 
privatised to individuals with close relationships to state officials (T. J. Cheng, 1990). 
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In order to facilitate industrialisation (but in the face of capital shortage), the Korean 
government preferred the corporate pension to shift the cost of political legitimacy to 
chaebols, and to concentrate financial resources on national-building and other 
economic and military goals (P. H. Kim, 2009, 2010). After the Korean War, its 
government’s financial capacity for launching public pensions was limited. Also, the 
chaebols could not resist it, since they had to rely on the government’s subsidies and 
interventions during the early period of industrialisation (Fields, 1995; Hundt, 2009).  
In the 1950s, however, the nascent chaebols could not, and were reluctant to, 
bear additional financial burdens resulting from labour protection laws. The Korean 
government also perceived that the implementation of labour regulations was 
unrealistic. This was because great financial burden would be borne out of these 
labour regulations, which, added to the chaebols, would hurt its economic 
development. Thus the Korean government ‘turned a blind eye’ to it, particularly for 
those chaebols with closer relationships with governments (Yi, 2007, pp. 64-69). That 
is, the Labour Standard Act in this period was essentially volunteerism, though legally 
compulsory. The coverage of the Retirement Allowance was consequently very 
limited, due to the government’s weak regulation and supervision (Table 7.1.1, below).  
Since the 1960s, the idea of developmentalism was accented, firstly by the 
Chang regime, then by the Park regime, to serve the implementation of labour-
intensive export-oriented industrialisation (Rudra, 2008; D.-M. Shin, 2003; Woo, 
2004; Yi, 2007). With new emphasis in American Aids being to achieve ‘self-
sufficiency’, American Aids thus declining (Haggard, 1990, pp.61-62), the transition 
from the import-substitution to export-oriented industrialisation was consequently 
necessary, and inevitable. Labour-intensive export-oriented industrialisation was 
implemented through exploitation of the abundant, cheap and educated labour, rather 
than highly skilled labour (Deyo, 1989; Haggard & Kaufman, 2008; Wibbels & 
Ahlquist, 2011). As such, employers did not show a strong preference for investment 
in the company-based skills formation (Bai & Cho, 1994; Yi & Lee, 2005). Some 
employment practices for developing long-term commitment with employees (such as 
the seniority-based system and life-time employment) were not developed 
significantly during this period (D.-O. Kim and Bae, 2004). As a result, employers, 
including the Federation of Korean Industries and the Korea Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry, fiercely resisted the clauses improving working conditions and 
occupational welfare. The Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry suggested that 
a regulation on the reduction of the Retirement Allowance should be established (Yi, 
2007), while the Federation of Korea Trade Union, through mass demonstration, 
strongly resisted it. In the early 1960s, however, the main political demand of the Park 
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regime was to increase its political base and so the Park regime adopted a hostile 
attitude against the capitalist class, in order to vie for political supports- consequently, 
employers’ suggestions were rejected. The amendment of the Labour Standard Act 
was passed in 1961, mandating employers to offer the Retirement Allowance to their 
workers. However, the Retirement Allowance covered only 5.4% of total employees 
in 1966 and 9.7% in 1970.  
It did increase significantly in the 1970s. First, the postponement of the National 
Welfare Pension led the Park regime to encourage corporate pension and welfare (Yi, 
2007). Second, chaebol employers’ social policy preferences were changed, due to the 
state externalising public training system to the chaebols in order to reduce the state’s 
financial burdens and prompt the chaebols to develop a company-based training 
system for heavy and chemical industrialisation. The emphasis on heavy and chemical 
industrialisation shifted the Korean economic base of comparative advantage, from 
cheap but educated labour, to skilled workers and economies of scale, as stated by the 
state (ibid). The number of workers with specific skills significantly increased in the 
1070s (see appendix 6). The chaebols, thereby, began changing their social policy 
preferences to emphasise the importance of corporate welfare for the resolution of 
economic coordination in the development of heavy and chemical industries. In the 
absence, particularly, of a coordination mechanism between chaebols for the 
prevention of skill poaching, though Korea’s employers endeavoured to establish it. 
The retirement allowance and corporate welfare were critical to help reduce high 
labour mobility, and to encourage workers and employers to invest in long-term 
human capital (M.-K. Chung, 2008, 2010; S.-Y. Lee, 2011; J. Song, 2012b).  
The state actively promoted corporate pension and welfare. First, Park issued 
Presidential Emergency Measure No. 3 labelled the ‘Emergency Measure for the 
Stabilisation of the People’s Livelihood’. This Emergency Measure had two important 
elements. First, it aimed to use fiscal, rather than public, welfare to bring about an 
equitable distribution of the imported inflation burden, caused by the oil crisis.45 It 
also reinforced the role the state played in mandating employers to provide corporate 
welfare to workers (Yi, 2007, p. 113). This signalled a change in policy direction of 
the Park regime (from public to occupational welfare). Second, the Labour Standard 
Act was revised in 1974, extending the coverage of the Retirement Allowance to firms 
with more than 15 employees. Third, the ‘Workers’ Saving Scheme for Asset 
Building’ was introduced in 1976, which Park announced as ‘the Year of All-out 
45 This Emergency Measure included some important measures: (1) the reduction of the burden of oil-
price increases on low-income groups; (2) the imposition of heavy taxes on the high-income group, and 
consumption tax on luxury goods; (3) the postponement of public welfare, such as the National 
Welfare Pension (Yi, 2007, p.113).  
127 
 
                                                  
National Saving’. This scheme was considered to be another method of mobilising 
financial resources, as well as increasing people’s well-being (ibid, pp. 127-128). 
Lastly, the Park regime launched the ‘New Community Movement’ to encourage 
employers to offer occupational welfare to their workers for reinforcement of the 
spirit of independence, self-help, and cooperation (M.-K. Chung, 2010). This argued 
that “in order to achieve the goals of the Factory New Community Movement, 
employers should provide welfare benefits to employees and employees should do 
factory work like their own business. Factories should participate in the Factory New 
Community Movement and employers should do their best to enhance the welfare of 
workers” (The Ministry of Home Affairs, 1980b, p. 465; cited from Yi, 2007, pp. 117-
118).  In this Movement, the idea of ‘firm-as-family’ was stressed under the slogan of 
“treat employee family, (do) factory work like one’s own personal work” (The 
Ministry of Home Affairs, 1980a, p. 239; cited from Yi, 2007, p. 122).  
The chaebols needed to follow the state’s initiates- because as well as employers 
relying on the state’s financial assistance, employers’ social policy preferences had 
also been changed. The Koran Chamber of Commerce and Industry was advised by 
the Park government to place emphasis on the creation of harmonious industrial 
relations (Yi, 2007, pp. 121-122). Korean employers thus began perceiving 
occupational welfare as a critical method for encouraging workers’ industriousness. 
This established a tighter relationship between employers and employees, that created 
harmonious industrial relations (labour control), and developed and secured highly-
skilled workers (M.-K. Chung, 2010; D.-O. Kim and Bae, 2004; Yi, 2007). A survey 
of the Korea Employers Federation showed that nearly 90% believed the company 
should be the major welfare provider (Yi, 2007, p. 133). Likewise, Taeyang Metal 
Industrial Co. Ltd argued that “employers should take care of employees as family 
members, and consider the company as their own venture, and both employer s and 
employees should make the factory like home” (The Ministry of Home Affairs, 1980b, 
p. 184; cited from Yi, 2007, p. 122). The change in employers’ social policy 
preferences resulted in the expansion of corporate welfare, and significant expansion 
in the number of workers covered by the Retirement Allowance. Further, employment 
practices for development of long-term employee commitments were made 
widespread, with wages increased during the 1970s (D.-O. Kim and Bae, 2004; S.-H. 
Kim, 2005). 46  
By encouraging corporate pension and welfare, and other employment practices, 
the result was the dualisation of the labour market. Chaebol, but not non-chaebol, 
46 For example, the seniority-based pay system had begun to be adopted in the 1970s. In 1979, 72.4% 
of companies adopted it for white-collar employees (D.-O. Kim and Bae, 2004, p. 144).  
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workers were well-protected by corporate pension and welfare. Further, as with Japan, 
the provision of corporate pension and welfare to core workers, and the development 
of company-based skill formation system and other employment practices, resulted in 
these chaebol workers becoming more growth-minded, with greater interests in job 
and economic securities (Song, 2012b; J.-J. Yang, 2006, 2013). The Park regime 
reinforced this, having banned and supressed national-level labour movements in 
order to force labour (particularly enterprise unions of chaebols) to concentrate efforts 
on non-political issues, such as corporate welfare, and to collaborate with the 
government for economic development (Yi, 2007). For the New Community 
Movement to be carried out, the government amended the Trade Union Act, forcing 
the companies with labour unions to establish a Labour Management Council to deal 
with issues such as skill training, working conditions, and corporate welfare in order 
to prevent labour disputes. The Park regime’s intention was for this measure to create 
business-friendly employees’ representational organisations that replace labour unions, 
and to confine the demands of labour to a definite institutional framework (Yi, 2007, p. 
124). In other words, the Park regime wanted to make labour unions of chaebol 
workers more cooperative, and obedient to the management. From the mid-1970s, this 
strategy resulted in an emerging internal labour market for white-workers of large 
chaebols (J.-Y. Jeong, 2007; D.-O. Kim and Bae, 2004; S.-H. Kim, 2005; Y.-K. Lee, 
2011; J.-J. Yang, 2013).  
 
Table 7.1.1 the History of Extension of the Retirement Allowance Scheme 




Ratio to the total 
employees (%) 
1966  30 or more workers  452,951  5.4 
1970  30 or more workers  945675  9.7 
1975  16 or more workers  1,448,099  12.2 
1980  10 or more workers  2,841,317  20.7 
1985  10 or more worker  3,583,457  23.9 
1990  5 or more workers  5,366,000  29.8 
1991  5 or more workers  5,118,915  27.5 
1993  5 or more workers  5,380,284  27.9 
1994  5 or more workers  5,695,912  28.7 
1995  5 or more workers   6,192,130  30.3 
1998  5 or more workers  5,786,000  30.1 





Table 7.1.1 shows the Retirement Allowance’s extension history, in Korea, from 
1966. In 1961, its coverage was extended from workplaces of 30 or more workers to 
those with 16 or more in 1975. Further, in 1966, only 5.4% of total employees were 
included, but in 1970, this had increased to 9.7%, and doubled during the 1970s.  
Following the war, the Korean government attempted integration of the pension 
system into its developmental strategy. Public pensions were only introduced for 
public workers to consolidate the political base of the authoritarian ruling regime. In 
the early 1970s, the Park regime wished to introduce the National Welfare Pension as 
a policy tool of capital formation, so that its capital-intensive heavy and chemical 
industrialisation could be supported. This was postponed, however, by employers’ 
resistance, and the first oil crisis. After the Korean War, the chaebol-dominated 
capitalist structure, and the chaebols’ great reliance on the government, allowed the 
Korean government to externalise the cost of political legitimacy to the chaebols. This 
was through introduction of a corporate pension, and other labour laws, in the face of 
limited financial capacity to launch public welfare. In the early stage of 
industrialisation, employers, shaped by the developmental strategy (import-
substitution industrialisation, then labour-intensive export-oriented industrialisation) 
and constrained by limited financial capacities, were reluctant to bear financial 
burdens caused by corporate pension and welfare. This changed in the 1970s, 
employers changing their social policy preferences, with heavy and chemical 
industrialisation adopted and the increase in the number of workers with specific 
skills, and the National Welfare Pension postponed. Additionally, the state encouraged 
corporate welfare and pensions, and developed the company-based skill formation 
system. Corporate pensions and welfare were thus developed to resolve economic 
coordination of skill formation, particularly in the case of the absence of an economic 
coordination mechanism to avoid skill poaching. Consequently, the corporate pension 
was significant in Korea.  
In the early post-war period (1950s and 1960s) in Korea, it was seen that the 
authoritarian state tended to act a dominant actor. Since the 1970s with growth of the 
chaebols, the state-chaebol developmental alliance, through exploitation of state 
assistance to become a symbiotic partner, was forged. The chaebols required financial 
assistance of the state, but were needed by the state to implement its development 
strategy (heavy and chemical industrialisation in the 1970s). Labour was intentionally 
supressed and divided, and chaebol workers were politically and economically 
incorporated into the state-chaebol developmental alliance through corporate pension 
and welfare, the company-based skill formation system, and state interventions. As 
with Japan, by ‘welfare through work’ practices, chaebol workers became more 
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growth-minded. This simultaneously created a dual labour market, gradually 
consolidating social cleavages between chaebols and SMEs, as well as chaebol core 
and SMEs non-regular workers. These social cleavages were deeply sharpened, 
shaping pension reforms and politics during the democratic period.  
Figure 7.1.1 shows the pension structure in 1980s Korea, prior to the 
introduction of the National Pension Insurance. With regard institutional structure, 
three public pension programmes were launched for different groups, the National 
Welfare Pension, though postponed, being for private workers. Meanwhile, corporate 
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7.2 The Dualisation of the Korean Pension System since the 
1980s 
Korea underwent democratisation and economic liberalisation from the 1980s. 
This dual transformation added universalism into the Korean pension system. 
Democratisation and economic liberalisation (accelerated by the Asian Financial 
Crisis in 1997) resulted in a deepening dualisation of labour market. A dualist strategy, 
in the face of economic liberalisation, as in Japan, was adopted to externalise the cost 
of economic liberalisation to SMEs and non-regular workers with low-general skills. 
Conversely, it consolidated chaebol workers with specific skills, to maintain its 
comparative institutional advantage. The chaebols and their regular workers tended to 
act as a defender of the existing employment-related welfare, and were reluctant to 
share risks with non-regular workers, or SMEs employers, through universalistic 
social policies. The state, at first, gradually extended the coverage of the National 
Pension Insurance to peasants and the self-employed, but simultaneously cut its 
benefit level from 70% to 40%. Eventually, in 2007, a nearly universalistic, non-
contributory pension scheme was introduced by the progressive government. In line 
with the dualist strategy, its corporate pension system was modernised, allowing 
employers to provide DC pensions for non-regular workers, in turn, reducing labour 
cost, though DB pension are still dominant.  
 
7.2.1 Public Pension: Towards Universalism 
Public Pension reforms in Korea could be roughly divided into two stages in this 
period. First, prior to 1997, democratisation was critical in the implementation of the 
National Pension Insurance. Second, after the Asian Financial Crisis, Korea not only 
reformed its capitalist structure, but also overhauled public pensions, modernising 
corporate pensions. Two public pension reforms of 1999 and 2007 changed the 
Korean pension system to the multi-pillar pension model.  
 
Pension Reforms during the period between 1980 and 1997 
In the early 1980s, although the Chun government endeavoured to legitimate its 
militaristic authoritarian regime through the ‘creation of a welfare state’ (Yi, 2007, p. 
152), a public pension was not the focus, in the face of economic difficulties. Instead, 
more efforts were devoted to encouraging occupational welfare, to achieve its goal 
(Hwang, 2006; D.-M. Shin, 2003; Yi, 2007). The transformation of political regime 
and employers’ social policy preferences in the mid-1980s changed the context.  
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Since the 1950s, and as mentioned earlier, the Korean government tended, by 
encouraging corporate welfare and pensions, to externalise the cost of political 
legitimacy to the chaebols, in the situation of weak financial capacity. This was 
particularly significant during the late 1970s and early 1980s. This strategy, however, 
reached its limits due to a decline of employers’ support, and democratic 
breakthrough. It led the Chun government to emphasise public welfare as a policy 
instrument of political legitimacy. 
Thanks to economic recovery, less reliance on the state, since 1984, encouraged 
employers to show their concerns about financial burdens of the corporate welfare. 
Employers suggested that a ‘Korea Social Welfare Model’ should be established- the 
state being the main provider, with employers playing a supplemental role on welfare 
provision (Yi, 2007, p. 164). From the late 1970s, the institutionalisation of 
employment practices and corporate welfare, together with wage increases, levied 
great financial burden on employers. This forced the state to shift the focus from 
occupational welfare to public welfare, to politically legitimise its authoritarian 
regime. Second, and more critically, in 1985, the minjung-democracy alliance formed 
the New Korea Democratic Party so that the ruling Democratic Justice Party could be 
challenged in the 1985 National Assembly election. In the election, the ruling party, 
though it still controlled the National Assembly, received only 35.3% of votes (D.-M. 
Shin, 2003, p. 108). Following this, several members of the Democratic Justice Party 
admitted that welfare policies should be introduced to vie for electoral supports in the 
next National Assembly in 1988 (S. Kim, 2006, p. 79). Thus, in 1986, Chun 
announced that three welfare policies would be implemented: (1) the universalisation 
and unification of the National Health Insurance to all citizens; (2) the implementation 
of the National Pension Insurance; (3) a minimum wage law. It was considered as a 
political instrument for the 1987 presidential election, and the 1988 National 
Assembly election (Hwang, 2006; S. Kim, 2006; Y.-M. Kim & Kim, 2005).  
Although this issue was raised by democratisation, the institutional design of the 
National Pension Insurance was economic-oriented. The Economic Planning Board 
took a leading, and coordinating role in the institutional design, but conflicts between 
economic (the Economic Planning Board) and social (the Ministry of Health and 
Social Affairs) technocrats were significant (Hwang, 2006, pp. 64-65). The chairman 
of the National Pension Fund Operation Committee was debated firstly: the Economic 
Planning Board preferred its Minister, but social technocrats favoured the Premier. It 
is critical for the operation of a pension fund, and the Minister of the Economic 
Planning Board was appointed as the chairman of this Committee (ibid, p. 64). Next, 
the use of the National Pensions Fund was debated as well. Social technocrats tended 
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to reserve it through real capital investment.47 Economic technocrats, however, 
preferred to divert it through financial investments, such as stock exchange securities. 
The latter was adopted, though in practice, the government used both (ibid, p. 64-65).  
After the 1985 election, labour (the Federation of Korean Trade Unions) and 
employers (the Korea Employers’ Association) were allowed to join the Preparation 
Committee of the National Pension Insurance at the early stage of policy making (S. 
Kim, 2006, p. 79). Labour argued that marginal workers, such as the self-employed 
with a certain income level should be covered; the level of pension benefit should be 
set at 45% of a worker’s last three years’ average income; and pension benefits should 
also be adjusted, such as market prices or income increases (ibid). Employers focused, 
however, on the financial burden, arguing that as well as employers and employees, 
the state should also subsidy it, and the contribution rate should be minimised (ibid). 
A more critical conflict between labour and business was whether the Retirement 
Allowance should remain intact (Hwang, 2006, pp. 65-66; S. Kim, 2006, pp. 79-80; 
Woo, 2004, pp. 80-82; Yi, 2007, p. 182). Labour insisted that it should be separated 
from the National Pension Insurance, while employers argued the introduction of the 
National Pension Insurance would result in a double burden on employers. Therefore, 
the Retirement Allowance should be seen partly as a form of social security and a 
reward for meritorious services. The employers’ idea was accepted, and it was 
decreed that a portion of the pension funds of the Retirement Allowance should be 
transferred to the pension fund of the National Pension Insurance. Put simply, the 
Korean government did not see the relationship between public social insurance 
pension schemes, and occupational pension schemes, being complementary, but 
substituted (Yi, 2007, p. 182). Its implementation was postponed until 1993 as such, 
and in order to reach compromise between labour and business, the government 
extended the coverage of the Retirement Allowance again to firms with 5 or more 
employees (Woo, 2004, pp. 80-81). 
In November 1986, the bill was passed. The National Pension Insurance is a 
contributory pension scheme. Initially, the contribution was equally shared by 
employers and employees, each contributing 1.5% of the insured’s person wage until 
1992. This increased to 6% in 1993, but was equally shared between employers and 
employees, and the pension funds of the Retirement Allowance (2% each), while 1998 
saw a split of 9% (3% by each). Pension benefits consisted of two parts: a basic 
amount, and an additional amount. The basic amount is decided by the average 
monthly wage of all insured persons, and the average amount of the monthly standard 
47 Through this, the state could borrow capital from the Fund at an interest rate of 3 or 4% lower than 
those in the financial market, to invest in government projects such as infrastructures.  
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wages of insured individuals. The replacement rate will achieve 70% for a retired 
person paying at least 40 years contributions.  
The institutional design of the National Pension Insurance mirrored the 
interaction of two critical factors: democratisation and developmentalism. The 
National Pension Insurance, designed to vie for political supports, could be seen as 
the result of democratisation, thus its benefit level was high. In consideration of 
labour cost, however, its contribution was low. This low contribution rate/high 
replacement rate caused a problem of financial unsustainability (Y.-M. Kim & Kim, 
2005; D.-M. Shin, 2003). The National Pension Insurance also excluded marginalised 
workers, such as peasants, fisherman and self-employed. The following pension 
reforms, thereby, aimed to address these problems. Following its implementation, the 
Korean government quickly extended its coverage, in 1992, to workers in firms of 
five or more employees, and in 1995, to the self-employed in rural areas. The 
expansion of coverage was to increase its financial bases (more contributors) to 
address its financial unsustainability, caused by the low contribution rate/high 
replacement rate (Hwang, 2006, pp. 67-68), and this reflected Korea’s conservative 
character. It did not, however, solve the financial problem, worsened by the Asian 
Financial Crisis. Consequently, two more radical pension reforms were launched in 
1998 and 2007.  
 
Public Pension Reforms after the Asian Financial Crisis 
The 1999 Pension Reform 
Since the 1980s, the Chun regime endeavoured to process a series of economic 
liberalisation reforms, including dissolving the chaebols, in the face of the changing 
international economic environment, but failed due to employers’ resistances (D.-M. 
Shin, 2003; Woo, 2004). In order to join the OECD, the Kim Young-Sam government 
(1993-98) sped up the path of economic liberalisation, particularly the financial and 
labour markets, to fit its standards (D.-M. Shin, 2003). The financial issue of the 
National Pension Insurance, therefore, had to be understood in the context of 
economic liberalisation (Y.-M. Kim & Kim, 2005, p. 215).  
In 1996, the government attempted overhaul the National Pension Insurance, but 
economic and social technocrats had opposite views (Hwang, 2006, pp. 68-69). The 
National Pension Reform Board, which comprised 21 members, including 
bureaucracies and interest representatives such as the Federation of Korean Trade 
Unions, the Korea Employers Federation, policy experts and so on, was established to 
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mediate the contending views (Hwang, 2006; Y.-M. Kim & Kim, 2005). The first 
camp, supported by the Presidential Office, economic technocrats, experts and 
employers, proposed a bi-pillar system that reflected the World Bank’s idea. It 
consisted of a basic pension and an earning-related pension which could be 
contracted-out. Social technocrats, social policy experts, and labour insisted that the 
current mono-pillar structure should be maintained, and that expansion of coverage 
should be prioritised. Unsurprisingly, the bi-pillar plan was selected (Y.-M. Kim & 
Kim, 2005, p. 216).  
The Asian Financial Crisis, unfortunately, severely attacked the Korean economy, 
with the conservative developmental alliance ended by the progressive leader, Kim 
Dae-Jung, during the presidency, in December 1997. The Crisis deteriorated the 
financial stability of the National Pension Insurance (Chosun, 30/12/1997). This 
power shift not only altered the composition of political coalition, but also the idea of 
the welfare state. With regard to pension reform, Kim clearly announced: “Built 
around the middle and working classes…I will actively seek to implement 
constructive social welfare measures…national pension system will be built up in 
order to develop a comprehensive social welfare system” (Chosun Ilbo, 24 January 
1998; cited from S. Kim, 2006). Simultaneously, the conservative actors were 
weakened, through the establishment of the Tripartite Committee that included two 
nation-level labour organisations (the Federation of Korean Trade Unions and the 
Korean Confederation of Trade Unions48) (Y. M. Kim, 2008; J.-J. Yang, 2004). 
Consequently, the Ministry of Health and Welfare came to the fore, to resist the 
bi-pillar plan, stating that it would destroy solidarity, and reduce the redistributive 
effect of the National Pension Insurance. Further, the significant reduction in pension 
benefits would provoke political opposition (S. Kim, 2006; Y.-M. Kim & Kim, 2005). 
The Kim Dae-Jung government eventually accepted its suggestion to maintain the 
current, unified pension scheme, and to reduce the replacement rate to 55% instead of 
40% (Y.-M. Kim & Kim, 2005, p. 217).  
48 The Korean Confederation of Trade Unions was rooted in the ‘democratic union movement’ in the 
mid-1980s. Its establishment was due to democratic unionists wanting to establish an alternative labour 
movement, outside of that of the Federation of Korean Trade Unions. This was viewed as completely 
co-opted, and controlled either by management or authoritarian regimes. In 1990, democratic and 
independent unions formed the National Congress of Trade Unions; and then, in 1995, it was expanded, 
and changed into the Korea Confederation of Trade Unions. During the Crisis, the Kim Dae-Jung 
government invited the Korea Confederation of Trade Unions to join the Tripartite Committee. This 
was the first time the government recognised the Korea Confederation of Trade Unions. The actual 
legalisation of the Korea Confederation of Trade Unions, however, was not granted until 2000, due to 
the revision of labour laws. For the Korea Confederation of Trade Unions, therefore, the most 
important task was to gain legal status before 2000 (Y.-K. Lee, 2011).  
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However, this mono-pillar plan was criticised by business and chaebol workers, 
with employers strongly reluctant to expand its coverage to the urban informal sector, 
under a unified pension system. They argued that it would deteriorate financial 
stability due to under-reported income of the self-employed, especially, the ratio of 
self-employed was high (see figure 7.2.1) (Y.-M. Kim & Kim, 2005, p. 217; Woo, 
2004, pp. 111-112). This would eventually lead to an increase in labour costs, in turn 
weakening their economic competitiveness. Chaebol workers also favoured the bi-
pillar plan, arguing that the self-employed should be separated in order to avoid 
income redistribution between the waged middle class, and the self-employed (S. Kim, 
2006, p. 82). After democratisation, these organised unions of chaebol workers could, 
comparatively, effectively exert their mobilisation strength to maximise company-
level gains (such as corporate welfare and wages). As such, in the face of economic 
liberalisation, organised chaebols workers (with specific skills) showed more interest 
in employment security (Y.-K. Lee, 2011; Song, 2012c). However, peak-level labour 
unions, and civil society groups, were unsatisfied due to the reduction in pension 
benefit to 55% (from 70%) (Y.-M. Kim & Kim, 2005, p. 217).  
In the face of strong opposition from labour and civil society groups (Chosun, 
12/2/1999), the Kim Dae-Jung government decided to limit the reduction in the 
replacement rate to 60% instead of 55%. The bill was approved by the National 
Assembly in December 1998: (1) the mono-pillar pension structure would be 
maintained; (2) the coverage would be extended to the urban inform sector in April 
1999; (3) the replacement rate would be reduced to 60%; and (4) the contribution rate 
of 9% would be equally shared by employers and employees (4.5% each) - the 
pension funds of the Retirement Allowance would not be devoted to the National 
Pension Insurance. This reform increased the financial burden placed on employers, 
with the contribution rate of the Retirement Allowance remaining intact at 8.3% (Y.-
M. Kim & Kim, 2005, p. 218). The 1990s pension reforms witnessed a dual 
movement: the expansion in coverage, but the retrenchment of benefits. 
 
The 2007 Pension Reform 
In the face of the Asian Financial Crisis, however, Korea received two structural 
adjustment loans from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. One of 
the conditions was to undertake structural pension reform (C. L. Jung & Walker, 2009; 
Y.-M. Kim & Kim, 2005). Particularly, the World Bank critically reviewed the Korean 
pension system, suggesting that it should be transferred to a multi-pillar pension 
system (World Bank, 2000). The Ministry of Health and Welfare adopted a lukewarm 
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attitude to the World Bank’s suggestion, however, when the economy had been 
recovering from the recession (S.-K. Kim & Lee, 2004; Y.-M. Kim & Kim, 2005), 
though the neo-liberal idea had been shaping Korea’s capitalist structure and welfare 
state.  
Since the 1980s, thanks to economic liberalisation and the rise of low-general 
skill service workers (appendix 6), the dualisation of labour market has been 
gradually consolidating. Particularly, after 1997, the dualisation of the labour market 
was further deepened through the structural reform (figure 7.2.1 and table 7.2.1) (I. 
Peng, 2012; Song, 2012a; J.-J. Yang, 2006). In the face of the Crisis, the progressive 
Kim government comprehensively liberalised the labour market to allow employers to 
adopt a more radical way (such as laying off staff) of corporate restructuring through 
political incorporation of labour unions into the Tripartite Committee (Y.-K. Lee, 2011; 
Woo, 2004). However, constrained by its chaebol-dominated capitalist structure, 
chaebol employers had to adopt a dualist strategy. As with Japan, chaebol workers 
with specific skills, in the face of economic difficulty, tended to prioritise the securing 
of possible buffers against the risks of labour market deregulation, rather than seeking 
solidarity at the national level, maintaining their benefits and jobs (Y.-K. Lee, 2011; 
Song, 2012c; J.-J. Yang, 2006, 2013). Chaebol workers tended to resist a 
comprehensive labour market deregulation, but accepted wage restrains49 because, 
since the 1970s, organised chaebol workers became more growth-minded by the 
consolidation of employment practices and wage increases.50 On the other hand, 
chaebol employers did not want to fundamentally dismantle the system, in order to 
maintain its comparative institutional advantages, established in the 1970s and 
consolidated after the 1980s. Following the Crisis, and as a result, employers did not 
choose more drastic measures that were open to them for workforce adjustment (such 
as layoff and replacing regular worker with non-regular workers), but a dualist 
strategy- chaebol employers and workers endeavoured to externalise the cost of 
economic liberalisation to SMEs and non-regular workers with low-general skills, 
through the subcontracting networks, but to maintain a portion of core workers with 
specific skills for their comparative institutional advantages to be protected (Y.-K. Lee, 
2011; Song, 2012a, 2012c). For example, around two-thirds of employers tended to 
use the wage adjustment (around 40%) and working hour adjustment (nearly 20%), 
even though mass layoff is possible (Yun, 2008, p: 228-229). Rather, the cost of 
labour market restructuring or deregulation was externalised to low-general skill 
49 For example, the labour union of General Motors Daewoo accepted, in 2003, wage restraints in 
exchange for job security (Kong, 2012).  
50 For example, the ratio of wage increase between firms with fewer than 30 employees and firms with 
more than 500 employees was 100:111 in 1986, widening to 100:171 in 2004 (Y.-K. Lee, 2011, p. 113).  
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workers by replacing them with non-regular workers, since they are not considered as 
the source of comparative institutional advantages. Consequently, the number of non-
regular workers has been increasing since 1990 (figure7.2.1). As a result, a huge 
cleavage having occurred between workers in organised chaebols and SMEs. 
 
Figure 7.2.1 Proportion of Total Workers by Employment Status and Ratio of Part-
Time Employment Rate  
Source: Rowsley, Yoo, and Kim (2011, p. 70); and OECD Labour Force Statistics, various years 
 
The deepening dualisation of the labour market, a cleavage between chaebol 
workers and labour market outsiders, is reinforced by the Korean ‘welfare through 
work’ system. In the ‘welfare through work’ system, welfare benefits are mainly 
obtained through regular employment. Therefore, labour market outsiders are 
excluded from the ‘welfare through work’ system, if not totally, such as self-employed, 
family workers and non-regular workers. Although self-employed and family workers 
have different social policy preferences due to low risk of unemployment (Rueda, 
2007), in the past two decades, the proportion of family workers and self-employed 
has been declining in line with increasing non-regular workers (figure 7.2.1). Table 
7.2.1 and 7.2.6 and 7.2.7 show that the increase in non-regular workers with low-
general skills was concentrated on SMEs, and these SMEs workers were less 
protected, and enjoy less corporate welfare. The workers with low-general skills are 
not seen as the source of its comparative institutional advantages, and could be easily 
replaced and supplied through the external labour market. Thus, these non-regular 
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workers with low-general skills are less covered by corporate welfare. Like Japan, in 
Korean ‘welfare through work’ system, labour market insiders (mainly, chaebol 
regular workers with specific skills) are well-protected, but outsiders (such as part-
time workers, temporary workers, family workers and self-employed) are less covered 
by social insurance programmes, and enjoy fewer fringe benefits, such as a corporate 
pension.  
 
Table 7.2.1 Distribution of Non-Regular Workers by Firm Size (2011) 
 (Unit: thousands, %) 




Part-time workers   Atypical workers  
Number   Percentage  Number   Percentage  Number   Percentage  Number   Percentage 
1-4  1,546  25.8  572  16.6  739  43.4  745  30.7 
5-9  1,156  19.3  573  16.7  337  19.8  532  21.9 
10-29  1,483  24.7  922  26.8  349  20.5  631  26.0 
30-99  1,097  18.3  773  22.5  175  10.3  396  16.3 
100-299  375  6.3  296  8.6  46  2.7  89  3.7 
300 or more  337  5.6  307  8.9  56  3.3  32  1.3 
Total   5,995  100  3442  100  1,702  100  2,427  100 
Source: Statistic Korea, Economically Active Population Survey Supplementary Survey by 
Employment Type, August 2011; adopted from Kum and Yi (2012, p. 6) 
 
The issue of pension reform was therefore shifted from financial sustainability to 
the creation of a broader pension scheme for non-regular workers and labour market 
outsiders (H.-W. Chung, 2010, p. 140). In 2006, the Ministry of Health and Welfare 
proposed a new idea- the introduction of a non-contributory, basic old-age pension 
scheme. For this reason, Yoo Si-Min, who insisted a basic pension scheme should be 
introduced, was appointed Minister (Joo, 2010, p. 201). This idea aimed to address the 
problem of contribution non-payment caused by the increase in non-regular workers 
(Chosun, 23/2/1999, 20/2/2006).51  
The different plans proposed only varied in terms of their coverage (from 60%, 
to all elder citizens) and benefit level (from 4.6% of the average income of those 
insured by the National Pension Insurance, to 20%). Simply because its plan was 
more generous, labour and civil society groups tended to support the opposition 
conservative parties- even though they may not have fully understood the plans (Joo, 
2010, p. 200). The Grand National Party, alongside other opposition parties, submitted 
51 According to the 2009 official annual report, 27.13% of those insured by the National Pension 
Insurance were exempted from contribution payment, these people mostly non-regular workers, and 
labour market outsiders (National Pension Service, 2009). 
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the joint revised bill in April 2007, which covered 80% of the aged, offering a flat-rate 
benefit at 10% of the average income of those insured by the National Pension 
Insurance. The old-age benefit of the National Pension Insurance would be reduced to 
40% (Chosun, 29/1/2007). The main intention of this proposal was to vie for electoral 
support in the 2007 presidential election through the more generous plan. This bill 
was rejected. 
The ruling party and the opposition parties, however, soon reached a compromise, 
with the Basic Old-Age Pension Act introduced at the end of 2007. The ‘Basic Old-
Age Pension Scheme’ is a nearly universalistic, tax-financed basic state pension 
scheme. It initially covered 60% of the elderly, with the benefit level 5% of the 
average income of those insured by the National Pension Insurance (Chosun, 
10/4/2007). However, it was amended before its implementation in July 2007, with 
the coverage increased from 60% in 2008, to 70% in 2009, while the level of benefit 
also increased to 10%. The replacement rate of the National Pension Insurance, 
however, was reduced by 0.5% annually, from 60% down to 40% by 2028, with the 
contribution rate increasing from 9% to 12.8%.  
During this period, the National Pension Insurance was introduced due to 
democratisation in the late 1980s. In the face of economic liberalisation in the 1990s 
and 2000s, the Korean public pension system underwent a dual transformation 
(retrenchment in benefit and expansion in coverage). This was to address financial 
unsustainability, and labour market dualism, caused by economic liberalisation, 
institutional legacies and the dualist strategy. The Asian Financial Crisis pushed the 
issue of pension reform to the centre, bringing the progressive leader into the 
presidency. The 1999 pension reform was signalled as a neo-liberal turn in the 
pension system. The 2007 pension reform, by universalism being embedded into the 
Korean public pension system, after a non-contributory basic pension scheme was 
introduced, was the result of the dualist strategy. Chaebols employers and workers 
with specific skills preferred to maintain the existing system, but externalise the cost 
of labour market deregulation, to non-regular workers and the state, through a 
universalistic non-contributory pension scheme. Simply put, public pension reforms 
in Korea in the 1990s and 2000s were the product of the way the Korean chaebol-






7.2.2 Private Pension: The Modernisation of Corporate Pension 
The Introduction of the ‘Employee Retirement Income Security Act’ 
The Retirement Allowance was introduced in 1952, and its coverage, particularly 
after the 1980s, was gradually expanded52 as employers began to develop long-term 
commitments with employees through generous corporate welfare (Y.-K. Lee, 2011; 
Yang 2013). First, however, its social function was eroded after the National Pension 
Insurance and the Unemployment Insurance were introduced in 1988 and 1995 
respectively (Phang, 2010, p. 99). Second, economic liberalisation since the 1980s, 
forced the chaebols to rely on other financing schemes, when the policy loans were 
significantly reduced. The significance of direct finance, and nonbank financial 
institutions, as demonstrated by table 7.2.2, increased (although they were severely hit 
by the Crisis after 1997). Thus, chaebol employers asked the government to create a 
more flexible corporate pension system that would flexibly mobilise pension funds of 
the Retirement Allowance (Chosun, 11/2/2001; Chosun, 26/2/2002; Moon, 2002).53 
Third, although there is no legal requirement that stipulates employers must record the 
liability of the Retirement Allowance on their balance sheet, many employers tend to 
take advantage of favourable tax treatments, by according these liabilities into book 
reserve (World Bank, 2000, p. 16). But, it lacked regulations and supervisions (Hahm, 
2003; World Bank, 2000). Thus, the debt-equity ratio of the chaebols deteriorated. 
Confronted by the Crisis, a financial problem of the Retirement Allowance was 
established- it was possible to relinquish the responsibility of making the mandated 
payment due to insolvency and bankruptcy. (Chosun, 23/8/2004; M. J. Park, 2014; 






52 It was revised to a mandatory scheme in 1961 for employees in firms of more than 30 employees, 
before being gradually extended: to those with 15 or more employees in 1975, to those of 10 or more in 
1980, to firms of more than 5 in 1988, and finally, to all firms in 2010. 
53 In 1997, the amendment of the Labour Standard Act allowed employers to convert the retirement 
allowances to annuities; and life insurance companies were allowed to offer annuity schemes in 1999. 
54 Thus, the government established the ‘Wage Guarantee Fund’ in July 1998, to pay benefit (3 months 




                                                  
Table 7.2.2 Structure of Corporate Financing (inflow, %) 
  1985  1988  1990  1995  1997  1998  1999  2000  2003  2006 
Indirect Finance   56.2  27.4  40.9  31.8  28  -7.3  4.1  17.9  38.8  35.8 
From Banks  35.4  19.4  16.8  14.9  14  0.9  29.3  35.4  42.5  31.8 
From NBFIs  20.8  8  24.1  17  13.9  -59.8  -25  -17.6  -3.8  3.9 
Direct Finance   30.3  59.5  45.2  48.1  47.2  178.9  46.8  26.2  35.1  42.1 
Commercial Papers   0.4  6.1  4  16.1  17.5  42.2  -30.4  -7.2  -5.7  7.8 
Corporate Bonds  16.1  7.5  23  15.3  17.9  165.9  -5.3  -3.1  -2.5  13.4 
Stocks  13  40.6  14.2  14.4  10.9  48.9  77.6  31.6  35.9  20.5 
Foreign Borrowing   0.8  6.4  6.8  8.4  10.4  -35.5  24.1  25.6  15.2  3.1 
Others*  12.7  6.7  7.1  11.7  14.4  13.9  25  30.4  10.9  19.0 
Source: adopted from H. J. Jung (2012, p. 168 and 188). 
* Includes among others commercial trade credits, borrowing from government, bill payables, reserves 
for retirement allowance.  
 
Consequently, the issue of the Retirement Allowance’s modernisation was 
brought to the table of the Tripartite Committee and scheduled for discussion in 1998. 
This did not happen until 2000, however. Facing the Crisis, labour were 
predominantly concerned with job security and the financial stability of the 
programme, preferring the DB pension plan. Employers, however, wished to 
minimise financial burdens, through the introduction of a DC pension plan for a more 
flexible labour market. Table 7.2.3 summarises the arguments from three sides. The 
negotiation ended without concrete agreement, but a consensus of transforming the 
Retirement Allowance to corporate pensions, so that employers’ financial burden 
could be relieved in the face of the crisis, was achieved (Y. J. Choi, 2006, pp. 238-239; 












Table 7.2.3 the Debates on the Institutional Design of the Corporate Pensions 
  Labour  Employer  State 
Functional 
Focus 
 Provide Stable Income for 
workers after retirement 
 Do not use DC scheme 
 Limit investment to share 
capital market 
 Put management of funds 
under negotiation of both 
labour and management 
 Minimise companies 
burden 
 Abolish retirement 
pay 
 Make contribution in 
connection with the 
National Pension 
Insurance to reduce 
burden on employers 
 Guarantee livelihood for 
worker after retirement 
 Facilitate economic 
growth through the 





Expand coverage to firms 
with less than 5 employees 
Opposed to expand 
coverage firm with less 
than 5 employees 
Pursue to expanded 
coverage to firms of less 
than 5 employees in 2008-
2010, but would consider 




DB Benefit only  Preferred DC pension  Autonomous choice 
between DB and DC 
through negotiation 
between employers and 
workers.  
Source: cited and revised from M. J. Park (2014, p. 92, table 6.5) 
 
The state thereby decided to introduce a new corporate pension scheme to 
replace the old Retirement Allowance (Chosun, 11/2/2001). The Korean Labour 
Institute, funded by the Ministry of Labour, proposed three alternatives (Phang, 2004, 
pp. 21-24): (1) System transition model: this aims to replace the Retirement 
Allowance through (initially) voluntary corporate pension schemes and favourable tax 
treatment, which ultimately turn it to a mandatory pension plan that completely 
replaces the Retirement Allowance; (2) Intern-generational model: this aims to replace 
the Retirement Allowance through a compulsory corporate pension scheme at one 
point in time, or gradually through contribution conversion; and (3) Contract-out of 
public pension: this attempts to reduce the burden of the National Pension Insurance 
by gradually increasing the role of the corporate pension.  
In 2002, the Federation of Korean Industries simultaneously, and fiercely, asked 
for the conversion of the Retirement Allowance into the corporate pensions again, 
listing several principles: minimal governmental intervention; an optimal, but not high, 
contribution rate; transferable pensions; incentives for enterprises; and professional 
supervision of the government over pension funds (Y. J. Choi, 2006, p. 239). In 
contrast to public pensions, the chaebols showed more concerns about corporate 
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pensions, since they could gain more management authorities from corporate over 
public pensions (J.-J. Yang, 2013). 
In 2004, the Ministry of Labour drafted an act, known as the ‘Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act’, according to the system transition model. Passed in 
2005, it was implemented in 2006 to replace the Retirement Allowance, on a 
voluntary basis initially. Essentially, the principles suggested by employers were 
accepted (Y. J. Choi, 2006, p. 239). According to the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act, new corporate pensions could either be DB or DC pensions, or the 
Individual Retirement Account plan. At first, employers could choose either the 
Retirement Allowance or new corporate pension schemes (DC or DB plan), and the 
choice of pension type depends on the negotiation between employers and employees. 
Irrespective of the type adopted, the final benefit level should be no less than that of 
the Retirement Allowance.  
 
The Implementation of the ‘Employee Retirement Income Security Act’ 
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act includes three types of corporate 
pension. The DB plan is not a traditionally defined-benefit pension, but acts as a kind 
of external vehicle for unfunded retirement allowance liabilities. The minimum level 
of funding is based on the negotiation between the employer and employees, through 
consideration of the company’s business condition. In the DB plan, a clear statement 
of benefit entitlement should be included in the plan contract, but the level of benefit 
should not be less than the final payment of the Retirement Allowance. The DC plan 
shifts the risk of fund management from the employer to employees, though 
legislation sets a guaranteed income certificate. Under the DC plan, employers must 
contribute no less than 8.3% of the payroll expenditure to the funds that should be 
funded, and managed, by either an insurance or trust contract to protect the benefit 
rights of workers in the event of employer bankruptcy. According to the Act, coverage 
of corporate pension schemes has been extended to all firms, though those with less 
than 10 employees can introduce the Individual Retirement Account plan from 2007. 
The Individual Retirement Account plan is a transitional, or terminal, savings account 
where workers can deposit the lump-sum payment from their last employer’s 
corporate pension scheme, including the Retirement Allowance, DB, or DC plan. 
Principally, the Individual Retirement Account plan is regulated as the DC plan, yet, 
the Individual Retirement Account plan is an individual saving account, detached 
from any specific employer’s plan. Table 7.2.4 summarises the features of four 
corporate pension schemes. 
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Table 7.2.4 the Features of the Retirement Allowance, DB and DC and Individual 
Retirement Account plans 
  The Retirement 
Allowance 
DB Plan  DC Plan  Individual 
Retirement 




Average of Final 3 
Months’ Salaries * 
years of service 
Average of Final 3 
months’ Salaries * 
years of service 
Account balance  Account balance 
Funding  Internal and/or 
external 
External funding, 
but the minimum 
level of funding 
must be negotiated 
between employer 
and employees.  
Fully external, and 
must be funded and 
managed by 








Funding basis  Employer’s 
discretion, but no 
less than 8.3% 
Actuarial 
determination 
8.3 % of salary each 
year (minimum) 
1/24 (for 2007-











 No advance 
payments 
 Loans up to 
50% of accrued 
benefit 
 No advance 
payments 
 Loans up to 50% 
of accrued balance 
 Hardship 
withdrawals 
Like DC Plan 
Benefit form  Lump-sum  Lump-sum/ 
annuity 
Lump-sum/ annuity  Lump-sum/ 
annuity 
Source: Beram (2005, p. 35) and M. J. Park (2014, p. 87); and my revision.  
 
Following the introduction of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, the 
importance of new corporate pensions increased conspicuously (table 7.2.5). The 
number of workers covered by new corporate pensions increased threefold between 
2008 and 2011. In 2011, 69.3% were covered by the DB plan, while 28.3% had DC 
plans, so as in Japan, the DB plan is still dominant, even in the face of economic 
liberalisation. With economic liberalisation and the Crisis, and constrained by its 
chaebol-dominated capitalist structure, chaebol employers tend to adopt the dualist 
strategy. This is due to the resistance of chaebol workers to the deregulation of the 
comprehensive labour market, and the need for maintaining of comparative 
institutional advantages. This increases the number of non-regular workers with low-
general skills, enhancing labour market flexibility, and enabling them to adjust to 
changing business environments, while still strongly maintaining job security for core 
workers with specific skills to preserve its comparative institutional advantage (Song, 
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2012a; 2012b). The cost of labour market deregulation is thus externalised to less 
organised, non-regular workers of SMEs (Song, 2012b; J.-J. Yang, 2013). This 
strategy, and social cleavage between organised chaebol workers and less organised 
SMEs workers, also resulted in the dualisation of corporate pension between the 
chaebol and SME workers. 
 
Table 7.2.5 the Number of Workers Covered by Corporate Pension Plans 
(Unit: Numbers of workers, %) 
  Total  DB plan  DC plan  Individual 
Retirement 
Account Plan 
















Source: Ministry of Employment and Labour 
(http://www.moel.go.kr/view.jsp?cate=7&sec=4&smenu=2&mode=view&seq=1328575388075&page
=1&state=A&bbs_cd=105); and Phang (2010, p. 104) 
 
Table 7.2.6 and table 7.2.7 demonstrate this. Table 7.2.6 demonstrates that in 
2008, 20.7% of firms with over 500 employees introduced new corporate pensions for 
their workers. This compares to just 2% of firms with less than 10 employees, and 
11.2% of firms with 30-99 employees. In 2011, though an increasing number of firms 
introduced new corporate pensions for their employees, the gap between large 
chaebols and SMEs was more significant- only 6.2% of firms with fewer than 10 
employees introduced corporate pensions for their workers, compared to 84.6% of 
firms with above 500 employees. In other words, the ratio increases in tandem with 









Table 7.2.6 the Number of Workplaces Adopting Corporate Pensions by Firm Size  
(Unit: Number of workplace, %) 






24,441  11,156  5,053  1,085  170  200  42,105 
(B) Total 
Workplaces 
1,189,714  156,304  45,083  8,700  1,018  965  1,4101,784 






79,039  37,648  16,313  4,467  737  947  139,151 
(B) Total 
Workplaces 
1,277,326  167,033  50,007  10,309  1,363  1,120  1,507,158 
A/B (%)  6.2  22.5  32.6  43.3  54.1  84.6  9.2 
Source: Ministry of Employment and Labour 
(http://www.moel.go.kr/view.jsp?cate=7&sec=4&smenu=2&mode=view&seq=1328575388075&page
=1&state=A&bbs_cd=105); and Phang (2010, p. 104) 
 
Firm size determines not only the ratio, but also the types, of corporate pensions 
being adopted by workplaces. Table 7.2.7 shows that larger firms were likely to 
introduce the DB plan, with smaller firms preferring the DC plans. Since the 1970s, 
Korean chaebols begun to institutionalise company-based skill formation through 
establishment of long-term commitments with employees, through generous corporate 
welfare. Chaebol workers, thus, have a strong preference for the DB plan in order to 
protect their specific skills (M. J. Park, 2014; Phang, 2010; J.-J. Yang, 2013). 
Furthermore, following democratisation (the mid-1980s), these organised chaebol 
workers have, when compared to less organised SMEs workers, more power to fight 
for company-level gains and job security (Y.-K. Lee, 2011). The types of corporate 
pensions adopted is determined by the co-determination of employers and employees, 
and consequently, the DB pension is prevalent in large firms of more than 500 
employees. Table 7.2.7 shows that around two-thirds of those firms adopted DB 
pension for their workers, compared to 29.1% of firms with less than 10 employees. 
Under economic liberalisation, non-regular workers of SMEs must bear the cost of 
economic liberalisation (Song, 2012a, 2012b; J.-J. Yang, 2013), and firms with less 
than 10 employees tend to introduce either the DC pension (36.7%) or the Individual 
Retirement Account plan for their employees (33.4%). This deepening dualisation 




Table 7.2.7 the Distribution of Corporate Pension Plans by Firm Size (2011) 




Only DB  Both 
DB, DC 




Under 10  23,035 (29.1)  518  (0.7)  29,038 (36.7)  26,448 (33.4)  79,039 (100.0) 
10~29  17,269 (45.9)  892  (2.4)  19,487 (51.8)  n.a  37,648 (100.0) 
30~99  9,023 (55.3)  743  (4.6)  6,547 (40.1)  n.a  16,313 (100.0) 
100~299  2,904 (65.0)  399  (8.9)  1,164 (26.1)  n.a  4,467 (100.0) 
300~499  507 (68.8)  92 (12.5)   138 (18.7)  n.a  737 (100.0) 
500 +  613 (64.7)  232 (24.5)   102 (10.8)  n.a  947 (100.0) 
Total  53,351 (38.3)  2,876 (2.1)  56,476 (40.6)  26,448 (19.0)  139,151 (100.0) 




In short, since the mid-1980s, the dualisation of the labour market has deepened, 
as the chaebols, and their highly unionised workers, defended their dominant political 
and economic position while externalising the cost of economic liberalisation to 
SMEs and non-regular workers. With economic liberalisation and the Crisis, chaebol 
employers tended to adopt, to increase the number of non-regular workers, the dualist 
strategy. This facilitates the gaining of more labour market flexibility, while 
maintaining employment protection for core workers, and sustaining competitiveness. 
Pension reforms in the 1990s and 2000s reflected this dualist strategy.  
The National Pension Insurance was introduced in 1988 thanks to 
democratisation, with its coverage extended in the 1990s. Under the economic 
liberalisation and Crisis, the dualist strategy led the Korean government to cut 
benefits, and absorb the cost of the increase in non-regular workers through the 
gradual extension in the coverage of the National Pension Insurance and the 
introduction of the Basic Old-Age Pension scheme. Corporate pensions was similarly 
reformed, along with this dualist strategy, by introducing the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act to gradually replace the old Retirement Allowance. Chaebol 
workers were mainly covered by the DB pension in order to maintain cooperative 
labour relations, and the company-based skill formation system to sustain its 
comparative institutional advantage. Non-regular workers with low-general skills, 
meanwhile, must bear the cost of economic liberalisation through the subcontracting 
networks, are mainly covered by DC pensions. The number of DC pensions are 
increasing, generally speaking, DB corporate pension is still dominant in Korea.  
Korea’s pension structure since 2008 is shown in figure 7.2.2. The Basic Old-
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Age Pension was introduced in 2007, and functioned as the zero-tier (of the first-
pillar), non-contributory pension scheme that covered 70% of the aged. The earning-
related state pensions included the National Pension Insurance- which predominantly 
covered private workers (included self-employed and peasants), and others such as 
housewives (who could join it voluntarily- and three pension schemes for civil 
servants, military servicemen, and private school teachers. There are four corporate 
pensions: the Retirement Allowance, DB and DC, and Individual Retirement Account 




























Figure 7.2.2 Pension Structure in Korea, 2012 
 
Conclusion 
In Korea, its pension system was designed to be embedded into the chaebol-
dominated capitalist structure. Political actors’ social policy preferences, and the 
nature of cross-class coalition, were shaped by the chaebol-dominated capitalist 
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in tandem with the interaction between the developmental strategy and the national 
capitalist structure. To begin with, in the early post-war period, the Korean 
government privatised the public enterprises of the Japanese colonial government, 
these public enterprises becoming chaebols. Instead of public pensions, the Korean 
government opted to introduce the Retirement Allowance through the Labour 
Standard Act, a strategy that aimed to externalise the cost of political legitimacy to the 
chaebols, when the state faced financial difficulties following the Korean War. During 
the 1950s, employers’ attitudes towards social policies and labour protection laws 
were hostile- mainly because nascent chaebols could not bear the financial burden. 
This attitude did not change during the 1960s, since labour-intensive export-oriented 
industrialisation was underpinned by the exploitation of abundant, cheap and educated 
labours. Employers were reluctant to develop company-based skills and corporate 
welfare, although the state was keen to introduce the company-based skill formation 
system, and corporate pensions and welfare. Although labour was empowered by the 
Korean War, it had been politically alienated since the 1950s, even repressed in the 
1960s by the Park regime.  
Employers’ preferences changed, however, as heavy and chemical 
industrialisation was adopted during the 1970s. In order to implement heavy and 
chemical industrialisation, the state encouraged, even forced, the chaebols to 
institutionalise the company-based skill formation, and corporate pensions and 
welfare, particularly after the state failed to introduce the National Welfare Pension. 
Employers began changing their attitudes in favour of corporate pensions and welfare. 
In the early 1970s, the National Welfare Pension was attempted, to be introduced as a 
policy tool of capital formation to reduce the great reliance on foreign capital (loans). 
However, it failed due to the first Oil Crisis, and employers’ resistance. In the 1970s, 
the chaebols had grown to become a symbiotic partner of the state through 
exploitation of its financial assistance, allowing diversifying of their businesses. The 
state-chaebols developmental alliance was forged to facilitate the development of 
corporate welfare and pension. Moreover, through the institutionalisation of corporate 
pension and welfare, and the formation of the company-based skill formation system, 
enterprise unionism was enhanced, chaebol workers turned to be more growth-minded. 
That is, these unionised chaebol workers had been politically, and economically, 
incorporated into the state-chaebol developmental alliance, and a dual labour market 
was being forged.  
Since the 1980s, Korea underwent democratisation and economic liberalisation 
however. Under the pressure of democratisation, the old state-chaebol developmental 
alliance was challenged in the mid-1980s, and forced to introduce the National 
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Pension Insurance in 1988. Employers resisted it as it would increase labour costs, 
however, the state wanted to use it as a policy tool of political legitimacy, in the face 
of democratisation. Employers argued that the Retirement Allowance funds should be 
used to pay contributions of the National Pension Insurance, in order to reduce 
financial burdens, but the state-chaebol developmental alliance was shortly 
consolidated by the grand conservative regime, in the early 1990s.  
Since the 1980s, organised chaebol workers with specific skills began to ask for 
the consolidation of the existing ‘welfare through work’ system, and to fight for job 
security. This led chaebol employers to adopt the dualist strategy that treasured its 
core workers with specific skills, while externalising the cost of economic 
liberalisation to non-regular workers with low-general skills of SMEs. Pension 
Reforms in the 1990s and 2000s were in tandem with this dualist strategy, and the 
Korean public pension system was reformed. This allowed it to address the 
dualisation of the labour market, caused by institutional legacies of its dualist, and 
chaebol-dominated capitalist, strategies, by cutting benefits and embedding 
universalism into its public pension system. Simultaneously, the corporate pension 
system was modernised in 2005, along with the dualist strategy. Chaebol workers, 
with firm-specific skills, were protected by the DB pension to maintain Korea’s 
comparative institutional advantages, though DC pensions are provided for non-
regular, SMEs workers.  
Finally, universalism in the Korean public pension system will likely be 
reinforced. President Park Geun-Hye, daughter of Park Chong-Hee, is attempting to 
turn the Basic Old-Age Pension scheme into a real universalistic, non-contributory 
pension scheme that covers all of the elderly in her presidency. Once passed (in fact, 







Chapter 8 – Taiwan 
Compared to Japan and Korea, Taiwan’s pension system is distinctive. First, 
corporate pension is negligible; second, the state was/is dominant in pension policy, 
the coordinating of pensions, and national capitalist structure. This chapter argues that 
the SMEs-dominated capitalist structure that relies on ‘flexibility’ as its main 
comparative institutional advantage, constrained the state’s capacity for adopting 
corporate pensions. This led employers to put more emphasis on short-term profits, 
given their reluctance to bear high labour costs, eventually leading to a statist pension 
system.  
The institutional origins of the statist pension system can be attributed to 
Taiwan’s SMEs-dominated capitalist production. The KMT government adopted a 
dualist strategy in the post-war period. In the 1950s, the social insurance system was 
created to, politically, vie for political loyalty from its main constituencies. It 
consisted of mainland Chinese, workers in the state and party-owned enterprises, civil 
servants and military; economically, it helped to externalise, to society, the cost of 
buying political loyalty, maintaining aggregate demand that guaranteed an autonomic, 
countercyclical demand boost, in turn stabilising domestic demand. This is the 
strategy of ‘political clientelism’. Conversely, since the early 1960s, the 
implementation of export-oriented industrialisation led the KMT government to create 
a flexible labour market, and to minimise non-wage labour costs to maximise its 
comparative institutional advantages to facilitate export-oriented SMEs. This 
production-oriented strategy is known as ‘productivism’. Accordingly, unlike in Japan 
and Korea, the SMEs-dominated capitalist structure constrained the state’s capacity in 
introducing corporate pensions.  
Also, political-economic liberalisation did not change Taiwan’s pension system 
and capitalist structure, but consolidated its ‘statism’. Due to party competition in the 
early 1990s, the issue of pension reform surfaced. It was, however, still subordinated 
to broad economic goals, the economic technocrats dominating the process of 
institutional design of the National Pension Insurance. Labour and employers were 
not influential. Although democratisation triggered the discussion of pension reform, 
it resulted in the consolidation of a fragmented pension system. Further, the corporate 
pension was still negligible, even though reformed from DB to DC scheme. The 





8.1 The Origins of the Statist Pension System in Taiwan 
(1945-1990)  
In Taiwan, “the political necessities of a transplanted minority regime” led the 
KMT government to coordinate an institutional coherence, different to those of Japan 
and Korea. Throughout this period, the origins of the Taiwanese statist pension system 
have to be understood by the interaction between authoritarian politics, and the 
development of developmental strategy, thus two principles are critical – political 
clientelism and economic developmentalism. 
 
8.1.1 The Institutionalisation of Public Pension Insurances 
The Rise of Political Clientelism in the Period of Import-substitution 
Industrialisation 
In the 1950s, the KMT government faced two challenges: the external threat 
from the Communists, and, thought as outsiders to the indigenous Taiwanese, an 
internal challenge (Tsai, 2010; Wang, 2010b). During this period, the broad goal of 
the KMT government was to control the state apparatus in order to create a social 
structure of capital accumulation, and to deal with the issue of political legitimacy 
resulting from ethnic division (between mainland Chinese and indigenous Taiwanese) 
(K.-L. Tang, 2000, p. 66). The KMT government, specifically, had to implement 
import-substitution industrialisation to support its war regime (Tsai, 2010, p. 83) and 
to consolidate its core constituencies for the foundation of political legitimacy (Ku, 
1997; Wang, 2010b). In this manner, pension policy in the early post-war period was 
designed to vie for political loyalty (to construct political clientelism) and to maintain 
aggregate demand. This was so that implementation of import-substitution 
industrialisation could be supported, since social insurance benefits being able to 
ensure workers’ income, to guarantee an autonomic countercyclical demand boost and 
stabilise domestic demand (Haggard & Kaufman, 2008; Ku, 1997; K.-L. Tang, 2000; 
Wibbels & Ahlquist, 2011). 
As a result, public social insurance programmes were introduced, in the early 
stage of industrialisation, for different occupational categories to consolidate the 
KMT’s constituencies. In the social structure of the war economy, or import-
substitution industrialisation, military and government officials were seen as the core 
constituencies- not because they were the core of state apparatus alone, but also 
because they were constituted by the mainland Chinese (C. H. Huang, 2010; Tsai, 
2010). Thus, in 1950 the ‘Military Servicemen’s Insurance Scheme’ was enforced, 
legislated as the ‘Military Servicemen’s Insurance Law’ in 1953; in 1958, the 
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‘Government Employees Insurance’ was introduced for civil servants (Aspalter, 2001; 
Haggard & Kaufman, 2008; Ku, 1997). These social insurance schemes were an 
‘integrated’ social insurance, that is, a number of kinds of benefit (such as pension, 
health, death, childbirth subsidy) were provided. This institutional design was 
considered as a policy instrument of social control by the KMT, in order to 
consolidate its core constituencies (Fu, 1993). 
Conversely, private employees did not enjoy generous social benefits; the only 
social insurance programme for private employees was the ‘Labour Insurance’. In 
1950, the ‘Labour Insurance’ was introduced, but as a temporary programme. In 1951, 
a social insurance programme was initiated for private workers without specific 
employers, while the ‘Fishermen Insurance’ was introduced in 1953. The ‘Sugar 
Farmer Insurance’, was introduced in 1956. These four social insurance programmes 
were integrated into a single, social insurance scheme in 1958, known as the ‘Labour 
Insurance’. It was the first nationwide social insurance scheme for private workers, 
and the cornerstone of the Taiwanese pension system. The Labour Insurance was an 
‘integrated’ social insurance scheme as well. This ‘package of benefits’ characterised 
the Taiwanese social protection system. However, it was dissolved in the 1990s, while 
the health component was extracted by the introduction of the National Health 
Insurance. This integrated the health benefits of different social insurance schemes 
into one universalistic health insurance scheme in 1995. For the old-age benefit, the 
Labour Insurance provided a lump-sum benefit until 2009. The average replacement 
rate of the lump-sum retirement benefit was 17% for men, and 13% for women (F.-L. 
Chen & Chung, 2008, p. 88).  
As with other social insurance states in Europe and East Asia, the Labour 
Insurance was launched to deal with the ‘labour question’ (Baldwin, 1990; Gough, 
2004), due to the failed labour policy of the KMT government in mainland China. 
Goodman and Peng (1996, p. 205) argued that the Labour Insurance was “an 
appeasement measure to avoid potential worker revolt”. Initially, the coverage of the 
Labour Insurance was very limited, predominantly for workers in state and party-
owned enterprises, and large private firms of 100 or more employees. This was soon 
reduced to those with 20 or more however (Ku, 1997, p. 158). These public 
enterprises and private large corporations were critically prominent in the 
implementation of import-substitution industrialisation and state machinery (Ku, 1997, 
p. 158). Thus, as with other social insurance programmes, the Labour Insurance 
functioned to buy the political loyalty of workers in these domestically oriented 
enterprises, to consolidate KMT’s ruling base.  
155 
  
Unlike Japan and Korea, Taiwan did not develop comprehensive corporate 
welfare. As discussed, the KMT government took over the large public enterprises of 
the Japanese colonial government in the early post-war period. Controlling these 
domestic-oriented public enterprises, and large private firms, was a political and 
economic necessity for supporting the KMT’s political legitimacy, and war economic 
regime (C. H. Huang, 2010; Tsai, 2010). Thus, the KMT was an employer. 
Additionally, the KMT was a Leninist party, that dominated the state (T. J. Cheng, 
1990; T.-H. Huang, 2004). Thus, in the party-state structure, the KMT, as the 
employer, preferred public social insurance programmes to consolidate its core 
constituencies, since corporate pension would increase financial burdens on the KMT. 
Through this, the employers of large private firms would be politically incorporated 
into the KMT ruling regime (see chapter 5 for details). The KMT could finance these 
social insurance programmes through state subsidies55 to minimise the cost of the 
consolidation of its political base.  
The Labour Insurance, furthermore, was a partial funding contributory system, as 
were the other social insurance programmes. In Taiwan, however, pension funds were 
(and are) not mobilised as industrial capital- for one thing, the KMT government had 
strong power over the financial system, determining the flow of financial resources 
towards domestic-oriented public enterprises, and large private firms (T. J. Cheng, 
1990; Fields, 1995). Then, since the 1960s, the heart of the Taiwanese capitalist 
production shifted towards export-oriented SMEs. These SMEs have less financial 
needs as large companies, and thus tended to rely on informal financial systems (C.-H. 
Chen, 1994; Y. J. Choi, 2009; S.-Y. Lee, 2011; Whitley, 1992, 1999). Thus, unlike in 
Japan and Korea, pension funds were/are not widely mobilised as industrial capital in 
Taiwan.  
The Taiwanese welfare state, in short, was founded during the period of import-
substitution industrialisation. Social insurance programmes were instituted in the 
initiative of the KMT government, in implementing import-substitution 
industrialisation and, simultaneously, buying political loyalty of core constituencies in 
the public sectors, domestic-oriented public enterprises, and large private firms. That 
is, rather than the result of industrialisation and class struggle, social policy was used 
to support the KMT’s war economic regime. ‘Political clientelism’ was central to the 
development of the Taiwanese pension system in the period of import-substitution 
industrialisation.  
55 Thus, during the 1950s, 20% of the contribution of the Labour Insurance was from the state. 
Employers had to pay 60%, while labour had to bear another 20%.  
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The Period of Export-oriented Industrialisation: Economic 
Developmentalism 
American aids were terminated in 1965, and the developmental strategy had to 
be shifted towards export-oriented industrialisation due to the small size of the 
domestic market, and poor natural resources (Haggard, 1990; C. H. Huang, 2010; Tsai, 
2010; Wibbels & Ahlquist, 2011). Taiwan reoriented its economy to the world market 
for light industrial goods, and in contrast to Japan and Korea (where export-oriented 
sectors were dominated by business-conglomerates), these sectors were dominated by 
SMEs. The KMT government, therefore, tended to use tax incentives (rather than 
policy loans as in Japan and Korea) to promote exports, given its ability to universally 
benefit SMEs (K.-D. Lee, 2005). The result was a lower level of industrial 
concentration, and an increase in significance of SMEs in Taiwan (Haggard, 1990, p. 
96).  
During the transition, the focus of the Taiwanese capitalist production shifted 
towards labour-intensive industries, and Taiwan’s economy was gradually integrated 
into the world market. This transition prompted the KMT government to place more 
emphasis on productive social policy so that a flexible labour market could be 
coordinated, and more educated workers for the labour-intensive manufacturing 
sectors, created (Deyo, 1989; Haggard & Kaufman, 2008). ‘Productivism’ or 
‘Developmentalism’, therefore, dominated the Taiwanese welfare state development: 
social policy had to be subordinated to economic development (Holliday, 2000). In 
particular, the KMT perceived that economic development could consolidate its 
political legitimacy: “Economic development is the chosen measure of national 
welfare and thus a crucial basis for political legitimacy” (Deyo, 1989, p. 102). In the 
early 1970s, the KMT government even announced that “All for Economy, All for 
Export” (C. H. Huang, 2010, p. 157). This determined the destination of the 
Taiwanese welfare state.  
In Taiwan, as stated, the export-oriented sectors are dominated by SMEs (C.-H. 
Chen, 1994) and their comparative advantage is ‘flexibility’ (quick response to the 
changing world market, and adoption of new technologies and skills) (Castells, 2010; 
C.-H. Chen, 1994; Hu & Schive, 1998). Thus, they could not bear high, non-wage 
labour costs. Consequently, from the 1960s to the 1980s, social policy development in 
Taiwan stagnated (Kwon, 1998, p. 44). To facilitate labour commodification, financial 
resources were channelled, mainly, to education and economic development 
(Appendix 2). There was no big change in the Labour Insurance until the 2000s, with 
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some exceptions in the gradual extension of coverage,56 used by the KMT 
government to extend its political bases and vie for electoral supports, when some 
local elections had been allowed (K.-M. Lin 2003).  
Table 8.1.1 shows the coverage of Labour Insurance from 1951 to 1980, when 
the coverage of the Labour Insurance was extremely limited. In 1951, only 2.7% of 
the population were allowed to join the Labour Insurance, while 1958, the year of the 
Labour Insurance being legislated, saw its coverage remain at less than 5% of the total 
population. Though it increased gradually, it remained lower than 20% of the total 
population pre-1980. Essentially, the foundation of the Taiwanese pension system was 
laid before industrialisation.  
Table 8.1.1 the coverage of the Labour Insurance, 1951-198057 
Year  Number of Insured Persons  Percentage of Total Population 
1951  163,341  2.07% 
1955  311,342  3.42% 
1958  460,408  4.58% 
1960  528,980  4.90% 
1965  632,940  5.01% 
1970  938,421  6.39% 
1971  1,030,191  6.87% 
1972  1,144,454  7.48% 
1973  1,380,885  8.87% 
1974  1,441,317  9.09% 
1975  1,565,639  9.69% 
1976  1,728,640  10.47% 
1977  1,885,730  11.21% 
1978  2,073,451  12.10% 
1979  2,296,283  13.13% 
1980  2,549,300  14.31% 
Source: G. H. S. Chan (1985, p. 333).  
 
The gradual expansion in coverage of Labour Insurance reflects the productivist 
character of the Taiwanese welfare state. The state endeavoured to minimise, to SME 
employers, labour costs in order to facilitate exports, but the expansion in coverage 
inevitably increased non-wage labour costs, weakening their comparative advantage. 
56 In 1968, the coverage had been extended to white-collar workers, and workers in firms with more 
than 10 employees; in 1979, the coverage of the Labour Insurance was expanded again to include 
workers in firms with more than 5 employees. Non-standard workers, such as those self-employed 
without specific employers, could also join the Labour Insurance through occupational unions.  
57 Because the problem of available data, the coverage of Labour Insurance is calculated as the number 
of insured persons/ total population in table 7.2.1, but in appendix 3 it is calculated as the number of 
insured persons/ total 15-64 population.  
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Thus, the level of contribution was kept as low as possible since its introduction (K.-
M. Lin, 2003). The government subsidised contribution of the Labour Insurance 
before the 1960s, but these were limited (Ku, 1997). In other words, the Labour 
Insurance was a production, and political-oriented, social insurance scheme, rather 
than a socially-oriented, social insurance scheme.  
In short, two critical principles in public pensions, political clientelism and 
economic developmentalism, were the result of Taiwan’s dual business structure. The 
KMT introduced generous social insurance programmes to cover the workers of 
domestic-oriented public enterprises and large private firms, mainly constituted by 
mainland Chinese, in order to consolidate its political bases. In contrast, the SME 
workers, constituted by indigenous Taiwanese, were covered by the Labour Insurance, 
and were expected to be productivist-oriented. The divide paralleled its dual business 
structure, and ethnic division was, therefore, reinforced. This opened a window of 
opportunity for pension reform in the early 1990s.  
 
8.1.2 Private Pension – The Missing Part of the Taiwanese Welfare 
State 
As argued by the existing East Asian welfare state studies, non-state welfare and 
pension provisions are critically prominent in East Asia (Aspalter, 2006; Deyo, 1989, 
1992; Holliday, 2000; Holliday & Wilding, 2003c; P. H. Kim, 2010; Kwon, 2005b; 
Ramesh, 2004). The Taiwanese situation, however, contradicts this argument. In 
contrast to Japan and Korea, Taiwan’s large public and private enterprises could 
extract financial resources through the state-controlled financial system; whereas, the 
SMEs must rely on informal financial channels (C.-H. Chen, 1994). Private pensions 
are not used as a policy instrument of capital formation in Taiwan. Also, Taiwan’s 
labour market is dominated by general skills, and therefore relatively decentralised 
and flexible (C.-H. Chen, 1994; Shieh, 1997). As a result, the private pension is 
considered as a financial burden rather than a resource. Additionally, the Taiwanese 
labour power is weak at national and enterprises level, while Japan and Korea have, 
relatively, stronger enterprise unionism (D. Y. Jeong & Aguilera, 2008; J.-Y. Jeong, 
1995, 2007). Private pension is, as such, underdeveloped in Taiwan. 
Although negligible, Taiwan did develop private pension schemes in the early 
post-war period. Two corporate pension schemes were introduced in 1951: ‘The 
Regulation of Retirement for Workers in Factories’, and ‘The Rule of Retirement of 
Miners’. They attempted to ‘encourage’ employers to offer a severance payment to 
retired workers, but no information about its coverage exists. It is assumed, due to the 
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deterioration of the economic situation in the first half of the 1950s, that the coverage 
of these corporate pension schemes was very low (Chan & Lin, 2002; Wu, 1999). In 
the 1960s and 1970s, the KMT government encouraged corporate pensions through 
tax revisions and other measures, but the coverage of corporate pensions was still 
limited58 for three reasons (Wu, 1999, p. 139). First, these measures were not 
mandatory, but voluntary; next, private employers relying on cheaper labour to 
compete in the world market, were reluctant to provide a corporate pension for 
employees, due to the implementation of labour-intensive export-oriented 
industrialisation; lastly, the structure of the Taiwanese labour force was still ‘young’ in 
the 1960s and 1970s (ibid). Simply put, in this period, Taiwan’s occupational pension 
system was underpinned on volunteerism. 
This situation did not change, even after the introduction of the Labour Standard 
Act in 1984, which was the result of the interaction of internal and external challenges 
(C.-L. Chen, 2010; Y.-J. Lee, 1999; Wu, 1999). From the late 1970s, export-oriented 
industrialisation was challenged, due to the oil crises and labour shortage (Gold, 1986, 
pp. 97-98). The oil crises sped up the increase in price of commodities, necessary to 
Taiwan’s survival (ibid, p.98). Also, the labour shortage and wage rise between 1976 
and 1980 forced up the price of Taiwan’s exports (ibid, p. 98). Furthermore, the rise of 
less developed countries, such as China, Vietnam and Thailand in South and 
Southeast Asia, with cheaper labour had challenged Taiwan’s economic position in the 
world market (Y.-J. Lee, 1999, p. 139). These factors endangered the foundation of 
the Taiwanese capitalist production and then the ruling base of the KMT government.  
Industrial upgrading, therefore, became the main need. Labour-intensive industries 
should be transformed into capital-intensive or high technology industries. In 1982, 
Sun Yun-Suan, the former premier, announced the idea of ‘Factories as Home, 
Factories as School’, to promote industrial development, and facilitate industrial 
upgrading; Yu Kao-Hua, another former premier, announced that the improvement of 
working condition would help industrial upgrading (Y.-J. Lee, 1999, p. 139). As such, 
the introduction of the Labour Standard Act could have been seen as a part of 
industrial upgrading. Furthermore, the pressure of its introduction was reinforced by 
America, given the unfavourable balance of trade (C.-L. Chen, 2010; Y.-J. Lee, 1999). 
America argued that this was the result of ‘the exploitation of export’, that is, Taiwan 
increased exports through exploitation of labour (Y.-J. Lee, 1999). The U.S. prompted 
the Taiwanese government to improve working conditions (C.-L. Chen, 2010; Ho & 
58 Due to its volunteerism, the data regarding the coverage of corporate pension in Taiwan was lacking. 
According to an official report entitled ‘The Survey of Labour’s Working Condition in Taiwan’ in 
1984, only 23% of total employees were covered by corporate pension, most of them in state and party-
owned enterprises; more than 74.4% of the total employees were excluded (Chan & Lin, 2002). 
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Hsiao, 2006; Tsai, 2001).  
The KMT government used the ‘Factories Act’ as the blueprint for drafting the 
‘Labour Standard Act’ in 1974, but its legislation encountered resistances (K. D. Lee, 
2005, pp. 334-336). First, the economic bureaucracies argued that the improvement of 
working conditions would have had a negative impact on economic growth (Y.-J. Lee, 
1999). For example, Chao Yao-Dong, the minister of Economic Affairs, argued that 
due to Taiwan’s SMEs-dominated capitalist structure, it would be impossible to 
facilitate industrial upgrading by improving working conditions and increase wage 
through the legislation of the Labour Standard Act (The Legislative Yuan Gazette, 
71(67)). Second, employers resisted it for similar reason (Council of Labour Affairs, 
2011). Wang Yung-ching (1985), the founder of the Formosa Group, one of large 
private firms in Taiwan, argued that Taiwan’s SMEs could not bear high labour costs 
once the Labour Standard Act was introduced. In 1978, Chiang Ching-Kuo, however, 
promised to legislate it as soon as possible. In fact, it was still strongly resisted by 
employers and economic officials (Council of Labour Affairs, 2011). Under the 
authority of the KMT government, it was finally legislated in 1984. 
According to the Labour Standard Act, employers must contribute to the pension 
fund of the Labour Retirement Benefit, for their employees. This is known as the old 
Labour Retirement Benefit. It was a define-benefit scheme, and fully funded by the 
employer’s contributions (from 2% - 15%). The entitlement of the Labour Retirement 
Benefit was very restrictive: either 25 working years at the same company, or 15 
working years at the same company with the employee having reached 55 years of 
age. The Labour Retirement Benefit was, consequently, very negligible in Taiwan. 
Figure 8.1.1 demonstrates that the number of beneficiaries of the Labour Retirement 
Benefit was very limited. Most of those private workers who were actually covered 
could not receive retirement payments from this scheme. Importantly, this is largely 
due to the KMT government ‘turning a blind eye’ to the implementation of the Labour 
Standard Act, due to employers’ resistances (Ho & Hsiao, 2006, pp. 66-67).  
This reflects a fact that in the SMEs-dominated capital structure, employers 
would be very reluctant to, and could not bear the cost of, a corporate pension. This is 
because their comparative institutional advantage is not underpinned by long-term 
employment relations and high-specific skills, but flexibility. A year after the 
implementation of the Labour Standard Act, employers asked the state to cancel the 
Labour Retirement Benefit. Wang Yung-ching (1985) suggested that the Labour 
Retirement Benefit should be integrated into the Labour Insurance to reduce labour 
costs, by arguing that Taiwan’s SMEs tending to focus on short-tem profits (pp. 177-
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189). This suggestion denotes that (large) employers wanted to externalise pension 
costs to the state. But it was resisted by SMEs employers, due to it still resulting in 
increased labour costs to them (Hsu, 2005). In 1989, Wang Yung-ching and other 
important capitalists asked for revision (Wang, 1993).  
 
Figure 8.1.1 the Ratio of the Number of Private Workers were Covered / the Number of 
Beneficiaries of the old Labour Retirement Benefit 
Source: http://www.cla.gov.tw/; and, http://www.lpsc.gov.tw/; and my own calculation 
 
The institutional misfit between the Labour Retirement Benefit, and the SMEs-
dominated capitalist structure, was obvious. The Labour Retirement Benefit was 
theoretically underpinned by the illusion of ‘stable firms and permanent employment’ 
(C.-L. Chen, 2010), while Taiwan’s SMEs-dominated capitalist structure was based 
on flexible employment relations, and inter-firm relations. This led private firms, 
particularly SMEs not really offering corporate pension to their employees despite 
this being mandatory. Thus, a further revision was required soon after the 5 years in 
order to resolve this institutional misfit. 
Following introduction of the Labour Retirement Benefit, the structure of the 
Taiwanese pension system is shown as figure 8.1.2. As in Japan and Korea, the 
Taiwanese pension system can also be considered as Bismarckian, though corporate 
pensions are negligible. Three social insurance programmes are state-dominated 
contributory pension schemes. The only occupational pension scheme was the Labour 
Retirement Benefit, which was a state-regulated pension scheme, but funded by 
employers, and should, consequently, be included in the second pillar. Its benefit is 






























Figure 8.1.2 Pension Structure in Taiwan, 1980s 
 
In short, two principles dominated the development of the pension system in this 
period. Political clientelism was central to public social insurance programmes, while 
economic developmentalism constrained further expansion into public and private 
pensions. These two dominating principles, however, reinforced the ethnic division 
between the mainland Chinese and indigenous Taiwanese. The institutional linkage 
between the pension system and capitalist production is relatively loose in Taiwan. 
Pensions were not used as industrial capital or a policy instrument for economic 
coordination and industrialisation. The corporate pension in Taiwan was very limited, 
with even the state endeavouring to use it for industrial upgrading. It failed, leading to 
an institutional misfit. The SMEs-dominated capitalist structure deeply shaped the 
institutional design and development of the public-private pension mix. Likewise, the 
state, as a coordinator between the economic and pension policies, was significant, 





















































































8.2 ‘Pension for All’ in the Era of Democratic Regime 
Since the mid-1980s, Taiwan has undergone economic liberalisation and political 
democratisation. This did not trigger a paradigm change in either the capitalist 
structure, or the pension system. The fragmented structure of the pension system was 
maintained, and the state still played a dominant role in the pension policy-making 
processes. During this period, pension politics and institutional designs were strongly 
shaped by historical legacies, and capitalist structure. The statist, but fragmented, 
pension system was consolidated in the era of democratisation.   
 
8.2.1 Public Pension Reforms  
The public pension reforms in Taiwan can be divided into roughly two periods– 
1990- 2000, and post-2000. In the 1990s, the Democratic Progress Party (DPP) started 
a 15-year discussion of the National Pension Insurance, by exploiting ethnic division 
in order to vie for political supports from indigenous Taiwanese. Democratisation 
resulted in the expansion of public pensions, but reinforced its fragmentation. 
Although a universalistic, national pension scheme was proposed initially, the 
fragmented national pension insurance scheme replaced it once economic 
bureaucracies dominated the pension policymaking, after 1997. The result was the 
consolidation of the statist, fragmented, pension system, due to the interaction of 
democratisation, and the SMEs-dominated capitalist structure.  
 
1.  Opportunity for Public Pension Reforms in the 1990s 
In the late 1980s, political democratisation triggered new social demands, 
changing the context of policy-making and offering an opportunity for the expansion, 
and universalisation of social protection (C. W. Lin, 2005; I. Peng & Wong, 2008; 
Wong, 2004). The KMT government is considered as a mainlander, Chinese 
government for the indigenous (Wong, 2004). Thus, the issue of ethnic division was 
central to Taiwan’s society (D. D. Yang, 2007). In particular, the KMT created a dual 
system along ethnic division in order to consolidate its political bases. Domestic-
oriented, large enterprises were either directly controlled (such as public enterprises 
usually managed by mainland Chinese) or indirectly incorporated into the KMT 
authoritarian regime (such as large private firms, managed by indigenous Taiwanese 
economic elites) (W.-W. Chu, 2011; Y.-H. Chu, 1994; T.-H. Huang, 2004; Wang, 
1993). They were well-protected by generous social insurance programmes (Fu, 1993; 
Ku, 1997). Under the restrictions of the KMT government, indigenous Taiwanese 
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were concentrated in the export-oriented SMEs, and agricultural sectors, without 
generous retirement benefits (C.-H. Chen, 1994; Fields, 1995, 2012; Fu, 1993; G. C. 
Liu, 2001). This politically-produced economic ethnic division offered a political 
opportunity for political mobilisation, particularly in social policy (Fu, 2000; C. W. 
Lin, 2005; Wong, 2004). As will be seen, however, it reinforced the fragmentation of 
the pension system. 
The Democratic Progress Party, the main opposition party,59 was established in 
1985 and martial law was lifted in 1986. Following this, the DPP endeavoured to 
bring the issue of social policy into politics, but achieved no significant success until 
1992. In the Legislative Yuan election of 1992, a DPP candidate of Tainan County, Su 
Huahn-Dj, made, as his campaign theme, old-age economic security through 
exploitation of the ethnic division. For Su, the matter of old-age economic security 
was not only an issue of social security, but also of economic inequality between 
Taiwanese old peasants, and mainlander veterans (C. W. Lin, 2005, p. 192). During 
the campaign, Su announced:  
“I often chat with old peasants about life, local infrastructure, and 
politics. They say: “veterans can receive NT$10,000 to 20,000 every month, 
but do not need to work.”….. How do you think about that if we can receive 
same benefit like veterans?” (W. I. Lin, 2000, p. 107) (my own translation) 
Su Huahn-Dj achieved a big victory in the election, and consequently, the DPP 
gained different degrees of success in other elections using the same strategy, 
compelling the issue to become a national one. Under the pressure of party 
competition, the KMT government launched the ‘National Pension Insurance 
Research and Planning Task Force’ in 1993, putting forward a proposal for 
introduction of a universalistic National Pension Insurance, with the existing 
contributory pension schemes, such as the Labour Insurance, being changed into 
supplemental earning-related pensions in 1994 (H.-S. Chan, 1996, pp. 96-97). 
Simultaneously, two non-contributory pension schemes were introduced- the ‘Old-age 
Farmers' Welfare Allowance’ in 1995 and the ‘Living Allowance for Mid or Low 
Income Elders’ in 1994. The Old-age Farmers' Welfare Allowance, a non-contributory 
pension scheme, provides a flat-rate benefit60 to those 65 years of age or above, that 
are insured by the Farmer Health Insurance. The introduction of the Old-age Farmers' 
Welfare Allowance was down to the KMT wanting to garner political support from 
59 The Democratic Progress Party is self-announced as Taiwanese’s party, and attempts to establish a 
new independent country (D. D. Yang, 2007).  




                                                  
the indigenous, Taiwanese peasants, thereby weakening political bases of the DPP (W. 
I. Lin, 2000; Shi and Yeh, 2011). This occupational-based allowance scheme covered 
one-third of those aged 65 years or older, but reinforced the fragmentation of the 
Taiwanese public pension system (Yeh and Chen, 2013). The ‘Living Allowance for 
Mid or Low Income Elders’ is a means-tested, non-contributory scheme, thus, its 
scope is limited. Furthermore, local governments ruled by the DPP launched 
citizenship-based, old-age allowance schemes. 
 
Figure 8.2.1 The Scope of Various Social Allowance Schemes (the number of beneficiaries of social 
allowance schemes/ total population of 65 years old and older) 
Source: Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/); Bureau 
of Labour Insurance (http://www.bli.gov.tw/); Council of Labour Affairs (http://www.cla.gov.tw/); and 
my own calculation.  
 
Although these schemes were temporary, the KMT government was prompted to 
introduce a contributory pension scheme to avoid financial burdens (H.-S. Chan, 1996; 
Shi & Yeh, 2011). Before 1994, the Ministry of Interior played a dominant role in the 
institutional design of the National Pension Insurance. However, the Council for 
Economic Planning and Development, as the pilot agency in Taiwan (Wade, 2004), 
took charge of the overall institutional design of the National Pension Insurance from 
1994, and the Ministry of Interior therefore played a supplement role. It means that 
the introduction of the National Pension Insurance should not be contradicted to 
developmentalism, or, in other words, social policy development is still subordinated 











Old-age Farmers' Welfare Allowance Old-age Citizens' Welfare Living Allowance
Old-age Indigenes' Welfare Allowance Living Allowance for Mid or Low Income Elders
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Initially the Council for Economic Planning and Development proposed a 
universalistic National Pension Insurance to cover all citizens, with the various 
existing pension schemes to become supplemental pension schemes, based on social 
insurance principles, in order to minimise financial burdens on the government 
(Council for Economic Planning and Development, 1995). The proposal was 
submitted to the Executive Yuan in April 1995, but due to the introduction of the 
National Health Insurance (1995), the KMT government decided to postpone the 
implementation of the National Pension Insurance to avoid a significant increase in 
financial burden on the government, and employers (H.-H. Chen, 2006; Y.-H. Huang 
& Hsueh, 1996; W.-H. Tang & Yeh, 2006). 
Yet a little later, the Council for Economic Planning and Development was 
turned to favour developmentalism. In 1996, it built the ‘National Pension Insurance 
Planning Group’, proposing the principle of “separating the administration while 
unifying the essence”. By this, the existing fragmented, occupationally-based pension 
schemes would be maintained, but their institutional features and operations would 
harmonise (Y.-L. Liu, 1997).61 Thus, in 1998, the Council for Economic Planning and 
Development proposed a fragmented scheme covering those unprotected by the 
existing pension insurances.  
The proposal of the fragmented scheme was based on some considerations. 
Firstly, the existing fragmented, social insurance programmes were too difficult to be 
integrated into a universalistic scheme– a difficulty not only in its administration, but 
also from the interests of bureaucracies.62 As mentioned, Taiwan’s social insurance 
programmes are ‘integrated’, with various kinds of benefits provided to cover 
different social risks. It was designed to be a policy instrument of social control (Fu, 
1993). However, in 1995, health elements of different social insurance programmes 
were integrated into the universalistic National Health Insurance. Thus, should old-
age pension benefits of the existing social insurance programmes be extracted, the 
functions of the existing social insurance programmes would decline. Another issue 
was finance. Labour technocrats worried that, in the event the universalistic National 
Pension Insurance was introduced, the pension fund of the Labour Insurance would be 
used to support it. Thus, not even labour technocrats preferred the universalistic 
National Pension Insurance. Then, the comparative advantage of capitalist production 
in Taiwan still relies on ‘flexibility’ (Amsden & Chu, 2003; Fields, 2012; Wang, 
2010a). A universalistic National Pension Insurance would increase financial burdens 
61 Liu Yu Lan was the main state official in the Council for Economic Planning and Development who 
proposed the principle of “separating the administration while unifying the essence”.  
62 Source: interview, 10 April, 2009.  
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on employers, and SMEs in particular would be ‘hard hit’, in turn weakening 
Taiwan’s comparative advantage.  
The KMT government decided to implement this proposal in 2000, but due to the 
‘921 Earthquake’ of 1999 (China Times, 6/10/1999), it was postponed. It changed the 
context of pension politics, the natural disaster giving the DPP a chance to govern 
Taiwan, and consequently, an opportunity for political manoeuvre of pension reform 
(Shi, 2010, p. 349).  
 
2.  Beyond Developmentalism?  
The DPP won the presidential election of March 2000, ending the power 
monopoly of the KMT. During the presidential campaign, the DPP’s presidential 
candidate- Chen Shui-Bian- proposed a ‘3-3-3 policy’63 to promise the introduction of 
a citizenship-based, old-age allowance scheme. In 2002, the DPP government 
launched the ‘Old-age Citizens' Welfare Living Allowance’ for those aged 65 years 
old and above, excluding those whose asset and household income was higher than a 
specific level (known as the rule of ‘Excluding the Rich’). Although it was a 
temporary allowance scheme with a lower level of benefit (NT$3,000), this scheme 
was to be the first citizenship-based pension scheme in the history of Taiwanese 
welfare state development.  
Since the 1990s, the KMT and the DPP both launched non-contributory pension 
schemes. Some argue the universalisation of the pension system was the result of 
democratisation, since democratisation can alter the logic of social policy making in 
Taiwan, forcing politicians to respond to social needs (I. Peng & Wong, 2008; Shi, 
2010; Wong, 2004). However, democratisation can be shown to have reinforced the 
existing fragmented pension system. Figure 8.2.1 shows that following 2002, more 
than 70% of an ageing population could receive a flat-rate benefit from these non-
contributory pension schemes. In 2007, 30.78% of the elderly could receive a flat-rate 
benefit from the ‘Old-age Farmers' Welfare Allowance’; 36.67% from the ‘Old-age 
Citizens' Welfare Living Allowance’; and 5.86% from the ‘Living Allowance for Mid 
or Low Income Elders’. This denotes that although the various, non-contributory 
pension schemes were introduced, and even the ‘Old-age Citizens' Welfare Living 
Allowance’ was a citizenship-based scheme, the Taiwanese pension system is still 
fragmented.  
63 ‘3-3-3 policy’ included three welfare benefits for three main subgroups: (1) providing those aged 65 
and older with a non-contributory allowance of NT$3,000; (2) free medical treatment for children 
under three; and (3) house loans at an interest rate of 3% for first time house owners (Shi, 2010, p. 350). 
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Although the DPP announced they are a labour-friendly party, developmentalism 
still deeply shaped its policy direction. The Taiwanese economy was exacerbated due 
to the dot com bubble crisis, thus the DPP President Chen therefore announced 
“Economic First, Welfare should be postponed” in 2000 (W. I. Lin, 2006, p. 28). The 
Council for Economic Planning and Development, as a result, re-submitted a draft 
proposal to the Executive Yuan, containing three plans: (1) integrated national pension 
insurance (universalistic National Pension Insurance), (2) fragmented national 
pension insurance, and (3) Individual Account. Initially, the DPP government 
preferred the Individual Account (Liberty Times, 23/5/2002), since it would not incur 
financial burdens on the government (Council for Economic Planning and 
Development, 2001). This institutional choice was due to the structure of Taiwan’s 
SMEs-dominated capitalist economy.  
However, civil societies played a critical role in shifting institutional choice from 
the Individual Account to the social insurance programme, although they were neither 
organised, nor mobilised. Being the main opposition party prior to 2000, the DPP 
collaborated with civil society groups to ‘stand’ against the authoritarian KMT 
government (Wong, 2004). Consequently, after 2000, the DPP government saw civil 
society groups as its partner. In May 2002, these groups advocated that the National 
Pension Insurance should be based on the social insurance principle, in the National 
Social Welfare Conference (Shi, 2010, p. 351). Following the conference, President 
Chen met with Liu Xia, a Senior Advisor to the Office of (the) President, and 
promised that instead of an Individual Account, a contributory, social insurance 
scheme would be adopted (Liberty Times, 23/5/2002). But, the fragmented National 
Pension Insurance was selected in order to keep the transitional cost as low as 
possible (Shi, 2010, p. 352).   
Democratisation shifted the issue of old-age economic security into a critical 
political agenda, even though it resulted from the politically-produced economic 
ethnic division, and weakened state autonomy. Yet, the institutional structures 
constrained the institutional design of the National Pension Insurance. In other words, 
democratisation facilitated social policy and pension development, and the 
institutional design of social policy and the pension system was institutionally 
constrained by its national capitalist structure. Although the universalistic National 
Pension Insurance was actually proposed, it was not a priority. Developmentalism, 
resulting from the interaction of the structure of capitalist production with the 
developmental strategy, still shapes the Taiwanese welfare state development today. 
Economic liberalisation furthers the existing capitalist production’s reliance on 
flexibility (Amsden & Chu, 2003; Fields, 2012; Wang, 2010a), and the fragmented 
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National Pension Insurance is, therefore, the one institutional choice alone.  
The fragmented National Pension Insurance was selected, and although the 
Executive Yuan decided to reconsider the overall framework of the National Pension 
Insurance in 2005, the destination of the National Pension Insurance had been 
determined. This was despite conflicts existing between civil society groups, and the 
DPP government in the institutional design of the National Pension Insurance. Civil 
society groups and labour are both too decentralised to influence institutional design. 
In 2006, the DPP government decided to introduce the National Pension Insurance, 
shifting the old-age benefit of the Labour Insurance from a lump-sum payment to an 
annuity next year. Since the old-age benefit of the Labour Insurance is still a lump-
sum payment, the replacement rate was around 17% (male) and 13% (female) (F.-L. 
Chen & Chung, 2008). Consequently, the annuitisation of old-age benefit was 
prominent. In 2007, the plan of the National Pension Insurance, and the revision of 
Labour Insurance, were simultaneously submitted to the Legislative Yuan (The 
Legislative Yuan Gazette, 96(49)). Under the pressure of the coming year’s elections, 
the National Pension Insurance was soon legislated, and implemented from 2008 
(ibid). The revision of the Labour Insurance, however, was postponed.  
The National Pension Insurance primarily protects those excluded by other 
pension schemes, such as housewives, the unemployed, or people without the ability 
to work. Two interim, non-contributory schemes: the ‘Old-age Citizens' Welfare 
Living Allowance’, and the ‘Old-age Indigenes' Welfare Allowance’, were integrated 
into the National Pension Insurance as the ‘Guarantee Minimum Pension’. The 
replacement rate is 1.3% for each year of contribution. The contribution is shared by 
the government and insured, 40% and 60% respectively. The introduction of the 
National Pension Insurance meant the goal of ‘Pension for All’ was achieved.  
Two issues resulted: the annuitisation of the old-age benefit of the Labour 
Insurance, and whether peasants should be covered or not. The annuitisation of the 
old-age benefit of the Labour Insurance, firstly, was debated among labour unions 
(Taiwan Confederation of Trade Union, 2007), labour technocrats and the Legislative 
Yuan (The Legislative Yuan Gazette, 96(59)). The focus concentrated on the rate of 
level of replacement (the Legislative Yuan Gazette, 97(15), 97(40)). The Executive 
Yuan, initially, set at 1.1% for each contribution year (as the replacement rate), but 
labour wanted to increase it to 1.5%. Employers preferred the low replacement rate, 
arguing that the fiscal deficits of the Labour Insurance should be filled by tax 
revenues, rather than by increasing the contribution rate (which should take into 
account the economic growth rate) (the General Chamber of Commerce, 20/6/2008). 
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However, employers could not effectively shape or dominate pension development in 
Taiwan due to the decentralised SMEs-dominated business system (Fields, 2012; T.-H. 
Huang, 2004; Tsai, 2001; Whitley, 1999; Yeh & Chen, 2013). Finally, the amendment 
of the Labour Insurance was quickly passed in 2008, with the replacement rate of the 
benefit set at 1.55% for a one-year contribution. This amendment represented a big 
progression. The average replacement rate in 2012 was 29.91% of the average regular 
earnings (or 38.45% of the average monthly insurance salary),64 compared to 17% 
before the amendment (F.-L. Chen & Chung, 2008).  
Although the replacement rate was set at 1.55%, it did not mean it was a victory 
of labour power. Instead, it should be considered as a result of party competition and 
the structural power of capital. The DPP and the KMT both endeavoured to increase 
the replacement rate to vie for political supports (Commercial Times, 24/6/2008). 
Additionally, the contribution rate of the Labour Insurance is low in the history of the 
Taiwanese welfare state, not only since a low contribution rate could minimise labour 
costs, but it could also be used to vie for political supports (K.-M. Lin, 2003). Second, 
the structure power of capital is significant- although employers could not 
significantly influence policy-making through such means as lobbying or institutional 
participation. As mentioned, either the KMT government (1990-2000, and from 2008 
to now) or the DPP government (2000-2008) were dominated by economic 
developmentalism, a tendency that forced the state to adopt a more ‘business-friendly’ 
policy, even in the face of pressure from party competition. Thus, the contribution rate 
of the Labour Insurance is set at a very low level. In fact, according to official 
estimations, once the replacement rate is 1.55%, the contribution will be increased to 
23% to reach a financial equilibrium (H.-L. Tsai, 2010). The contribution rate of the 
Labour Insurance was far less than 23% however, reflecting that the KMT and DPP 
saw it as a method to vie for political supports, and for restriction of the increase of 
non-wage labour costs. 
Another issue is whether peasants should be covered by the National Pension 
Insurance or not. The Old-age Farmers' Welfare Allowance is an occupationally-based, 
non-contributory scheme, thus reinforcing the fragmented structure of the Taiwanese 
pension system. The main condition for the entitlement of the Old-age Farmers' 
Welfare Allowance is the insured of the Farmers’ Health Insurance. In this, those 
insured must pay 10% of the contribution (less than NT$100 (around $3.3)), with the 
state subsidising the rest (90%). Peasants preferred to keep the status-quo, rather than 
being included into the National Pension Insurance (Shi & Yeh, 2011, p. 70). In the 
National Pension Insurance, the insured must pay 60% of the contribution, and thus, 
64 Source: Council of Labour Affairs, http://www.cla.gov.tw/; and my own calculation.  
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peasants, the beneficiaries of the ‘Old-age Farmers' Welfare Allowance’, requested to 
maintain an occupationally fragmented non-contributory pension scheme, arguing that 
joining the National Pension Insurance would lead them to pay more but for less 
benefits (Apple daily, 5/1/2008; Liberty Times, 1/52008). After democratisation, 
particularly following the 1990s, the DPP could effectively mobilise and vie for 
(indigenous) peasants’ political support, through such means as the issue of ethnic 
division and social policy (D. D. Yang 2007). Thus, during the 2008 presidential 
election, the KMT candidate, Ma Ying-Jeou, promised that peasants would not be 
covered by the National Pension Insurance. His attempt was to vie for peasants’ 
political supports and demobilise the DPP’s political bases. Hence, in 2008, the 
Legislative Yuan also reformed the National Pension Insurance to disallow peasants 
from joining the National Pension Insurance. That is, although democratisation led 
politicians to be more responsible for social demands, the interaction of policy 
legacies (the ethnic division resulting from the dual business structure) and party 
competition consolidated the Taiwanese fragmented pension system.  
 
8.2.2 Corporate Pension – From Defined-Benefit to Defined-
Contribution 
The corporate pension reform was launched in the early 1990s. The Labour 
Standard Act turned volunteerist corporate pension into a mandatory one, but it had 
some problems caused by the institutional misfit between it, and the SMEs-dominated 
capitalist structure. First, SMEs, the heart of the Taiwanese capitalist structure, 
couldn’t bear high, non-wage labour cost (C.-L. Chen, 2010; Ho et al., 2004). 
According to official data,65 8.02% of employers made regular contributions 
payments in 2000, most of them being larger firms (Ho et al., 2004, p. 77). In addition, 
most of these employers paid only the lowest contributions (2%) (W.-H. Tang & Yeh, 
2006, p. 83). Second, most SMEs were relatively short-lived- around 12 years 
averagely (C.-L. Chen, 2010; Wu, 1999, p. 142). But according to the Labour 
Standard Act, the entitlement of Labour Retirement Benefit was to be employed in the 
same firm for more than 25 years, or 15 years, but older than 55 years. Consequently, 
very few people could receive the Labour Retirement Benefit (figure 8.1.1 and 8.2.2). 
Third, this problem is exacerbated by Taiwan’s flexible labour market, where the 
average tenure rate is around 5.95 years, and 12.5 years for older workers (Ho et al., 
2004, p. 77). In other words, the rule of entitlement was meaningless for SMEs 
workers. Although the restricted entitlement of the Labour Retirement Benefit was to 
encourage employers and employees to establish a longer relationship for 
65 Source: Council of Labour Affairs (http://www.cla.gov.tw/) 
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development of highly specific skills for industrial upgrading (C.-L. Chen, 2010; Ma 
& Sun, 2011); it failed. The beneficiaries of corporate pension was negligible (figure 
8.1.1 and 8.2.2). 
Figure 8.2.2 The Ratio of Beneficiaries of the Labour Retirement Benefit of the Labour Standard Act 
and the Individual Account of the Labour Pension Act (the number of beneficiaries/ total 65 years old 
and older population) 
Source: Labour Pension Fund Supervisory Committee (http://www.lpsc.gov.tw/); the Council of 
Labour Affairs (http://www.cla.gov.tw/); and my own calculation. 
 
These problems soon developed into a heated debate regarding its restricted 
regulation on entitlement. After five years of the introduction of the Labour Standard 
Act, Chao Shou-po, the minister of the Council of Labour Affairs, admitted that it was 
problematic (C.-L. Chen, 2010, p. 16). In the 1990s, different ideas were proposed, 
but no significant progress was achieved. Initially, the labour technocrats favoured a 
DB pension as a second-tier pension; whereas the economic technocrats preferred a 
DC pension scheme. In 1991, the labour technocrats put forward a DB pension 
scheme. Not only employers, but also labour unions, resisted this proposal (C.-L. 
Chen, 2010). Employers resisted it because it would increase their financial burden; 
labour unions resisted it due to the restricted rules of entitlement (Hsu, 2005). 
Therefore, it did not receive attention.  
Likewise, developmentalism shaped the corporate pension reform in Taiwan. In 
1996, the National Development Conference formed the opinion that corporate 
pension should adopt either the DB or DC scheme or both. The Council for Economic 
Planning and Development, however, favoured the DC pension scheme, because of 
the consideration of financial burdens and the structure of the labour market (Guo, 
2009). According to this consensus, in 1998, the labour technocrats put forward a new 
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proposal that included two corporate pension plans, with the Individual Account, its 
contribution rate set at 6%, considered the primary proposal (W.-H. Tang & Yeh, 2006; 
Wu, 1999, p. 144).66 The labour technocrats argued that it was due to the 
consideration of SMEs’ financial capacity (Wu, 1999, p. 144-145) - that is to say, the 
Individual Account was selected to complement the SMEs-dominated capitalist 
structure. From then on, the Individual Account scheme was the main choice, with 
labour favouring the DB pension (W.-H. Tang & Yeh, 2006, p. 87). However, it was 
not legislated when the DPP won the presidential election in 2000.  
From 2000, the revision of the Labour Retirement Benefit was reviewed. 
Although the DPP a was self-announced labour party, and its presidential election 
candidate promised the Labour Retirement Benefit would be changed into a portable 
DB pension scheme, DC pension schemes were still the main choice following the 
election (C.-L. Chen, 2010, p. 38; Guo, 2009, p. 135). In 2001, the National Economic 
Development Conference, held by the President as a mechanism to obtain policy 
consensus, decided to adopt a parallel system that consisted of the Individual Account, 
and portable DB pension schemes. It would be based on the principle of “not 
increasing financial burdens on the government”.67 Soon, the Council of Labour 
Affairs proposed the draft of the Labour Pension Act, according to the consensus of 
the National Economic Development Conference. In the discussion that followed 
however, the DPP government explicitly showed its preference for the Individual 
Account. The labour technocrats argued that individual accounts are much better at 
controlling a government’s financial burdens than the DB pension scheme and are 
suitable for the Taiwanese flexible labour market (C.-L. Chen, 2010, pp. 33-34; Guo, 
2009, p. 129).  
Despite labour favouring DB pension schemes, endeavouring to reverse this 
decision, they were powerless due to structural constrains (the Legislative Yuan 
Gazette, 91(64); Taiwan Labour Front, 1/2/2001). The Taiwan Confederation of Trade 
Union argued that labour has neither money nor power, and this reform took 
employers’ interest into account, not labour’s viewpoint (the Legislative Yuan Gazette, 
93(33), p. 128). Labour power is decentralised by the SMEs-dominated capitalist 
production, with workers of public enterprises or private large firms not showing any 
preference of this topic. This was due to them being policy beneficiaries of the Labour 
Retirement Benefit, and well-protected (C.-L. Chen, 2010, p. 47). Furthermore, the 
relationship between the DPP and labour was cooperative in the 1980s and 1990s in 
66 In this proposal, the main debate was the level of contribution rate. Employers argued that 6% was 
too high for SMEs, but labour argued it was too low and a minimum contribution rate should be set at 
8% (The Legislative Yuan Gazette, 85(23)).   
67 Source: http://theme.cepd.gov.tw/president/chp3/ch304/chp3-24.htm.  
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order to protect against the KMT authoritarian regime. As a result, labour unions were 
gradually incorporated into the DPP ruling regime (ibid, p. 46). Although labour 
resisted the Individual Account, they did not take any action, and eventually, even the 
President of the Chinese Federation of Labour showed his support to the Individual 
Account (ibid, pp. 37-38). Labour power was insignificant here.  
Employers also preferred the Individual Account, focusing on the level of 
contribution, and the operation of pension funds (The Legislative Yuan Gazette, 
91(64)).68 They preferred a progressive approach by gradually increasing the 
contribution rate from 2% to 6% over three years, and suggested that pension funds 
should be re-channelled to capital markets through life insurance companies and 
banks  (The Legislative Yuan Gazette, 91(64)). Both labour and business, however, 
had no influence on the institutional design of the new corporate pension scheme, 
with the state dominating (Ma & Sun, 2011). Chen Chu, the minister of the Council of 
Labour Affairs, said: “the people who resisted the new Labour Pension Act should 
bear the responsibility” (Coolloud, 7/3/2005). It can be understood from this that 
although the new proposal of the DB corporate pension was allowed, it was just a 
political strategy to appease labour.  
In 2004, the Labour Pension Act was introduced to replace the Labour 
Retirement Benefit of the Labour Standard Act. According to the Labour Pension Act, 
both the DB pension and the Individual Account scheme can be adopted. So far, 
however, all firms in Taiwan adopted the portable, Individual Account scheme. In 
other words, the reform shifted the DB Labour Retirement Benefit to the DC 
Individual Account scheme. The state plays a prominent role in managing the pension 
fund of the Labour Pension Act, although employers preferred to decentralise it to life 
insurance companies, in order to stimulate the capital market, and guarantee a 
minimum return (the average interest rate over 2-year-terms). Otherwise, it must 
cover the shortfall. Put simply, although the Individual Account scheme of the Labour 
Pension Act is a corporate pension scheme, the role of the state is still prominent. 
Table 8.2.1 compares the Labour Retirement Benefit of the Labour Standard Act, and 
the Individual Account of the Labour Pension Act. In 2012, 0.8% of the total aged 
population received a lump-sum payment from the Labour Retirement Benefit, but 
around 2% received it from the Individual Account– this is expected to increase 
gradually in the near future. It did not change the nature of Taiwan’s statist pension 
system- the corporate pension is still negligible.  
68 In the public hearing of the Legislative Yuan, the Chinese National Federation of Industries and the 
General Chamber of Commerce clearly argued they preferred the Individual Account.  
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Table 8.2.1 Comparison of the Labour Retirement Benefit of the Labour Standard Act 
and the Individual Account of the Labour Pension Act 
Term   Labour Retirement Benefit  Individual Account 
Legislation  Labour Standard Act (1984)  Labour Pension Act (2004) 
Type  Defined-Benefit   Defined-Contribution 
Contribution rate  From 2% to 15% of monthly 
wage 
Employer: ≧6％ of employee’s 
monthly wage Employee: ≦6％ of 
monthly wage 
Coverage   Those employees who were 
subject to the Labour Standards 
Act 
Those employees who were subject to 




Central Trust of China  Bureau of Labour Insurance (Fund 
investment/utilisation and Labour 
Pension Fund Supervisory Committee) 
The definition of 
monthly wage 
Average wage of last six months 
before retirement 
Monthly wage 
The definition of 
‘point’ 
Working years in the same 
workplace 
Years of contribution 
The condition of 
entitlement 
25 working years in the same 
workplace, or 15 working years 
and aged 55 years old or older  
(therefore, it is not portable) 
To reach retirement age (it is portable) 
Benefit level  Total points: (1~15 years)*2 + 
(after 16th year ~)*1, no more 
than 45 points. 
Total benefit: average wage * 
total points 
Monthly wage * (employer’s and 
employee’s contribution)+ the 
dividend of pension fund 
 
Type of payment  Lump-sum  •  More than 15 years of 
contribution more: annuity 
•  Less than 15 years of 
contribution: lump-sum 
Severance payment   One point for each working year  ½ point for each year of contribution 
Right of retirement 
payment 
Employer  Employee 
Source: compiled by myself.  
 
The DB pension can be adopted, under agreement of the employer and 
employees (or enterprise unions), in firms with more than 200 employees and the 
approval of the government. So far, however, no firm adopts it, demonstrating that DB 
pensions, unlike in Japan, Korea and other coordinated market economies (Germany 
and Sweden) are not considered a human management and skill formation resource 
for Taiwan’s employers (Estévez-Abe, 2008; Estévez-Abe et al., 2001; S.-Y. Lee, 
2011). That is to say, although DB or DC corporate pension plans are both allowed, 
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the SMEs-dominated capitalist structure sees the Individual Account dominating.  
In this period, political democratisation (or, more accurately, party competition) 
prompted the government to pay attention to social demands, and responded to social 
needs. Yet the interaction of democratisation, and the SMEs-dominated capitalist 
structure, consolidated the fragmentation of Taiwan’s statist pension system. By 
exploiting the ethnic division caused by the dual business structure, reinforced by the 
KMT’s pension system, the DPP successfully mobilised political supports. It 
reinforced the fragmentation of the pension system, however, through creation of new 
policy beneficiaries (peasants) employing various kinds of allowance schemes. The 
fragmentation of the pension system was furthered by the SMEs-dominated capitalist 
structure, and since 1997, the Council for Economic Planning and Development have 
adopted the fragmented National Pension Insurance to minimise financial burden on 
employers, and the difficulties of integrating the existing social insurance 
programmes. In the discussion of pension policy-making, the state was dominant, and 
neither labour, nor employers were influential. Shaped by its SMEs-dominated 
capitalist structure, the statist, but fragmented, pension system persists. The corporate 
pension reform was deeply shaped by Taiwan’s SMEs-dominated capitalist structure, 
and the Labour Pension Act was introduced to address the failure of the old system, 
used for industrial upgrading in the 1980s. Constrained by the SMEs-dominated 
capitalist structure, employers saw it as a financial burden rather than a resource for 
resolution of economic coordination problems. Therefore, even though the DB plan is 
allowed, no one adopted it. Likewise, the state played a dominant role in corporate 
pension reform, with the statist pension system is further consolidating.  
Figure 8.2.3 shows that the fragmented pension system is maintained in Taiwan. 
Contributory pension schemes are institutionalised for each citizen as the first-tier 
pension, including the Labour Insurance, the National Pension Insurance, and public 
pension schemes for civil servants and military. The only exception is the ‘Old-age 
Farmers' Welfare Allowance’, a non-contributory pension scheme. The ‘Living 
Allowance for Mid or Low Income Elders’ is a social net, while the corporate pension 
in Taiwan is negligible. Those, such as the self-employed, peasants, or those covered 
by the National Pension Insurance, do not have second-tier pensions. Finally, third-
tier pensions in Taiwan are left totally to the market. In the first-tier, but also the 


































Figure 8.2.3 Pension Structure in Taiwan, 2012 
 
Conclusion 
In Taiwan, the statist pension system was developed alongside its dual business 
system, but reinforced the ethnic division between mainland Chinese, and indigenous 
Taiwanese. Initially, public pensions were introduced to consolidate the KMT’s 
political bases, mainly constituted by mainland Chinese, and to support the 
implementation of import-substitution industrialisation for sustenance of the war 
economic regime. In the 1960s, developmental strategy shifted, from import-
substitution industrialisation, to export-oriented industrialisation. This prompted the 
KMT government, in order to depress labour costs, to adopt a productivist-oriented 
attitude to SMEs workers, constituted by indigenous Taiwanese. Export-oriented 
SMEs relied on flexibility and low production costs as their comparative institutional 
advantage, and thus, SMEs workers were under-protected by the social insurance 
programmes. Political clientelism was adopted for domestic-oriented sectors, but 
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reinforced ethnic division, offering an opportunity for public pension reforms in the 
early democratic era. Taiwan’s SMEs-dominated capitalist structure depressed the 
demand of corporate pensions. Since shaped by it, employers did not see corporate 
pension as a resource in economic coordination, but as a financial burden. In the 
1980s, the state endeavoured to use corporate pensions to help establish long-term 
commitments between employers and employees, for industrial upgrading, but it 
failed. In the KMT’s authoritarian regime, there was little room for debating pension 
reforms, with labour and employers, particularly, decentralised by the SMEs-
dominated capitalist structure, and politically incorporated into the KMT’s ruling 
regime. The state-dominated developmental alliance dominated pension reforms, and 
the way it was designed to be inter-embedded with national capitalist structure.  
After the mid-1980s, the statist, but fragmented, pension system was 
consolidated by democratisation. Pension development in this period was strongly 
constrained by historical legacies and the SMEs-dominated capitalist structures. 
While ethnic division along the dual business system allowed political mobilisation 
for the DPP (through exploitation of the ethnic division through the old-age economic 
security issue), the SMEs-dominated capitalist structure limited the state’s capacity to 
adopt a universalistic national pension scheme, and developmentalism, especially, was 
still central to the state. Moreover, neither labour, nor employers, were powerful 
enough to influence pension development, even following democratisation. To begin 
with, labour and business power was decentralised due to the SMEs-dominated 
capitalist structure. Then, they were incorporated into state machinery, either by the 
authoritarian KMT government before the mid-1980s, or by the DPP democratic 
government from 2000-2008. So, even after democratisation, the state still dominated 






Chapter 9 – Conclusion 
This chapter will first compare the institutional complementarities between 
pension systems, and national capitalist structures to explain the variations in the 
public-private pension mixes. National capitalist structure shaped political actors’ 
social policy preferences and the composition of cross-class coalition, before 
determining the public-private pension mix. Then, five explanations, reviewed in 
chapter 2, will be critically and empirically re-examined. I will argue that the 
synthesis of the developmental state thesis, and the varieties of capitalism, is better 
than other perspectives in explaining the East Asian pension and social policy 
variations.  
 
9.1 Institutional Complementarities in East Asia 
Chapter 5 compared East Asian capitalisms, demonstrating that Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan have developed different national capitalist structures under the state’s 
coordination. In Japan, the keiretsu-dominated capitalist structure is characterised by 
the main bank financial system, and firm-specific labour market regime (firm-specific 
skill formation system and enterprise unionism). In Korea, the chaebol-dominated 
capitalist structure also developed a bank-based financial system, a company-based 
skill formation system, and enterprises unionism; Taiwan’s capitalist structure is 
dominated by SMEs, which tend to rely on informal financial support, prevailing with 
general skills and weak labour power. The diversity of national capitalist structures 
shaped political actors’ preferences over the pension system, affecting how they 
interacted and collaborated, in turn mediated how the pension system is inter-
embedded with the national capitalist structure.  
 
9.1.1 The Post-war Period: From 1945 to the mid-1980s 
In the post-war period, the variations in the public-private pension mix in East 
Asia were the result of their national capitalist structures (summarised in tables 9.1.1-
9.1.3). The Japanese pension system was rooted in the pre-war period, where the 
privatisation of public enterprises became the core of the pre-war Japanese economy, 
known as zaibatsu. In order to reduce high labour market mobility, caused by the 
Meiji government’s liberalisation policy, the state not only developed firm-specific 
skill formation, but introduced corporate pensions and other management practices 
(the permanent employment and the seniority-based system) for public workers in 
public enterprises. Public enterprises as the role model, and the privatisation of public 
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enterprises, helped diffuse the Japanese management practices to private firms. In the 
face of economic difficulty in the late 1920s, alongside the military mobilisation, 
these management practices were further consolidated. Further, the Employees’ 
Pension Insurance was launched during the war for capital mobilisation. These public 
and private pensions constituted the foundation of the post-war Japanese pension 
system, and with Korea and Taiwan colonised by Japan in the pre-war period, their 
pension systems were developed following the end of the Second World War, or, more 
specifically, the 1950s.  
 
1.  1945-1960: The Implementation of Import-substitution Industrialisation 
The variations in the public-private pension mix in East Asia were forged in 
tandem with the different national capitalist structures in this period. By controlling 
independent variables through the comparison between Korea and Taiwan (see section 
9.2.1 for more details), the variations in the public-private pension mix could be 
attributed to different national capitalist structures. Following the War (1945-1960), 
Taiwan and Korea adopted different paths to organise their national capitalist 
structures, in turn determining how pensions could be used to protect private workers, 
and to consolidate political legitimacy. Taiwan took over the public enterprises of the 
Japanese colonial government, whereas Korea privatised them. In Taiwan, the KMT 
was not only an authoritarian ruler, but also an employer, and the state was 
subordinated to the KMT. This structure led the KMT to prefer using the public 
pension (the Labour Insurance) to consolidate its political bases, and to 
simultaneously reduce financial burden through the state’s subsidies. The Korean 
government, however, encouraged chaebol employers, subordinated to the state, to 
offer corporate pensions for their workers, through the introduction of the Labour 
Standard Act. This was due to the state’s financial capacities being limited following 
the Korean War. Simply put, national capitalist structure and state-business relations 
determined what types of pension were chosen. In the period of import-substitution 
industrialisation, the coverage of the Labour Insurance in Taiwan was limited since it 
was predominantly provided for large enterprises. Likewise, due to its volunteerism, 
the coverage of corporate pensions in Korea was limited and while employers wanted 
to minimise labour costs, since they did not really require skilled workers in the initial 
stage of industrialisation. In this period, in Taiwan and Korea, the state held a 
dominant position in institutional coordination. In Taiwan, the KMT controlled state 
apparatuses and domestic-oriented public enterprises, dominating large private firms. 
The Korean government colluded with the chaebols to facilitate industrialisation, but 





Table 9.1.1 the Features of Institutional Complementarity between Pension and 
National Capitalist Structure during 1945-1960 






through the use of policy 














The conservative LDP 
regime based on 
collaboration between 




though chaebols were 
subordinated to the state 
The KMT’s Party-state-
dominated developmental 
alliance: business and 
labour were incorporated 






The state: to recover the 
function of the 
Employees’ Pension 
Insurance, and to 
introduce the National 
Pension Insurance. 
Employers: to restore 
management autonomy, 
and to reduce labour costs 
caused by corporate 
pensions 
Labour: to expand 
public, and corporate 
pensions  
The state: political 
legitimacy 




The KMT: public 
pensions to support its 
political legitimacy and 
war economic regime. 
Employers and labour 
were incorporated into 
the KMT’s ruling regime.  
Outcome  Public pensions were 
expanded and the 
National Pension 
Insurance was introduced; 
the development of the 
Retirement Allowance 
based on labour contracts 
Public pensions for 
public workers and the 
Introduction of the 
Retirement Allowance, 
but based on 
volunteerism 
Public pensions for public 
workers and the Labour 
Insurance for private 
workers; but private 
pension was very 
negligible  
Source: summarised by author depending on three case study chapters.  
 
In the face of post-war hyperinflation, in 1954 the Japanese state reformed the 
Employees’ Pension Insurance by increasing the benefit level. Then, the National 
Pension Insurance was introduced by the LDP government in 1959 to achieve the goal 
of ‘Pension for All’ due to party competition. To facilitate economic development, 
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these two public pension schemes were mobilised as industrial capital through the 
Fiscal and Investment Loan Programme. In this period, the Japanese government’s 
financial capacity was severely constrained by a deflationary fiscal policy that 
controlled inflation imposed by the Allied government. Thus, the mobilisation of 
public pension funds became a critical way of promoting economic development. 
Conversely, post-war corporate pensions were based on labour contracts, which 
labour tended to see it as a deferred wage; employers saw it as a strategy for restoring 
management authority, and establishing cooperative employment relations (through 
management practices such as permanent employment, a seniority-based system, and 
corporate pensions and welfare), the Japanese government being too weak to stabilise 
capitalist economy in the early post-war period. Since the 1950s, the increasing 
demand of heavy and chemical industries, caused by the Korean War, forced the 
Japanese government and its employers to consolidate these management practices. 
Further, employers asked for more tax exemptions for corporate pensions, to reduce 
labour costs and accumulate capital so wage increases in this period could be 
responded to. Thus, in this period, corporate pensions witnessed a significant increase. 
The state-keiretsu developmental alliance had been forged, effectively politically and 
economically incorporating core workers into this developmental alliance. This was 
achieved through firm-specific skills, and the management practices introduced to 
resolve economic coordination problems in firm-specific skill formation. Core 
workers became more growth-minded in order to secure their economic and job 
security.  
 
2.  1960-1970: Towards Export-oriented Industrialisation 
The end of American aids forced Korea and Taiwan to shift the developmental 
strategy from import-substitution industrialisation to labour-intensive export-oriented 
industrialisation. In Taiwan, export-oriented SMEs were promoted, becoming, 
through the state’s fiscal incentive schemes, the core of national capitalist structure. In 
Korea, the chaebols diversified to labour-intensive, exported-oriented sectors by 
exploiting the state’s financial assistance (this being policy loans). Korea’s 
‘discretionary control’ strategy promoted industrial growth and economic 
concentration. Thus, national capitalist structures in Korea and Taiwan were further 
diverged: chaebols versus SMEs, respectively. Moreover, in this period, 
developmentalism deeply affected social policy development. In order to facilitate the 
implementation of labour-intensive export-oriented industrialisation, the governments 
concentrated financial resources on productive social policies that created educated 
workers for light industries, and economic development, gaining political legitimacy 
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through continuing economic growth.  
In Taiwan, constrained by developmentalism and its SMEs capitalist structure, 
both the public pension and corporate pensions were restricted to minimise labour 
costs, in order to facilitate exports, rather than develop specific skills. In Korea, the 
state persistently encouraged corporate pensions to establish a company-based skill 
formation system to reduce financial burdens on the state. In the case of labour-
intensive export-oriented industrialisation, however, employers tended to exploit 
abundant cheap labour rather than specific skill workers. The growth of corporate 
pensions in Korea was, therefore, limited. In this period, the Taiwanese and Korea 
states dominated, with employers too weak to be institutional coordinators, and labour 
repressed by the authoritarian governments.  
Japan’s developmental strategy, meanwhile, shifted to capital-intensive, heavy 
and chemical industrialisation in the 1960s. During this period, the benefit level of 
public pensions was increased alongside rapid economic growth. The implementation 
of heavy and chemical industrialisation resulted in increased capital demand, and thus 
the state mobilised public pension funds to strategic industries for support of heavy 
and chemical industrialisation. Employers also asked for the introduction of two 
corporate pension schemes: the Tax-Qualified Pension Schemes, and the Employees’ 
Pension Funds- not only to reduce financial burdens, but also for capital mobilisation. 
Thanks to cross-shareholding, private pension funds managed by life insurance 
companies or trust banks could be mobilised as patient capital. It then helped the 
enhancement of long-term commitments in inter-firm relations and employment 
relations. It was encouraged and coordinated by the state, who, constrained by the 
conservative fiscal policy, wanted to use expansionary monetary policy to facilitate 
economic development. Thus, the state encouraged banks and financial institutions to 
provide capital for firms to support keiretsu’ continuous growth. In turn, this helped 
the state maintain and vie for political supports, and in the 1960s, these Japanese 
management practices were further consolidated. In short, in this period, the 












Table 9.1.2 the Features of Institutional Complementarity between Pension and 
National Capitalist Structure during 1960-1970 
  Japan  Korea  Taiwan 
Developmental 
strategy 
The capital- and skill-intensive 
export-oriented industrialisation 
and heavy and chemical 
industrialisation, basing on policy 




basing on policy loans 









The conservative LDP regime 
based on the collaboration 




alliance, but chaebols 
were subordinated to 









The state: needed more capital 
and to expand benefit level of 
public pensions 
Employers: asked for new type of 
corporate pension scheme for 
capital mobilisation and to sustain 
its firm-specific skills and to 
reduce the cost caused by public 
pensions and corporate pensions 
Labour: did not want a contract-
out corporate pension scheme and 
want to increase benefit level of 
public pension, but not consistent 
as core workers supported 
employers’ idea.  





Employers: to reduce 
labour cost 
Labour: repressed by 
the Park regime. 
The KMT: to 
reduce labour cost 





state regime.  
Outcome  The benefit level of public 
pension was improved;  
two corporate pension scheme – 
Tax-Qualified Pension Schemes 
and Employees’ Pension Funds 
were introduced. 
Public pension for 
private workers was 
lacking; corporate 
pensions grew, but 
very limited 
Public pensions did 
not change; but 
gradually expanded 
the coverage of the 
Labour Insurance 
to smaller firms 
Source: summarised by author depending on three case study chapters. 
 
3.  From 1970 to the mid-1980s: Towards Heavy and Chemical 
Industrialisation 
Since the late 1960s, Taiwan and Korea have gradually shifted to capital-
intensive heavy and chemical industrialisation in the face of newly emerging 
industrial countries in Southeast Asia and China. This transition did not change 
Taiwan’s SMEs-dominated capitalist structure, but consolidated Korea’s chaebol-
dominated capitalist structure, when the Park regime continued to use policy loans to 
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encourage chaebols to invest in heavy and chemical industries. Thus, there was little 
change in Taiwan’s pension system, but gradual expansion in the coverage of the 
Labour Insurance. Moreover, although the KMT government attempted to introduce 
DB corporate pensions to reduce labour market mobility, for industrial upgrading, the 
development of corporate pension was restricted by the institutional constraints of 
national capitalist structure. The institutional misfit between the corporate pension 
system and the national capitalist structure resulted in the 2004 corporate pension 
reform.  
In Korea, the transition to heavy and chemical industrialisation forced the Park 
regime to endeavour to introduce public pensions as a policy instrument of capital 
mobilisation. However, due to employers’ resistance following the first oil crisis, the 
implementation of the National Welfare Pension was postponed. The chaebols, as the 
rent-seeker, developed to become a symbiotic partner of the Park regime. It did this 
by exploiting the state’s financial assistance, but also the Park regime requiring these 
chaebols investment in strategic industries. The state-chaebol developmental alliance 
was, therefore, consolidated in this period. The postponement of the National Welfare 
Pension forced the Park regime to further encourage enterprise welfare and a 
company-based skill formation system. While the chaebols had to rely on the state’s 
financial assistance, employers’ social policy preferences were changed to favour 
corporate pension and welfare that facilitated the institutionalisation of the company-
based skill formation system and avoided skill poaching. Thus, corporate welfare and 
pensions, and the company-based skill formation system, were gradually developed, 
and enterprise unionism was further consolidated. Simultaneously, a dual labour 
market was gradually forged with chaebol workers highly unionised, and politically 
incorporated into the state-chaebol developmental alliance (when economic and job 
security were only secured in the case of continuing economic growth). This social 
cleavage, between chaebol workers and SMEs workers, deeply influenced labour 
market and pension reforms in the democratic era.  
In Japan, the keiretsu-centred capitalist structure was maintained in this period. 
The benefit levels of public pensions increased again, even given the first oil crisis, 
and corporate pensions grew significantly, and were further consolidated. However, 
since the late 1970s, the attempts of pension reform were launched to increase the 







Table 9.1.3 The Features of Institutional Complementarity between Pension and 
National Capitalist Structure during the period between 1970 and the mid-1980s 
  Japan   Korea   Taiwan 
Developmental 
strategy 




structure was maintained 
Capital, and skill-intensive 
export-oriented 
industrialisation and heavy 
and chemical 
industrialisation, based on 
policy loans to support 
chaebols 
Capital, and skill-intensive 
export-oriented 
industrialisation and heavy and 
chemical industrialisation, but 
still relied on fiscal incentive 
schemes to encourage exports. 
Cross-class 
coalition 
The conservative LDP 
regime, but was 











The state: to expand the 
benefit level of public 
pensions, but intended to 
increase retirement age  
Employers and labour: 
to resist the increase in 
the retirement age 
The state: needed capital 
for heavy and chemical 
industrialisation; and to 
encourage enterprise 
welfare; 
Employers: resisted the 
implementation of the 
National Welfare Pension; 
but began to use enterprise 
welfare for management 
practices 
Labour: repressed by the 
Park regime, but core 
workers were gradually 
incorporated into the state-
chaebol developmental 
alliance 
The state: wanted to keep 
labour costs as low as possible, 
to assist export-oriented SMEs 
and to compete in the world 
market 
Employers and labour were a 
part of the KMT’s party-state 
regime. 
Outcome  The benefit level of 
Public pensions was 
improved again; 
corporate pension did not 
change; and pension 
reform in increasing the 
retirement age was 
unsuccessful 
The National Welfare 
Pension as a policy 
instrument of capital 
mobilisation was 
postponed; corporate 
pensions were expanded. 
The coverage of the Labour 
Insurance was extended to 
small firms; the introduction of 
the Labour Standard Act to 
mandate employers to offer 
corporate pensions. 
Public-private 
pension mix  
A hybrid public-private 
pension system 
combining social 
insurance system and 
highly developed 
corporate pensions 
Public pensions for public 
workers; but corporate 
pensions for private 
workers. 
The statist pension system: 
public pensions dominated  




The variations in the public-private pension mix in East Asia was forged, and 
consolidated, in the post-war period. The institutional designs of the public-private 
pension mix were shaped by national capitalist structures, which shaped political 
actors’ social policy preferences, and how they interacted and collaborated. This in 
turn influenced the design of the public-private pension mix. In Taiwan, a statist 
pension system was forged: public pensions were dominant, while corporate pensions 
were negligible. In Korea, public pensions were mainly for public workers, while 
corporate pensions were developed for private workers. In Japan, however, public and 
corporate pensions were both highly developed to form a hybrid pension system.  
 
9.1.2 The New Era: From the mid-1980s until Now 
Since the mid-1980s, East Asia has undergone political and economic 
transformation. Under the pressure from the United States, East Asia was forced to 
launch a series of reforms for financial liberalisation, and the deregulation of labour 
market. Simultaneously, the authoritarian governments in Taiwan and Korea were 
challenged and forced to liberalise their political regimes. The Japanese LDP-
dominated regime, meanwhile, was challenged, with Japan’s electoral institution 
reformed in the 1990s. These transformations, mediated by the institutional legacies 
of national capitalist structures, led to different challenges, affecting political actors’ 
social policy preferences, and how they responded and coordinated pension systems 
and national capitalist structures. The result was that patterns of pension reforms are 
divergent in East Asia (table 9.1.4).   
In Taiwan, thanks to democratisation, the issue of pension reform arose. In order 
for political mobilisation, the DPP exploited the issue of the ethnic division, forged 
and consolidated by the KMT’s dual business structure and the pension system, in 
elections in the early 1990s. (Unlike Japan and Korea, the issue of non-regular 
workers never became a real issue in the pension reforms) Shaped by democratisation 
and the SMEs-dominated capitalist structure, however, Taiwan’s statist but 
fragmented pension system persisted. Party competition encouraged the KMT and 
DPP to introduce temporary allowance schemes to vie for political supports, which 
not only reinforced the fragmentation of the statist pension system, but also created 
new policy beneficiaries to defend their welfare, obstructing the introduction of a 
universalistic national pension insurance. Additionally, the SMEs-dominated 
capitalist structure also limited the possibilities of the introduction of a universalistic 
national pension system. Although different ideas were proposed, the fragmented 
National Pension Insurance was selected. This followed consideration of the 
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avoidance of additional labour costs on SMEs, and difficulties of integrating various 
existing social insurance programmes, these from when economic bureaucracies took 
charge of the institutional design of the National Pension Insurance in 1996. In 
pension reform discussions, employers relying on cheap labour, and high labour 
market flexibility as a comparative institutional advantage, wanted to avoid additional 
labour costs. Labour wanted a universalistic national pension scheme, and higher 
pension benefits. In fact, due to the SMEs-dominated capitalist structure and political 
incorporation by either the KMT or the DPP, even following democratisation, neither 
employers nor labour are influential. The state-dominated developmental alliance did 
not change, and was even challenged by political democratisation. Consequently, the 
fragmented National Pension Insurance was introduced in 2008, and the old-age 
benefit of the Labour Insurance was annuitised, significantly improving its benefit 
level. In short, public pensions were greatly expanded in Taiwan.  
By contrast, in the face of economic liberalisation and economic difficulties, the 
business conglomerate-dominated economies of Japan and Korea adopted a dualist 
strategy. To develop long-term commitments in inter-firm, and employment relations, 
they both relied on a bank-based financial system to shield them from the pressure of 
short-term profit seeking. Financial liberalisation, however, prompted both nations’ 
employers to respond to pressures from the shareholders, and to pursue short-term 
profits. Japan and Korea both consequently faced a dilemma: employers wanted to 
preserve firm-specific skilled workers, in order to sustain its comparative institutional 
advantage (based on a quality-based production strategy); at the same time, employers 
were urged to pursue short-term profits through expanding labour market flexibility, 
and reducing labour costs by replacing low-general skill workers with non-regular 
workers. Simultaneously, core workers with specific skills had strong incentives to 
defend job security in the face of economic difficulties, so consented to the 
deregulation of the labour market in exchange for their employment protection. Japan 
and Korea thus adopted a dualist strategy to externalise the cost of economic 
liberalisation to non-regular workers with low-general skills and SMEs, but to sustain 
a portion of firm-specific skilled workers. Public and corporate pension reforms were 
launched, alongside this dualist strategy. 
In Japan and Korea, large employers asked for the introduction of the basic 
pension to externalise the cost of labour market deregulation to the state. The increase 
in non-regular workers, by contrast, was not a serious issue in Taiwan (see appendix 
5). Further, they wanted to privatise the public pension to minimise pension costs. On 
the other hand, labour was divided by the business conglomerates-dominated 
capitalist structure. In Korea, since the 1980s, unionised chaebol workers were further 
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empowered to consolidate enterprise unionism, and welfare. Thanks to 
democratisation, chaebol workers showed concerns for job security, and maintaining 
of employment-related welfare. Less organised, non-regular workers, however, could 
not be mobilised, and had to rely on public welfare. Similarly, in Japan, labour was 
weak and its preferences inconsistent, although a peak-level labour organisation was 
established in the 1980s. The electrical, and automobile industrial unions, for example, 
agreed with the state and employers’ partial labour market deregulation in exchange 
for employment protection. However, they did not express clear preferences over the 
universalisation of public pensions that attempted to address the increase in non-
regular workers.   
Consequently, public pension systems in Japan and Korea underwent a dual 
transformation: the universalisation of the public pension system, and the reduction in 
benefit level. In Japan, a series of pension reforms was launched to address the 
financial challenges caused by population ageing and de-industrialisation since 1985 
by increasing the statutory retirement age and lowering benefit level. Conversely, it 
set out to universalise, through the interflow of public pension funds, the pension 
system. It did this by introducing the Basic Pension to financially support the National 
Pension Insurance, and to deal with the non-regularisation of the labour market. In 
Korea, democratisation resulted in the implementation of the National Pension 
Insurance in 1988, as promised by the Chun regime. Soon after, it experienced a dual 
transformation. Though the coverage was gradually extended, its benefit level was 
lowered from 70% to 40%. As with Japan, the deregulation of the labour market, 
caused by economic liberalisation, resulted in the increase of non-regular workers, 
their contribution capacity doubted. This eventually led the Korean government to 
introduce a nearly universalistic allowance scheme.  
Likewise, the patterns of corporate pension reforms in East Asia are divergent. In 
Taiwan, to reduce labour mobility, the Labour Standard Act was introduced in 1984 
under the consideration of industrial upgrading, by mandating employers to provide 
DB pensions to their employees, and the strict rule of entitlement. But Taiwan’s 
SMEs employers tend to rely on flexibility to compete in the world market, thus, are 
very sensitive to labour cost. This resulted in an institutional misfit between the 
corporate pension system, and the SMEs-dominated capitalist structure. Consequently, 
corporate pension was negligible in Taiwan. The Labour Pension Act was passed to 
address this institutional misfit, allowing employers to provide either DB or DC 
pensions to employees. So far, only the Individual Account has been adopted due to 
the SMEs-dominated capitalist structure. As with public pension reforms, the state 
(economic and labour bureaucracies) dominated corporate pension reform, and neither 
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employers nor labour were influential in Taiwan’s corporate pension reform. 
 
Table 9.1.4 the Features of Institutional Complementarity between Pension and 
National Capitalist Structure after the mid-1980s 





capitalist structure, but 
began to focus on short-
term profits 
The chaebol-dominated 
capitalist structure, but 








and the ‘lost decade' 
(1990s) 
Political democratisation 
and economic liberalisation; 







Ageing population; the 
non-regularisation of 
labour market 
Ageing population; the 
deregulation of labour 
market 
The inequality between 
indigenous Taiwanese 
and mainland Chinese 
and different 
employment status 
Public pension  The introduction of the 
Basic Pension; the 
increase in the retirement 
age; the benefit cut; more 
state’s subsidies for 
financing the Basic 
Pension 
The introduction of the 
National Pension Insurance 
in 1988 and the Basic Old-
age Pension in 2007. The 
benefit level of the National 
Pension Insurance was 
reduced to 40% however. 
The introduction of the 
National Pension 
Insurance and the 
annuitisation of benefit 





Economic difficulties and 
new international 
accounting system 
Financial crisis and new 
international accounting 
system 
The institutional misfit 
between corporate 




New corporate pension 
system was established to 
provide, generally, DB 
pensions to core workers; 
but DC pensions for non-
regular workers. The DB 
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but DC pensions for non-
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The transition from DB 
pension to DC pension 
Public-private 
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earning-related pensions, 
and well-developed 
corporate pension schemes 
The multi-pillarisation of 
pension system, combined 
with public basic, and 
earning-related pensions, 
and well-developed 
corporate pension schemes 
The statist pension 




Source: compiled by author. 
 
Japan and Korea reformed corporate pension systems in 2001 and 2005, 
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respectively. Employers wanted to modernise corporate pensions to cope with 
economic liberalisation along the dualist strategy: DC pensions are provided to non-
regular workers, while DB pensions are offered to sustain firm-specific, core workers. 
Generally, labour supported DB corporate pension schemes, but organised core 
workers in Japan and Korea tended to show, to maintain their privileged socio-
economic positions, more concerns over job security and employment-related welfare. 
Thus, they did not really resist the corporate pension reforms in Japan and Korea. The 
role of the state, in Korea and Japan, was more passive in responding to employers’ 
demands, and to economic liberalisation in corporate pension reforms, when 
compared with Taiwan. As a result, Japan and Korea’s new corporate pension system 
allows employers to provide either DB or DC pensions to their employees. Though 
the importance of DC pensions has been increased, DB pensions are still dominant in 
both countries. 
In short, the institutional designs of the public-private pension mix are divergent 
in East Asia. In Taiwan, the statist pension system persisted in the post-war period, 
while the corporate pension never became a critical source of retirement income. In 
Japan and Korea, the multi-pillar pension system is forged and consolidating, 
combined with a basic state pension, earnings-related public pensions, and well-
developed corporate pensions. This outcome can be attributed to their different 
national capitalist structures, and how political actors’ interacted and responded to 
new challenges in the new political-economic environment.  
The variations in public-private pension mixes in East Asia resulted in different 
pension policy outcomes (table 9.1.5). In Taiwan’s statist pension system, state 
mandatory pension schemes offer 73.2% of net the replacement rates for workers with 
average income. This is more than advanced European welfare states, and the OECD 
average; but compares with only 38.9% and 49.2% in Japan and Korea respectively. 
Japan is the lowest of the OECD countries, even than liberal welfare states; and Korea 
sits in the middle of the OECD countries, being higher than three liberal welfare states 
(the U.S., the U.K. and New Zealand), but lower than two other liberal welfare states 
(Canada and Australia) and the European conservative welfare states. It can be seen 
that Japan and Korea’s multi-pillar pension systems, compared to Taiwan, favour 
lower wage earners thanks to the universalistic state pensions. That is, average income 
earners in Japan and Korea have more reliance on corporate pensions to guarantee a 
decent living. Simply put, pension systems in East Asia are more divergent than the 





Table 9.1.5 Net Replacement Rates of Pension Benefits by Earning 
  Men  Women 
Individual Earning  
(% average) 
50  100  200  50  100  200 
East Asia/Pacific 
Hong-Kong  37.2  40.9  27.8  34.0  36.9  25.5 
Malaysia  35.9  35.9  35.9  31.5  31.5  31.5 
Singapore  16.3  16.6  10.9  14.6  14.8  9.7 
Taiwan  71.8  73.2  58.8  57.6  59.1  44.5 
OECD Asia-Pacific 
Australia   81.7  54.5  37.3  81.7  54.5  37.3 
Canada  87.7  56.6  30.2  87.7  56.5  30.2 
Japan  51.6  38.9  30.9  51.6  38.9  30.9 
Korea  71.4  49.2  31.6  71.4  49.2  31.6 
New Zealand  80.1  41.4  23.0  80.1  41.4  23.0 
United States  63.4  47.6  37.2  63.4  47.6  37.2 
Other OECD 
France   72.1  62.4  54.8  72.1  62.4  54.8 
Germany   59.1  61.3  44.9  59.1  61.3  44.9 
Italy  74.8  74.8  78.4  76.6  58.1  62.4 
United Kingdom  64.8  41.3  23.2  64.8  41.3  23.2 
OECD (30)  82.4  69.9  60.6  81.9  68.3  59.0 
Source: OECD (2009, p. 31). 
 
9.2 Theoretical Reflections and Contributions 
9.2.1 Theoretical Reflections 
The five explanations reviewed in chapter 2 are insufficient for explaining the 
variations in the public-private pension mix in East Asia. The logic of industrialism 
provides two problems in explaining the East Asian public-private pension mixes. 
First, it cannot explain why Korea and Taiwan adopted different pension systems for 
private workers. Second, it also cannot explain why the pension system did not 
expand in line with economic growth in Korea and Taiwan in the post-war period. 
However, Japan expanded public pensions from the 1950s, in the context of rapid 
economic growth. Through cross-national and cross-temporal studies, we can infer 
that social needs, caused by industrialisation, could not be mediated when democratic 
politics were absent. Overbye (1994) argues that democratisation acted as a catalyst to 
force politicians to respond to social needs, caused by industrialisation. A significant 
expansion in public pensions in Korea and Taiwan could, therefore, be observed 
following democratisation, since it forced politicians to respond to social needs.  
The democratisation thesis, indeed, can explain public pension expansions in 
East Asia. Korea and Taiwan, particularly, significantly expanded public pensions 
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following democratisation. Likewise, the introduction of the National Pension 
Insurance in Japan could also be partly attributed to democratic politics. It cannot 
explain, however, why three East Asian governments introduced pensions prior to 
democratisation, such as the Employees’ Pension Insurance during the war in Japan; 
corporate pensions in 1950s Korea; and the Labour Insurance in 1950s Taiwan. 
Further, it cannot illustrate why Korea and Taiwan adopted different pension schemes 
for private workers during the 1950s. The cross-national variations in the public-
private pension mixes in East Asia were forged before industrialisation, and 
democratisation. Nevertheless, democratisation furthered and consolidated their 
divergences. Democratisation and economic liberalisation prompted the East Asian 
governments to reform pension systems, but, constrained by the institutional legacies 
of national capitalist structures, they adopted different methods. Following 
democratisation, Taiwan’s statist pension system was consolidated by the 
implementation of new public pensions and increasing benefit levels. In Korea, 
corporate pensions were furthered, since organised chaebol workers could defend job 
security and corporate welfare in democratic politics. Public pensions were expanded 
to non-regular workers. Japan adopted the dualist strategy, after the 1990s. Dualism 
was gradually consolidated following the 1990s in Japan and Korea.  
The power resource theory cannot explain the public-private pension mixes in 
East Asia. First, labour power is unable to explain why Taiwan adopted a public 
pension for private workers, while Korea introduced corporate pensions for private 
employees in the 1950s. Indeed, some argue that the introduction of the Labour 
Insurance in Taiwan, and the Labour Standard Act in Korea, should be attributed to 
labour power, mentioned by Goodman & Peng (1996) and Yi (2007). This argument is 
problematic when comparing Taiwan and Korea. Generally, Korea’s labour is more 
militant than Taiwan, but has a lower union density (Y.-K. Lee, 2011). Taiwan’s 
labour, however, was organised under the control of the KMT government, thus not 
mobilised (see chapter 5). It would, therefore, be difficult to explain a country (Korea) 
with a more militant labour introduced corporate pension. In the post-war period, the 
Korean and Taiwanese governments, as authoritarian rulers, needed to address labour 
questions to maintain political legitimacy, to consolidate political bases (in turn 
creating a business-friendly environment that implements developmental strategies), 
while the way in which the states dealt with them very much depended on national 
capitalist structures. Second, the power resource could not explain why Taiwan 
institutionalised a statist pension system with a ‘highest net replacement rate’, despite 
labour power being weak at national and firm level; while Japan had the highest union 
density in 2010, but its net replacement rate is lowest in three East Asian welfare 
states. Third, the traditional power resource theory often ignores that labour are not a 
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homogenous group, but divided along industrial sectors and firm sizes. In Japan and 
Korea, due to their business conglomerates-dominated capitalist structure, it can be 
seen that labour is divided into core workers with firm-specific skills in large firms, 
and non-regular workers in SMEs. It is thus difficult to use labour power (such as 
union density) to explain East Asian public-private pension mixes. One point should 
be noticed, however, being that labour organisations in East Asian are divergent. 
Enterprises unionism, prevalent in Japan and Korea, could be a factor for explaining 
the development of corporate pensions, employers tending to establish cooperative 
industrial relations through generous corporate welfare. The causal mechanism, 
however, between enterprise unionism and corporate pensions is unclear. From the 
process-tracing studies of Japan and Korea, corporate pensions and enterprise 
unionism, were initially encouraged, and institutionalised, by the state’s intentions, 
rather than the mobilisation of labour.  
The rise of the varieties of capitalism school helps to focus on employers’ social 
policy preferences, such as Y. J. Choi (2008, 2009) and S.-Y. Lee (2011). This 
argument ignores that employers in East Asia were actually incapable of coordinating 
institutions in the post-war period, such as in Taiwan-employers were either too 
decentralised, or politically incorporated into the KMT’s ruling regime. In Japan and 
Korea, in the early stage of industrialisation, employers were not institutional 
coordinators, but acted as rent-seekers, exploiting the states’ financial assistance. 
However, through rent-seeking, large employers could be developed into a symbiotic 
partner of the state. Despite this, the state in Japan and Korea still played a significant 
role in recent pension reforms. 
The integrated political-economic explanation, synthesising the developmental 
state thesis and the varieties of capitalism, not only helps dissect similarities and 
variation in East Asian welfare states, but also demonstrates how the institutional 
complementarity between the pension system and the national capitalist structure is 
politically mediated. In the less developed countries, for example, in order to catch-up 
economically (often seen as one of the sources of political legitimacy), the states must 
be developmental to actively coordinate the national capitalist structure to enhance 
market efficiencies. How the state coordinates institutional coherence between social 
protection and capitalist production, however, depends on national capitalist structures. 
The Japanese and Korean states, for example, actively atomised labour by 
encouraging large employers to develop corporate welfare, and a firm-specific skill 
formation system. This made core workers more growth-minded in the post-war 
period, through expansionary monetary policy (i.e. policy loans) that ensured the 
continuous growth of business conglomerates. The KMT government in Taiwan 
196 
  
tended to adopt the strategy of political incorporation to manage labour relations, and 
to repress labour power, creating a SMEs-friendly business environment. Though by 
different means, the East Asian governments created a business-friendly environment 
to implement developmental strategies.  
Thus, we have to perceive that political actors’ social policy preferences, and 
how they interact and collaborate, are constrained, and shaped by national capitalist 
structures. In Japan and Korea, the state and employers saw corporate pensions as a 
resource for resolving economic coordination, and, constrained by the conservative 
fiscal policy, the state wanted public pension funds to be mobilised as industrial 
capital to support industrialisation. By contrast, Taiwan’s employers, wanting to 
minimise labour costs, saw pensions as a financial burden. Furthermore, thanks to 
Taiwan’s SMEs-dominated capitalist structure, the government tended to use fiscal 
incentives (such as tax exemption) to promote exports, rather than mobilise public 
pension funds.  
The national capitalist structure shapes how political actors interact and 
collaborate. In Taiwan, the KMT government dominated the institutional coordination, 
politically incorporating employers and labour into the KMT’s party-state ruling 
regime. This was partly because of the decentralised, SMEs-dominated capitalist 
structure. In Taiwan, therefore, the state dominated pension reforms, even following 
democratisation. In Japan and Korea, the state, in order to promote economic 
development and achieve full employment, collaborated with, and assisted, large 
business-conglomerates (keiretsu and chaebol, respectively). The state-business 
developmental alliances, including the state, large employers and core workers, are 
forged, while SMEs employers and non-regular workers, for example, are excluded.   
The difference in the national capitalist structures shaped political actors social 
policy preferences, and the nature of cross-class coalition, which led to different 
patterns of public-private pension mixes in East Asia. In Taiwan, the state, the 
conservative KMT government, or the progressive DPP government preferred a statist 
pension system under the SMEs-dominated capitalist structure. In Japan and Korea, 
however, the state-business developmental alliance developed a multi-pillar pension 
system. The state was happy to encourage employers to provide corporate pensions to 
their employees, corporate pensions then becoming a resource for employers in 
resolving economic coordination, but at the same time, large employers and core 
workers requested that the state launch universalistic pension schemes for the 
increasing, non-regular workers, to absorb the cost of economic liberalisation. 
Dualism is, therefore, gradually consolidating.  
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9.2.2 Theoretical Contributions and Limitations 
This study, comparatively and temporally, helps understand how different 
national capitalist structures structured different patterns of the public-private pension 
mixes in East Asia. Comparatively, this study systematically examined the diversity of 
East Asian capitalisms to explain the public-private pension mixes in Japan, Korea 
and Taiwan. Despite the varieties of capitalism perspective having been widely 
utilised to explain cross-national variations in European welfare states (Iversen & 
Stephens, 2008; Mares, 2003; Schröder, 2013; Swenson, 2002), in East Asian welfare 
state studies (apart from Choi (2008; 2009), S.-Y. Lee (2011), and C. U. Park (2007)) 
it is lacking. These East Asian studies did not systematically examine the diversity of 
East Asian capitalisms, however, theoretically assuming that national capitalist 
structures are functionally inter-embedded with welfare state regimes. More 
importantly, these studies bring employers back into analysis, but ignore the 
significance of the state in coordinating pension systems and capitalist structures. This 
study developed an integrated political-economic explanation to dissect the diversity 
of East Asian capitalisms, through comparative institutional analysis, and to illustrate 
how political actors’ pension preferences were shaped, through comparative historical 
analysis, by national capitalist structures. This can help us to understand how different 
patterns of public-private pension mixes are forged in East Asia.  
This study also compared the origins and development of the public-private 
pension mixes in three East Asian welfare states. In East Asia, comparative pension 
studies are still lacking in public pension systems, not to mention corporate pensions. 
The lack of a comparative analytical framework is probably responsible. This study 
not only systematically compared public pension systems in three East Asian welfare 
states, but also, particularly, the corporate pension systems, through the integrated 
political-economic explanation. A large number of East Asian welfare state studies 
point out that private welfare is the key to explaining the distinctiveness of the East 
Asian welfare state regime (i.e. Deyo, 1992; Pempel, 2002), however, East Asian 
corporate pensions are not systematically examined and compared. A comparison of 
public-private pension mixes in East Asia helps to systematically examine political 
actors’ social policy preferences. This is because, for example, Japan and Korea’s 
employers’ showed more interest in corporate pensions, but tended to resist public 
pensions due to them using corporate pensions as a policy tool of human resource 
managements. We can only draw a clearer picture of political actors’ social policy 
preferences through comparison of the public-private welfare mix. This lacking 
element may stop understanding of how the institutional complementarity between 




However, political actors’ social policy preferences are not fixed. Schmidt (2009, 
p. 520) points out that by underpinning on the rational choice theory, the varieties of 
capitalism school presupposes fixed preferences of political actors and stable 
institutions in that allow the logic of interaction among rational actors, within 
coordination games, to be mapped. In Korea, employers’ social policy preferences 
varied in tandem with the developmental strategies. In the early stage of 
industrialisation, although the chaebol-dominated capitalist structure had been forged, 
it did not directly lead employers to prefer the corporate pension and company-based 
skill formation system in the 1950s and 1960s. The developmental strategies of these 
decades did not rely on these employment practices, but abundant cheap and educated 
workers. It was changed in the 1970s and 1980s, when the Korean economy was 
shifted to focus on capital, and skill-intensive industries that prompted employers to 
change management practices, in order to further establish long-term commitments 
with employees. In Taiwan, employers’ social policy preferences have not changed 
since the 1960s, due to SMEs employers’ financial capacities being limited, forcing 
them to exploit flexibility as their comparative advantages (also see Yeh and Chen, 
2013). By temporally analysing the dynamic process of economic development in 
developing countries, we can go further than the traditional varieties of capitalism 
school, mainly focusing on advanced societies that illustrate how political actors’ 
social policy preferences are shaped by developmental strategies as well as national 
capitalist structures. 
The integrated political-economic explanation, however, has some limitations. In 
this study, firstly, the core theoretical assumption is that the state must act as the 
institutional coordinator to improve, or increase, market efficiencies, rather than to 
replace it. This assumption depends very much on the precondition that the state is 
rational, and that its capacity is strong enough to address economic coordination 
problems. In fact, in the case studies, state capacity varied, with the state not always 
being rational. In Japan, for example, the re-formation of the corporate pension 
system, and other management practices, following the war, was based on employers-
labour coordination, since the state was too weak to deal with labour questions. In 
Taiwan, in the 1980s, the state wanted to use DB corporate pensions to reduce labour 
market mobility, but SMEs employers could not, and did not, as a result want to 
launch corporate pensions for their employees. This institutional misfit resulted in the 
introduction of the Labour Pension Act in 2005. In other words, in the case of either 
the state is irrational, or state capacity is weak- we cannot understand how employers 
and labour could reach a consensus without the state’s intervention, particularly at 
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firm level.  
Another point to be understood is that the integrated political-economic 
explanation is very ‘East Asia-centred’, by the developmental state, and the varieties 
of capitalism, being synthesised– the result of the developmental state being 
originated from the experiences of the East Asian economic miracle. Its applicability 
to other countries, as such, will be questionable, since not all developing countries 
have strong states as evident in East Asia. 
 
9.3 Prospects for the Future: An East Asian Welfare Regime? 
Over the past two decades, the study of welfare regimes was significant in the 
comparative, East Asian welfare state studies. By explaining the cross-national 
variations in the public-private pension mix in East Asia, this study attempted to map 
various issues. For example, East Asia welfare states are insufficiently stable to be 
crystallised as ‘regime’. Taiwan introduced the National Pension Insurance in 2008, 
while Korea introduced the National Pension Insurance in 1988, and the Basic Old-
age Pension in 2007. These pension schemes are not mature due to relatively younger 
demographic structure. It demonstrates that the Taiwanese and Korean welfare states 
are in the process of regime crystallisation. I suggest, therefore, that more attention 
should be paid to the institutional dynamic and co-evolution of East Asian welfare 
states. 
In this study, also, the public-private pension mixes, and the institutional 
coherence between social policy and the national capitalist structure, are shown to be 
divergent in East Asia. These factors are critical criteria of welfare state regimes 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990), so, East Asian welfare regime should not be expected to 
exist just because of productivism (Holliday, 2000; Y. J. Lee & Ku, 2007). In fact, 
more and more studies have recently noticed that social policy arrangements (Choi, 
2013; Hudson & Hwang, 2013), labour market reforms (Song, 2012a; 2012b), labour 
politics (Y.-K. Lee, 2011; Yun, 2008), and the structure of income inequality (Chi & 
Kwon, 2012) are divergent in East Asia. These studies demonstrate that these East 
Asian welfare states cannot neatly fit into a ‘regime’. To see whether these differences 
can be explained or not, the integrated political economic explanation can be 
employed. If it cannot, ways for revision needs establishment. As such, to study these 
variations in East Asian welfare states should be the focus of such studies in the near 
future, since it may help to develop another theoretical vision, or system that differs to 







Appendix 1. Economic Indicators 






























Table a 1. 1 the share of economically active adults employed in agriculture sector, 
1900-2007 
  1900  1930  1950  1960  1970  1980  1990  2000  2007 


























Taiwana  --  --  --  --  --  19.50  12.85  7.79  5.28 
Hong-
Kong 




















































































Source: * Data retrieved from “LABORSTA Internet” (International Labour Organisation), various years. 
** The figures in () means unpaid family workers are also included. 
a Data retrieved from “National Statistic, R.O.C.” (http://www.stat.gov.tw);  
b 1971; c 1957; d 1991; e1907, date cited from Flora el al. (1987); f 1933, date cited from Flora el al. 
(1987);  g date cited from Flora el al. (1987); h 1961;  i date cited from Flora el al. (1987); j date 
cited from Flora el al. (1987); k 1901, date cited from Flora el al. (1987); l 1931, date cited from 












Figure a 1. 2 The percentage of the population ageing 65 and over (medium variant) 
Source: Council for Economic Planning and Development (http://www.cepd.gov.tw/); 










Appendix 2. Social Expenditure in Taiwan, Korea and Japan 
 
Figure a 2. 1 The Level of Social Expenditure on “Education” and “Social Security 
and Welfare” as Percentage of Total Government Expenditure in Taiwan 




Figure a 2. 2 The Level of Social Expenditure on “Education” and “Social Security 
and Welfare” as Percentage of Total Government Expenditure in Korea 





Figure a 2. 3 The Level of Social Expenditure on “Education” and “Social Security 
and Welfare” as Percentage of Total Government Expenditure in Japan 

























Appendix 3. The Coverage of Public Pensions in Taiwan, 
Korea and Japan 
 The calculation of the coverage of public pension schemes is very controversial, 
in particular, in the countries where adopted fragmented social insurance pension 
schemes for different status and occupations. In general, two different meanings of 
pension coverage could be identified. One is the number of insured, and the other is 
the number of beneficiaries. The later, in fact, could be advantageous in the 
comparison within the developed welfare states where pension systems have been 
mature. However, in East Asian welfare states, in particular, in Korea and Taiwan, it 
could be problematical. Since, the number of beneficiaries of immature public 
pension schemes could underestimate the real coverage of pension schemes. Hence, in 
order to estimate the coverage of public pension schemes more precisely, the number 
of insured is more suitable for estimating the coverage of social insurance in East Asia.  
The other issue is how to calculate the coverage of public pension schemes. The 
main controversy within it is the base of the pension coverage. In some case, the 
coverage of public pension schemes is calculated by the equation of the number of 
insured divided by economically active adults. However, it is problematical in some 
countries where adopted social insurance pension system. In general, the entitlement 
of social insurance pension schemes is based on the record of contribution, and it 
means that most of insured have to be included in the labour market. However, this 
link between labour market participation and entitlement tends to exclude those who 
are not included in the labour market or less-privileged such as self-employed. Hence, 
these welfare states have two avenues towards the goal of pension for all. One is to 
integrate the existing fragmented social insurance pension schemes along with 
occupations and status. And the other is to introduce another social insurance pension 
scheme for those who are excluded from labour market and have no will to participate 
or less-privileged workers. The later way was adopted in Japan and Taiwan. It means 
once we see economically active adults as the base of the coverage of public pension 
schemes, the coverage of public pension schemes would exceed 100%, since the 
numbers of insured of public pension schemes are far more than total working 
population. Here the coverage of public pension schemes is calculated by “the number 
of insured / total 15-64 population”. 
In Taiwan, we can see four public pension schemes are provided for employees 
(the Labour Insurance), civil servants, peasants (the Old-age Farmers' Welfare 
Allowance) and the rest (the National Pension Insurance). The Old-age Farmers' 
Welfare Allowance was introduced in 1995, is a non-contributory pension scheme 
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only provided for those who are insured of the Farmer Health Insurance. The National 
Pension Insurance was implemented in 2008. 
 
 
Figure a 3. 1 The coverage of public pension schemes in Taiwan from 1979 to present 
Source: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics; Council of Labour Affairs, various 
years 
 
In Korea, the National Pension Insurance was legislated in 1973, and but 
implemented in 1988. It is the only one public pension scheme for private workers. It 
is similar to Taiwan’s the Labour Insurance and Japan’s the Employees’ Pension 
Insurance. The public pension schemes for public and private teachers and state 
officials, in fact, had been introduced before the 1970s. However, the relevant data 
regarding the number of insured and the number of beneficiaries could not be 
acquired. Moreover, the Basic Old-Age Pension a non-contributory allowance scheme 





Figure a 3. 2 The coverage of public pension schemes in Korea from 1988 to 2008 
Source: Korean NPI Statistics Yearbook, various years; World Bank. 
 
In Japan, two main public pension schemes are the Employees’ Pension 
Insurance, and the National Pension Insurance, were introduced in 1942 and 1959 
respectively. The Employees’ Pension Insurance is provided for employees in private 
firms, that is “the Persons insured of class 2”; by contrast, the National Pension 
Insurance is provided for labour market excluded (the Persons insured of class 3, most 
of them are dependants), and less-privileged (the Persons insured of class 1, such as 
self-employed). “The Persons insured of class 2” also included employees in the 
public sector who are usually covered by the fragmented Mutual Pension Schemes. 






Figure a 3. 3 The coverage of public pension schemes in Japan from 1944 to 2007 












Appendix 4. The Degree of Democratisation in Japan, Korea 
and Taiwan 
The data regarding the degree of democratisation is collected from “Polity IV 
Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2010”. It offers the 
authority characteristics of states in the world system, including 164 countries. And 
within this dataset not only the degree of democratic or autocratic authority, but also 
other political indices, such as “State Fragility Index” are provided. The most 
important characteristic of this dataset is that it examines concomitant qualities of 
democratic and autocratic authority, rather than discreet and mutually exclusive forms 
of governance.  
 
 













Figure a 4. 2 Authority trend (the degree of democratisation) in Korea from 1945 to 
2010 
 
Table a 4. 1 South Korean Government Regimes 
Tentative democracy (the First and Second Republics, 1948-1960 and 1960-1961) 
Syngman Rhee, civilian, elected president, 1948-1960* 
Yun Po-sǒn, civilian, president within a parliamentary government, 1960-1962 
Hard authoritarianism (Military Government, 1961-1963) 
  Park Chung Hee, military, Chairman of the Supreme Council for National 
Reconstruction, by coup d’état, 1961-1963 
Soft authoritarianism (Third Republic, 1963-1972) 
Park Chung Hee, military, directly elected president, 1963-1972 
Hard authoritarianism (Fourth and Fifth Republics, 1972 -1981 and 1981-1987) 
  Park Chung Hee, military, indirectly elected president, 1972-1979 
  Ch’oe Kyu-hu, civilian, indirectly elected president, 1979-1980** 
  Chun Doo Hwan, military, coup d’état 1979, indirectly elected president, 1980-
1988 
Re-democratisation (Sixth Republic 1987-) 
  Roh Tae Woo, military, directly elected president, 1988-1993 
  Kim Young Sam, civilian, directly elected president, 1993-1998 
Democratic consolidation (Sixth Republic, cont.) 
  Kim Dae Jung, civilian, directly elected president, 1998-2003 
  Roe Moo Hyun, Civilian, directly elected president, 2003-2008 
  Lee Myung-bak civilian, directly elected president, 2008- 
* Syngman Rhee was elected president by the National Assembly in 1948, and by 
direct elections in 1952, 1956 and 1960. 
** Ch’oe Kyu-ha was a stop-gap president under the control of the military junta,  

























Appendix 5. Labour Market Indicators  
 
Table a 5. 1 the numbers of union members and union density in five countries 
Unit: thousands, ％  
年別 































1994  637  27.4  1659  13.5  233  16.4  12699  24.1  16748  15.5 
1995  598  25.4  1615  12.7  235  15.6  12614  23.8  16360  14.9 
1996  588  23.6  1599  12.3  255  17.1  12451  23.2  16269  14.5 
1997  589  23.0  1484  11.2  260  16.4  12285  22.6  16110  14.1 
1998  576  22.1  1401  11.5  273  16.9  12093  22.4  16211  13.9 
1999  614  22.5  1,481  12.6  290  15.3  11,825  22.2  16,477  13.9 
2000  589  20.9  1,526  12.0  314  15.0  11,539  21.5  16,258  13.5 
2001  584  20.9  1,568  12.0  338  16.5  11,212  20.7  16,275  13.5  
2002  562  20.3  1,606  11.6  390  18.1  10,801  20.2  16,145  13.3 
2003  559  19.5  1,550  11.0  417  19.5  10,531  19.6  15,776  12.9 
2004  595  19.6  1,536  10.6  444  20.1  10,309  19.2  15,472  12.5 
2005  619  19.7  1,506  10.3  450  19.4  10,138  18.7  15,685  12.5 
2006  580  18.1  1,559  10.3  463  18.6  10,041  18.2  15,359  12.0 
2007  573  17.4  1,688  10.8  495  18.1  10,080  18.1  15,670  12.1 
2008  523  15.8  1,666  10.5  517  17.5  10,065  18.1  16,098  12.4 
2009  518  15.4  1,640  10.1  526  17.6  10,078  18.5  15,327  12.3 
2010  521  14.6  …  …  …  …  10,054  18.5  14,715  11.9 
Source: http://www.cla.gov.tw/. (Taiwan －http://www.cla.gov.tw/; Japan －
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/list/13-22.html; the United States － 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.toc.htm; others －Japan’s “The Comparison of International 
Labour”) 
a.  Taiwan’s union density is calculated as the share of the numbers of industrial unions members in the 
















Table a 5.2 the Ratio of Non-regular Workers to Total Employees in East Asia (%) 






















2001  5.3  --  --  --  1.0  12.8  7.3  --  -- 
2002  5.5  --  --  17.7  1.1  13.5  7.6  --  -- 
2003  5.1  --  --  18.2  1.2  13.8  7.7  --  -- 
2004  4.1  --  --  18.1  1.4  13.9  8.4  0.2  25.7 
2005  3.3  --  --  18.2  1.7  14.0  9.0  0.3  27.4 
2006  2.1  1.7  --  18.0  1.9  14.0  8.8  0.3  25.4 
2007  2.3  --  3.0  18.9  2.1  13.9  8.9  0.3  24.7 
2008  2.6  --  3.3  19.6  2.2  13.6  9.3  0.3  23.7 
2009  3.2  1.4  2.7  20.3  1.8  13.7  9.9  0.4  26.1 
2010  3.2  1.5  2.5  20.2  1.5  13.8  10.7  0.4  23.0 
2011  3.1  1.4  2.5  20.6  1.5  13.7  13.5  --  23.8 






Appendix 6. Skill Profiles in East Asia 
First of all, “workers’ skills are difficult to measure because they are not directly 
observable” (Estévez-Abe et al., 2001, p. 169). Estévez-Abe et al. (2001) use a 
number of indirect indicators to measure skill profits, including (1) median length of 
tenure, (2) vocational training share, (3) vocational training system and (4) upper-
secondary/ university education. The combination of these measures helps to identify 
three types of skill profiles: firm-specific skills, industry-specific skills, and general 
skills. In table a 6.1, I replicate their approach to add Korea and Taiwan to show that 
Korea could be categorised into firm-specific skill formation system, and Taiwan’s 
skill profile should be grouped as general skills. Their approach offers a sophisticated 
way to measures skill profiles, but ignores the dynamic or change of skill profiles 
since the data they collected is based on 1995. Especially, in the post-industrial 
economy, the change in the national composition of human capital has become more 
significant.  
 
Table a 6. 1 Skill profiles in OECD and East Asian countries 
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a.  The median length of enterprises tenure in years, 1995 (Norwegian figure refers to 1991, 
Taiwanese figure refers to 1994) 
b.  The share of an age cohort in either secondary or post-secondary (ISCED5) vocational training. 
c.  The character of the vocational training system according to whether most of the training occurs 
at the company level (as in Japan), through a dual apprenticeship system (as in Germany), through 
vocational colleges (as in Sweden), or through some mixture of the latter two (as in the 
Netherlands). Where vocational training is weak, we have not distinguished between the type of 
system.  
d.  First entry is the percentage of 25-34-years-olds with an upper secondary education; the second 
entry is the percentage of 25-34-years-olds with a university degree (1996 figures). 
Source: adopted from Estévez-Abe et al. (2001, table 4.3) and my own revision 
 
Fleckenstein et al. (2011), therefore, develop another approach to analyse the 
change in the national composition of skill profiles. They use ISCO-88’s (the 
International Standard Classification of Occupations) occupational classifications to 
group nine occupational categories into three skill categories, including high-general, 
low-general and specific skills, regardless of whether the acquisition of skills occurred 
69 2010, source: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932664233.  
70 1994, source: http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/.  
71 2001, source: http://www.edu.tw/. The share of an age cohort in the secondary vocational schools.  
72 Source: http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/.  
73 1995, source: OECD (1998). OECD Economic Surveys: Korea. Paris: OECD. 
74 1994, source: Ashton et al. (1999, p. 70). 
75 2010, source: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932664176; http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932664233.  
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through formal or in-firm training schemes. Table a 6.2 summaries how they grouped 
different occupational categories into three different skills categories.  
Table a. 6.2 Skills Reclassification76 
Occupation  Skills category 
1.  Legislators, senior officials, and managers  High-general 
2.  Professionals  High-general 
3.  Technicians and associate professionals  High-general 
4.  Clerks  Low-general  
5.  Service workers and shop and market sales workers   Low-general 
7.  Craft and related workers   Specific 
8.  Plants and machine operators and assemblers  Specific 
9.  Elementary occupations  Low-general 
Source: Fleckenstein et al. (2011, p. 1628). 
This approach has two advantages. First, this approach is better in analysing the 
change of skill specificity in the era of post-industrialisation, by grouping into 
different occupational categories into high-general, low-general and specific skills. 
Second, it has potential to account for skill polarisation in post-industrial economies. 
Principally, this approach is developed to explain how social protection reforms came 
with the change of skill specificity in the post-industrial Britain and Germany.  
However, by analysing the change in the composition of occupational categories 
and grouping different occupational categories into three skill categories, this 
approach ignores that the types of skill formation regime and the developmental 
strategy (product market strategy). First, this approach simply groups some 
occupational categories into one particular skill category, but ignores what the types 
of skill formation regime. For example, in Japan, although high-general and low-
general skills have been increasing in the last two or three decades, its firm-specific 
skill formation regime did not significant change. Firms’ on-the-job and off-the-job 
training schemes are still prevailed. Taiwan, as an opposite example, although the 
proportion of specific skills were much higher than high- and low-general skills 
before the 1990s, the acquisition of skills occurred through formal education and 
training programmes. Moreover, export-oriented sectors were and are dominated by 
small and medium enterprises, and therefore, small employers did not have 
preferences in developing highly specific skills. Taking into the types of skill 
76 Due to their approach is develop to analyse the change in the proxies of skill specificity in the ‘post-
industrial societies’, the sixth occupational category- ‘skilled agricultural and fishery workers’, 
therefore, is excluded. 
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formation regime is necessary.  
Second, this approach ignores that skill specificity is complemented with 
national developmental strategy or product market strategy. For example, a nation’s 
developmental strategy or product market strategy is labour-intensive export-oriented 
industrialisation, like Korea and Taiwan in the 1960s, what employers emphasised is 
the minimisation of labour cost. Thus, we can witness that although the proportion of 
specific skills was high in Korea and Taiwan in the 1960s, employers’ preferences 
were to reduce labour cost as possible. Japan’s product market strategy is quality-
based, therefore, employers have preferences in developing firm-specific skills in 
order to increase their competiveness in the world market. Therefore, it would be 
difficult to measure skill level by disaggregating the composition of occupational 
categories.  
From table a 6.1 to table a 6.4, I adopt a similar approach to show the 
composition of occupational categories in Japan, Korea and Taiwan, but do not simply 
divide them into three skill categories. Since the International Labour Organisation 
does not include Taiwan, therefore, Taiwan’s data is collected from the Taiwanese 
official data. More detailed and better data about Japan’s composition of occupational 
categories could be collected from the Japanese government. Therefore, I do not use 
the International Labour Organisation’s data for Taiwan and Japan. But, principally, 
the definition of occupational categories in Japan and Taiwan is according to the 
International Labour Organisation. Therefore, they would be comparable.  
These figures draw a picture to show the change in the composition of 
occupational categories. But we should not easily conclude that Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan in the 1970s had same skill formation regime. In Taiwan, the SMEs-
dominated business structure restricted its capacity in developing either firm- or 
industry-specific skills, but had to rely one public education and training systems. 
Furthermore, Taiwan’s product market strategy was developed to exploit low labour 
cost rather than quality-based. Since the 1980s, the proportion of ‘Product machine 
operated and related workers’ which is considered as workers with specific skills had 
been declining. Simultaneously, occupational categories which are grouped into either 
high- or low-general skills increased significantly since the 1990s, especially, 
‘Technicians and associate professionals’ (high-general) and ‘Service workers and 
shop and market sales workers’ (low-general).  
In Korea, according to Fleckenstein et al.’s approach (2011), the proportion of 
specific skills increased by nearly 10%, because its developmental strategy was 
shifted to heavy and chemical industrialisation. Simultaneously, the ratio of 
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occupational categories with high- and low-general skills increased, especially, 
‘clericals and related workers’ and ‘sales workers’ (low-general skills). Since the 
1990s, the ratio of high-general skills occupations, such as ‘Professionals, ‘Legislators, 
senior officials, and managers’ and ‘Technicians and associate professionals’, has 
been increasing as well.  
In Japan, in the early 1950s, the ratio of agriculture related workers was high, but 
it declined soon since the late 1950s. The ratio of specific-skills occupations was 
increased to around 40% in the 1970s and high- and low-general skills occupations 
also increased significantly at the same period. But since the 1990s, the former has 







Figure a 6.1 Employment by Occupations in Japan 1953-2010 
Source : Japan Statistic Yearly Handbook, various years 
‘*’ indicates that Okinawa-ken is not included in the figures. 





Figure a 6.2 Employment by Occupations in Korea, 1970-1993 (ISCO 1968) 





Figure a 6.3 Employment by Occupations in Korea, 1993-2008 (ISCO 88) 
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